Problems of Communism

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

THE CHINESE MILITARY

Ellis Joffe
Angus M. Fraser

Czechoslovakia

Jan F. Triska

Book Reviews

Neil McInnes
Melvin Croan
Sidney I. Ploss
Louis A. Barth
Guy J. Pauker
Samuel L. Sharp

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Problems of Communism

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NOV-DEC 1975 VOL XXIV

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Cover: A People's Liberation Army honor guard lined up for the arrival of US President Gerald Ford in the People's Republic of China on December 1, 1975. Photo by Wide World.

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China's Military

EDITORS' NOTE—Early in its history, the Chinese Communist Party became concerned with developing a military arm as an instrument for carrying on its struggle for power. Out of this preoccupation grew the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, however, altered the contextual framework in which the PLA functioned and raised fresh questions with respect to it. For example, what was to be its role in the domestic political system, and how was it to be employed in the service of the new government's foreign policy? These issues have retained their significance throughout the period of Communist rule on the mainland of China. The following two articles explore them with an accent on the contemporary situation. Mr. Joffe looks at the history of PLA involvement in civil affairs in an effort to assess recent changes in the character of the PLA's internal political role. Mr. Fraser attempts to piece together the available evidence to arrive at some judgment about how the Chinese rulers conceive the purposes for which the PLA may be used in the international arena today.

The PLA in Internal Politics

By Ellis Joffe

In the past decade, but especially since the late 1960's, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has played a central if somewhat fluctuating role in the politics of the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1] Starting with a limited intrusion into the political process in the early 1960's, the army went through several phases of deepening political involvement which culminated in large-scale intervention and a takeover of civil functions by the military in the closing stages of the Cultural Revolution. The political rise of the army then triggered a reaction which led to a reversal of the trend toward military predominance and a gradual disengagement of the military from politics. The process of disengagement is still a long way from completion, however, and there is no telling how far it will go. Meanwhile, the army retains considerable political power.

In short, the political role of the Chinese army is currently in a state of flux and has not yet settled into a stable mold. An assessment of this role cannot, therefore, focus on a given point in time; instead, one has to look at the whole process of increasing military intervention in—and subsequent disengage-

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[1] In Chinese usage, it should be noted, the term "People's Liberation Army" encompasses air and naval forces as well as ground forces. Throughout the following discussion, the shorthand designation "army" will be used in this sense.

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ment from—China's political affairs. It is the purpose of the present article to provide a brief overview of this process.

The First Decade

For more than a decade after the establishment of the PRC, the army did not actively intervene in Chinese politics *per se*. This does not mean, of course, that the army's role was strictly confined to carrying out purely military functions. On the contrary, during this whole period but especially during the first few years of the new regime, the army was deeply involved in performing a wide range of nonmilitary tasks that had devolved upon it as a legacy from the pre-1949 revolutionary period as well as in response to current needs, and that added a unique political and social dimension to its conventional military role.[2] Despite this fact, however, the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) until the mid-1960's was qualitatively different from the role it came to play after that, and an appreciation of this difference is essential to an understanding of how the army's involvement in Chinese politics has changed over the years.

A group of PLA soldiers returning to their barracks near Nanning after participating in a road-building project, one of the various nonmilitary tasks performed by the army, especially in the early days of the Communist regime.

—Marc Riboud/Magnum.

To look more closely at the early period, when the Chinese Communist forces swept over the mainland in the final phases of the civil war, the political power of the new regime was initially established and consolidated in the conquered areas by the PLA units which had moved into those areas. During the regime's first few years, until party and government institutions were able to take over the tasks of administration throughout the country, local administration was carried out largely by the military authorities. For this purpose, the country was divided into six major regions, each controlled by a Military-Administrative Committee, with most of these committees headed by military men. At subregional levels, local administration was exercised through Military Control Committees, again set up and dominated by military personnel. Thus, until 1954, when the abolition of the Military-Administrative Committees completed the transfer of power to civilian institutions, local government was largely dominated by the military in most areas of China.[3]

The involvement of the military in political affairs in this early period, however, differed in several key respects from the military dominance that developed in the latter part of the 1960's. First, the military in the early period acted throughout the country as an arm of a unified leadership in Peking, whereas in the latter part of the 1960's the army entered the political arena as a participant in a power struggle that split the leadership. Second, the army in the initial years assumed political and administrative functions under the direction of the party because the party had not yet developed the necessary mechanisms for carrying out these functions, whereas the military in the later stages of the Cultural Revolution took over civil tasks because the dismantling of the party apparatus under the assaults of the Red Guards had created a vacuum. Third, in the early period there was little role differentiation between the top civilian and military leaders, whereas by the mid-1960's functional specialization and professionalism had developed to a point where

[2] See John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, esp. Chap. 9; and Ying-mao Kau, *The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation-Building*, White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973, esp. Chap. 3.

[3] Gittings, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-71.

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civilian and military leaders were members of distinct and frequently competing bureaucratic hierarchies. To sum up, in contrast to what happened in the latter 1960's, the party in the early 1950's delegated important functions to the army, but a united party leadership retained firm control over the military. And, for its part, the army aided the party but did not compete with it or pose a challenge to its position of primacy.

This early relationship between the party and army was strikingly evidenced by the smooth transfer of power from military to civilian organs. Although many observers predicted at the time that the military would not relinquish its grip on the regional levers of authority and that China would fall back into some form of warlordism, nothing of the sort occurred. Instead, once the civilian organs were ready to assume the tasks of administration, the military withdrew swiftly and quietly from civil political affairs.[4] To be sure, the PLA continued to perform a wide variety of nonmilitary tasks—from spearheading mass campaigns to helping the peasants at harvest time—but it did so under party direction and control.

The subordination of the army to the party does not mean, of course, that the military did not chafe under party direction or that the party-army relationship was free of stresses and strains. Quite the opposite was true. The modernization of the Chinese army, which was greatly accelerated by the Korean War, brought into being a professional officer corps, composed partly of young graduates of the newly-founded military academies and partly of veteran commanders who reoriented their thinking along more professional lines. This officer corps developed professional military perspectives on military strategy and organization that differed in several fundamental respects from the party leadership's politically-oriented approach to military matters, and in the policymaking councils the military tended more and more to act as a pressure group advocating its own views on subjects affecting the armed forces. Consequently, from about 1955 until the dismissal in 1959 of the then Minister of Defense, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, the party-army relationship was increasingly strained by controversy and conflict over a wide spectrum of military issues.[5]

These conflicts, however, did not extend to the basic issue of overall party control over the military, and they were played out within the implicitly accepted parameters of dissent and debate. When the party leadership turned down the demands of the military, the decisions were accepted by the army in disciplined fashion. In short, the military vigorously advocated their views, but the army did not move out of its barracks to force acceptance of those positions.

Thus, during the 1950's, the military participated in political and civil affairs on two levels: as a force assuring the execution of national policies in the localities and as an opinion group in decision-making forums. On both levels, however, military participation was characterized by the army's subordination to party control and by its noninterference in the resolution of political conflicts. Against this background, the gradually deepening involvement of the military in politics during the 1960's represented a clear break with the pattern of the preceding decade, and it is erroneous to view it as a linear development and merely an extension of the military's previous role.

The Genesis of Political Involvement

The transformation of the pattern of military participation began gradually and almost imperceptibly in the early 1960's in response to a changing political situation.[6] Dominating this situation was the incipient intraparty conflict over power and policy that was to explode with untrammeled fury several years later in the Cultural Revolution. Fueled by the failure of the Great Leap Forward and centering on the fundamental issue of China's developmental strategy, the conflict entered a critical phase after 1962 as those party leaders opposed to Mao's insistence upon steering China along a more revolutionary course sought to evade his directives by blocking them on the level of policy implementation. As the gap between declaratory policy and actual implementation widened, Mao and his supporters became increasingly disenchanted with the party bureaucracy and its top leaders. This disenchant-

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 271-79.

[5] On these developments, see the author's *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.

[6] On this period, see the author's *Between Two Plenums: China's Intraleadership Conflict, 1959-1962*, Michigan Papers In Chinese Studies, No. 22, 1975; and Stuart R. Schram, "The Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective," in Stuart R. Schram, Ed., *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 69-85.

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ment led Mao to the conclusion that it was necessary to shake up the party and to reinfuse it with revolutionary values in order to overcome its bureaucratic ossification.

To this end, Mao turned to the army. Under the leadership of Lin Piao, who had replaced P'eng Teh-Huai as Defense Minister in 1959, the problems caused by the growth of professionalism in the officer corps had been overcome, and the army's revolutionary qualities had been revived. While Lin's program within the army prudently maintained a balance between political and professional requirements, there is no doubt that the revolutionary vigor of the PLA in the early 1960's contrasted sharply with the increasing bureaucratism and unresponsiveness of the party apparatus. Consequently, Mao began to use the PLA in order to prod the party, with the result that the army was drawn into the political arena—not, as previously, to carry out the policies of a united leadership, but rather to support the Maoists against other groups in an increasingly divided leadership.[7]

The initial impetus for this new type of military involvement in politics thus came from outside the army rather than from within it. Although it is clear that the military leadership, or at least the dominant group within it, willingly responded to Mao's initiative, it seems equally clear that the military leaders could hardly have foreseen that this new involvement in politics would eventually lead to the army's elevation to the top of the power pyramid—a dramatic development that reached its culmination amidst the frenzy of the Cultural Revolution and could not have been predicted, or even desired, by most of the leaders, both political and military. There is therefore no basis for maintaining, as many analysts have, that the army's entry into politics in the early 1960's was the first step in a grand design conceived by the military under Lin Piao to capture political power in China. As far as can be determined, the political ascent of the army was neither planned nor predetermined, but was rather the product of unforeseen and, at least to some military leaders, unwelcome circumstances. The Chinese military, in short, did not grab political power; instead, political power gravitated to the military through a complex process extending over several years.

[7] See the author's "The Chinese Army Under Lin Piao: Prelude to Political Intervention," in John M. H. Lindbeck, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971, pp. 343-74.

This process began to unfold in 1963 with a series of countrywide campaigns highlighting the revolutionary qualities of the army and holding it up as a model for the nation to follow. The purpose of the campaigns was a limited one: to reinvigorate the party by infusing it with a revolutionary spirit and style of work, but not to replace it in its leading role by the army. Starting with drives publicizing individual army heroes and model units, the campaigns reached a high point in 1964 with a major national movement to "learn from the army." As part of this movement, a new apparatus modeled on the army's political branch and staffed by military officers was established in governmental and economic organs to ensure that the army's political techniques would be copied and carried out.[8] The party, however, stiffened its resistance and intensified its tactics of subtly sabotaging Maoist directives. As the contrast between the party and the army from the Maoist perspective sharpened, the stage was set for the epic struggle between the Maoists, supported by the military, and the party. This was the genesis of the Cultural Revolution.[9]

But while Mao, in unleashing the Cultural Revolution, relied on the army as his power base, the role of the military in the early phases of the upheaval continued to be limited. For the period until the end of 1966, a distinction must be drawn between the parts played by the military leadership itself and by the army as a nationwide organization. The central army command did, indeed, play a pivotal role from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution struggle, rendering crucial support to the Maoists, but the army as a whole remained for the time being on the sidelines, although it did provide logistical and (probably) organizational support to the Red Guards.[10]

Active Military Intervention

The character and extent of the army's involvement in the Cultural Revolution changed sharply after January 1967. In what was probably the single most important decision affecting the role of the military, the army was ordered to intervene in the

[8] *Ibid.* Also see Gittings, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-58.

[9] See the author's "The Chinese Army Under Lin Piao," *loc. cit.*, pp. 365-66, and A. Doak Barnett, *Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1974, pp. 76-79.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

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struggles that were then raging in many parts of China. This dramatic transformation of the army's hitherto limited role was plainly the product of fast-moving events rather than of Maoist or military planning. By the end of 1966, many Chinese cities were hovering on the edge of chaos as a consequence of the actions of the Red Guards in seeking to take over power from the local party, government, and other organizations. These actions had the effect of paralyzing the local administrative hierarchies and producing power vacuums, and the only national organization capable of taking effective charge of the situation was the army. However, owing to the temporary preponderance of the radical forces in the central party leadership, the army was directed to intervene not for the purpose of restoring order, but rather to aid the "revolutionary" forces in "seizing power." [11]

In the eyes of many in the professional officer corps, military intervention in an internal political conflict was not a welcome development. In fact, some of the senior army commanders vigorously opposed it, predicting (correctly, as it turned out) that the embroilment of the army in factional conflicts would subject it to dangerous strains and possible internal splits. Even though their opposition was overridden, they proceeded to exert every effort—while pledging verbal allegiance to Maoist slogans—to stem rather than to aid the revolutionary forces.[12] Their efforts, furthermore, were clearly coordinated with those of the moderate elements in the central leadership.

The upshot was that in most areas the army intervened in local conflicts not as an ally of the revolutionary radicals, but rather as a stabilizing and moderating force. Instead of helping the Red Guards to establish a new political order based on the "revolutionary masses," the army engineered a compromise arrangement to place authority in the hands of Revolutionary Committees based on a "triple alliance" of army representatives, veteran officials, and representatives of the Red Guards. In practice, local army commanders generally tended—partly in the interests of order and partly because of personal connections—to side with the veteran officials against the Red Guards in the strife that promptly developed over the distribution of power in the Revolutionary Committees. Owing to this protracted strife, the formation of the committees became a long and arduous process, and pending their establishment, the army set up Military Control Committees which assumed major political and civil functions in the localities, in effect replacing the party.[13]



PLA garrison troops in Tsinghai Province marching in a demonstration on the occasion of the formation of the Tsinghai Provincial Revolutionary Committee during the Cultural Revolution.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 11, 1967, p. 13.

The efforts of the army to curb the activities of the Red Guards, which split into a bewildering array of radical organizations, gave rise to constant conflict in many areas of China. Attacked by the radicals for damping down the fires of revolution, the army responded with differing degrees of toughness, de-

[11] For the text of the directive ordering the PLA to intervene, see *Current Background* (US Consulate General, Hong Kong), No. 852, pp. 49-50.

[12] See Stanley Karnow, *Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution*, New York, Macmillan, 1972, pp. 276-86.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 292, 297.

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pending to a large extent on the shifting balance of power between the radical and moderate groups in the central leadership. As the power pendulum in Peking swung in one direction or the other, the instructions issued to the army not only varied greatly over time but were often contradictory. Local army commanders, embroiled in incredibly complex factional struggles, frequently had to fend for themselves. Their actions differed from locality to locality, but by and large they tended to come down on the side of order, stability, and control and to display increasing forcefulness in cracking down on the radical Red Guard organizations and maneuvering to restrict the representation of such organizations in local Revolutionary Committees. By the time the curtain was rung down on the Cultural Revolution in April 1969, the Red Guard organizations had been largely broken up, and the power of the radical group in Peking had been considerably diminished. For the most part not of its own volition, the army emerged from the upheaval not only as the dominant political and administrative authority in the provinces but also—consequently—as a powerful force in the central policymaking councils.

The army's greatly increased political power was strikingly apparent in the composition of the most important organs of regional authority. Of the chairmen of the 29 province-level Revolutionary Committees, 21 were military men, while 235 of the 479 standing committee members, or almost 50 percent, came from the army.[14] Moreover, the army's share of representation increased shortly after the Cultural Revolution as regional leadership organs were reorganized. Local-level administrations were also dominated by the military.

The enhanced power position of the military at the provincial and local levels was reflected in the top-level national policymaking organs. Of the 170 full members of the Central Committee, about 45 percent were military men, while about half the members of the Politburo could be classed as having a primary identification with the military. The close connection between the growth of the military's regional power and its strengthened position at the national level was evidenced by the fact that about 65 percent of the military representatives in the Central Committee (about 28 percent of the total Committee membership) came from the provinces.[15]

These developments had far-reaching political

[14] On the army's representation among the standing members of provincial Revolutionary Committees, see Jürgen Domes, "Party Politics and the Cultural Revolution," in Frank N. Trager and William Henderson, Eds., *Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty Year Assessment*, New York, New York University Press, 1970, p. 90.

[15] The data cited in this paragraph are based on research done by Gerald Segal at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

A scene at an enlarged meeting of the standing committee of the Shansi Provincial Revolutionary Committee in 1967: in the foreground, Chang Jih-ching, political commissar of the Shansi Military Command and Vice-Chairman of the Committee; seated to his right, Liu Ke-ping, Committee Chairman.

—China Pictorial (Peking), No. 7, 1967, p. 27.

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Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, then Minister of Defense, pictured on the rostrum at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969. The Congress officially designated Lin as Mao's successor.

—Camera Press.

implications. The regional predominance of the military, with its strong reflection at the center, meant not only that regional interests would have increased weight in the formulation of national policy, but—more importantly—that the regional military commanders, holding the levers of political power in the provinces, would in effect be able to control how national policy would be carried out in their respective areas. In sum, if the army's intervention in the Cultural Revolution resulted in a pronounced shift of political power to the military, it was the regional commanders within the army who were the main beneficiaries of the shift.

The new situation raised critical questions with respect to the future role of the regional military in Chinese politics. As a consequence of the extraordinary conditions that had arisen in the course of the Cultural Revolution—*i.e.,* the weakness of the center, which was divided among conflicting viewpoints and consequently issued vague and sometimes contradictory directives; the entanglement of the military authorities on the spot in local factional conflicts which often forced them to make difficult political decisions on the basis of their own judgment; and the virtual elimination of the party apparatus as an effective mechanism for exercising control over the actions of army commanders in the localities—the regional military authorities came to enjoy a large degree of *de facto* autonomy vis-à-vis the center, and in many instances they used their autonomy to circumvent or reinterpret central directives that they perceived to run counter to local interests and needs.[16]

This tendency prompted some observers to evoke the specter of China's reversion to a system of military governerships akin to the "warlordism" of the early republican period. Such a view, however, overlooked the fact that the autonomist tendencies of the regional military authorities remained subject to important limitations. For one thing, the center, whatever its weaknesses caused by internal dissension, still remained the repository of national authority and as such commanded the basic allegiance of the military as a whole. For another, the regional army commanders themselves, because of their strong sense of professional discipline and their commitment to national unity, felt impelled to restrain themselves from taking any action, even if they had the opportunity to do so, that would endanger national unity or cast doubt on their loyalty to the center.[17]

At the same time, the army's injection into the political arena had important side-effects in another

[16] Karnow, *op. cit.*, Chap. 13.

[17] See Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-98, and Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power: The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), December 1972, pp. 1008-10.

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sensitive area—that of intramilitary politics. It is axiomatic that when an army enters politics, politics enter the army—and the PLA has been no exception. Although internal cleavages and conflicts had characterized the Chinese Communist military to some degree throughout its history, such divisions were revived and sharply intensified within the PLA in the heat of the Cultural Revolution struggle, and new ones crystallized. The post-Cultural Revolution cleavages ran along a variety of lines: center-regional, bureaucratic-*vs*.-field army, inter-service, and political-*vs*.-professional.[18] The most serious appeared to be the cleavage between the central military leadership and the regional army commanders.

What significance do such cleavages have in the context of the army's role in politics? For one thing, they indicate that it is somewhat misleading to speak of "the army" as a unitary actor, since different groups are likely to have competing interests and perspectives and to act accordingly. Such groups, moreover, are apt to form coalitions—sometimes tacit rather than explicit—with groups in the civilian hierarchies that have similar views and interests. One example may be found in the tacit cooperation that developed between regional army commanders and moderate elements in the Maoist leadership during the Cultural Revolution. A more recent example is the support which appears to have been given by some regional army commanders and professional military officers to the Mao-Chou group in its conflict with Defense Minister Lin Piao and the central military leadership in 1971[19]—about which more later. Given the veil of secrecy enveloping intra-army relations in China, a major problem that faces the analyst in this area is to identify factions within the military and to trace their activities. In any case, factionalism has to be taken into account in assessing the army's role in politics. Its impact should not be overrated, however, as internal army rivalries seem, generally speaking, to have been kept within bounds by recognition of a broader "military" interest as well as by the restraints of military discipline.

Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution

Although the army's involvement in politics was an outgrowth of the Cultural Revolution, the end of that upheaval did not lead immediately to a military withdrawal from the political arena. On the contrary, for some two years after the Cultural Revolution, the army consolidated its political position and strengthened its domination of the regional power structures. These processes took place primarily in the course of the reconstruction of the party organization, which began after the end of the turmoil.[20]

The reconstruction of the party was marked by constant conflict between regional army leaders and remnant radical elements over the allocation of power in the revamped party organs, especially in the Party Committees at the provincial level. Since the reconstituted Party Committees were supposed to have higher authority than the army-dominated Revolutionary Committees, the radicals viewed the rebuilding of the party as an opportunity to regain the power that had been wrested from them by the army. The army commanders, however, showed no disposition to accommodate the radicals. Although many of them had been reluctant to become involved in the political turmoil in the first place, they displayed an even greater reluctance to hand over power to the same radical elements with whom they had clashed violently and whose policies they opposed. In fact, given the bitterness and hostility that had developed between the radicals and most local army commanders, the latter had good reason to fear that a reascendance of the radicals would bring retaliation against the army—a prospect that they were naturally unwilling to help bring about. Whether or not they would, at this stage, have been more ready to step aside in favor of veteran, conservative party officials whose basic views on national policy they shared is not certain. What *is* certain is that they were not prepared to step aside as long as the danger of a radical comeback persisted.

Consequently, instead of giving up their political posts, the military commanders used these posts to ensure that the reconstruction of the party organs would not result in a reduction of their power. This they did primarily by supervising the process of reorganization, and the results were apparent in the composition of the reconstituted Party Committees, where the military was able to get its representatives appointed to positions paralleling those they had held in the Revolutionary Committees. Thus, 21 of the 29 first secretaries of the new Party Committees in the provinces were military officers

[18] For the most thorough exposition of Chinese military factionalism, see William W. Whitson and Huang Chen-hsia, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71*, New York, Praeger, 1973.

[19] See the author's "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention," *The China Quarterly* (London), July-September 1973, pp. 472-73.

[20] See *ibid.*, pp. 464-68; also, Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

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

PLA soldiers attending a mass criticism meeting during the campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius in early 1974. The meeting took place in front of the Hall of Profound Learning of the Confucian Temple in Chufu, Shantung Province.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 6, 1974, pp. 16-17.

(commanders or political commissars), while 62 percent of the members of provincial party secretariats also were from the military—representing a 12-percent increase over its share of such positions under the interim Revolutionary Committees.[21] It seems probable, in light of these results at the provincial level, that the military retained its dominant position in the lower-level party bodies and other reconstructed local organizations as well.

However, the struggles that accompanied the reconstruction of the party apparatus apparently fueled a new conflict that now began to build up at the level of the central leadership. Many aspects of this complex conflict still remain obscure, but it appears that Mao, alarmed at the reluctance of the top military leaders to relinquish the political preeminence that they had acquired at the expense of the party during and after the Cultural Revolution, now swung his weight behind a coalition of moderate and radical elements in the leadership—both of whom found the army's political ascendancy unpalatable—in a power struggle against Defense Minister Lin Piao and several top members of the army general staff. In this crucial confrontation, the Mao-Chou coalition succeeded in winning the support or acquiescence of those regional army commanders and professional officers who had been antagonized by Lin's excessive politicization of the army and by his alliance with the extreme radicals, especially Ch'en Po-ta, a veteran left-wing ideologue and driving force behind the Cultural Revolution, whom the military professionals had good reason to despise. The struggle reached its dénouement in September 1971 with the mysterious death of Lin Piao and several close military associates in a plane crash in Mongolia while they were allegedly attempting to flee to the Soviet Union.[22]

Military Disengagement from Politics

Although the "Lin Piao Affair" was a limited struggle at the center, its outcome marked an important turning point in the political role of the army and its relationship to the party. The elimination of Lin and his supporters removed a major obstacle to redressing the balance between the party and the army, and the central leadership proceeded—despite continued internal divisions on various issues—to mount a determined drive in that direction. As a result, the post-Lin Piao period has witnessed a gradual but marked disengagement of the army from the political arena and a reassertion of the party's political primacy. The disengagement process has had three main facets: first, a scaling down of the army's excessive involvement in civil affairs; second, a reaffirmation of professional military values within the army, at the expense of extreme politicization; and, third, a reduction of the army's position of strength in the national and regional organs of political power.

[21] Same source cited in footnote 14.

[22] For accounts and interpretations of the "Lin Piao Affair," see Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," *The China Quarterly*, July-September 1973, pp. 427-49; this author's "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution," *loc. cit.*, pp. 468-77; Joseph Lelyveld, "The Ghost of Lin Piao," *The New York Times Magazine*, (New York), Jan. 27, 1974; Ying-mao Kau and Pierre M. Perrolle, "The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Military Coup," *Asian Survey*, June 1974, pp. 558-77.

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Evidences of the first of these facets have been largely indirect and have taken various forms. One reflection was a renewal of exhortations and instructions to the military to subordinate themselves to the leadership of the party;[23] to display modesty and prudence in their relations with civilian cadres and the masses;[24] to observe military discipline and concentrate on army affairs.[25] Another was an increasing flow of publicity about the rebuilding of party organizations and their resumption of "normal" operations,[26] accompanied by the virtual disappearance of reports—which earlier had flooded the media—describing the involvement of military units in civil functions. Further reinforcing these developments was the gradual reappearance in public life of veteran party cadres who had dropped out of sight under radical assault during the Cultural Revolution.[27] To what extent these manifestations mirrored reality is difficult to judge, but—taken cumulatively—they definitely suggest a significant lowering of the army's profile on the political scene. This is not to say that the army ceased to play any role in civil affairs, but only to indicate that there was a gradual reversion to its former role—*i.e.*, noninterference in politics and the performance of limited nonmilitary tasks under the direction of the party rather than in competition with it. These tasks obviously include the maintenance of public order, as was demonstrated by the dispatch of troops to factories in Hangchow in July 1975 to restore production disrupted by factional strife.

The second facet of the disengagement process was the cultivation of a renewed emphasis on professionalism and military proficiency within the armed forces. In a concerted effort to redress the balance between politicization and professionalism in the military establishment, the central leadership subjected the policies of the late Lin Piao to severe attack on the ground that they had neglected the military functions of the army in favor of excessive politicization, and it called upon army leaders to concentrate their energies on raising professional military standards.[28] It also proceeded to effect the rehabilitation of a number of professional officers who had been purged in the Cultural Revolution, the most notable example being Lo Jui-ch'ing, who had been forced out as PLA Chief of Staff because of his emphasis on a highly professionalized defense establishment and the need to mend relations with the Soviet Union as a source of advanced military technology. This reordering of the army's priorities doubtless coincided with the views of a great many professional officers who had been unhappy about the army's entanglement in politics from the start. Its rationale in the context of the regime's perception of the army's proper role was quite clear: soldiers who concentrated on improving their specialized military skills would be less likely to wish to involve themselves in politics.

The third facet of the army's disengagement from politics—*i.e.*, the reduction of military political power as measured by the army's representation in national and regional ruling organs[29]—proceeded more slowly. This was especially true at the regional level, where the overwhelming majority of the top military leaders held on to their concurrent political and administrative positions of authority for more than two years after the fall of Lin Piao. In part, this probably was the price paid by the Mao-Chou coalition for the support of the regional commanders in the struggle against Lin and his supporters; in part, it may have derived from the desire of the leadership to avoid disruptions after the trauma of the Lin Affair; and, in part, it doubtless reflected the simple reality of the army's dominant power position in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

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[23] *E.g.*, Szechwan Provincial Radio (Chengtu), Dec. 26, 1971; Anhwei Provincial Radio (Hofei), Jan. 9, 1972; Heilungkiang Provincial Radio (Harbin), June 16, 1972; Hunan Provincial Radio (Hunan), Feb. 17, 1973; Kirin Provincial Radio (Changchun), Nov. 20, 1974; and Kiangsu Provincial Radio (Nanking), Jan. 22, 1975. All radio reports cited in this article may be found in English translation in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC).

[24] *E.g.*, collection of articles in *Union Research Service* (Hong Kong), Vol. 66, No. 5, Jan. 18, 1972; also, Szechwan Provincial Radio, April 27, 1972; Heilungkiang Provincial Radio, June 21, 1972; Hainan Island Radio (Haikow), Jan. 26, 1973; Anhwei Provincial Radio, Aug. 25, 1973.

[25] *E.g.*, Peking Radio, Domestic Service, Sept. 13, 1971; Heilungkiang Provincial Radio, Nov. 6, 1971. See also "Outline of Education on Situation for Companies," translated in *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), Vol. 10, No. 10, July 1974, p. 97.

[26] See Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-66.

[27] See Parris H. Chang, "Political Rehabilitation of Cadres in China: A Traveller's View," *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1973, pp. 331-40.

[28] *E.g.*, see the collection of articles in *Union Research Service*, Vol. 66, No. 3, Jan. 11, 1972; also, Fukien Provincial Radio (Foochow), April 12, 1972; Lhasa Radio, April 27, 1972; Shanghai Radio, July 26, 1972, and July 31, 1974; Peking Radio, Domestic Service, April 29, 1973; and Yunan Provincial Radio (Kunming), May 7, 1973. It should also be noted that the buildup of the urban militia in the post-Lin period may have been intended in part to relieve the army of many of its nonmilitary, civil duties (see Parris H. Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign: Its Meaning and Purposes," *Asian Survey*, October 1974, p. 883).

[29] Representation in ruling organs is, of course, only one component of "political power."

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Whatever the mix of reasons, it is clear that the central leadership moved with caution in its attempt to whittle down the political power of the military. This was most evident in the nature of the denunciations—esoteric at first and straightforward thereafter—leveled at Lin Piao and his comrades. While these denunciations (some of which were without doubt fabrications) were often severe and even vicious, they drew a clear line between Lin Piao and the army. On some points, most notably military resistance to party direction, the deviations attributed to Lin Piao had plainly been widespread throughout the army; nevertheless, the leadership took pains to distinguish Lin's behavior from that of the rest of the army and to blame him and his small coterie of associates for all the wrongdoings of the military establishment.[30]

But if the leadership treated the army gingerly, it was not prepared to tolerate the entrenchment of military leaders in key positions of power as a permanent feature of Chinese politics. From the viewpoint of the party leaders of all persuasions, this was an abnormal and ominous situation that violated the cherished principle that "the party commands the gun" and raised the danger of military dictatorship (a danger which the Russians gleefully claimed had already materialized in China). In short, it was a situation that *had* to be rectified.

Back Toward Party Primacy

In assessing the dimensions of this task and the regime's ability to accomplish it, certain considerations must be borne in mind. If one assumes, as many outside observers have, that the army's intervention in the Cultural Revolution was part of a military plan to capture political power, then one would have to conclude that the military leaders would strongly resist any attempt to dislodge them from the positions they had acquired. If, on the other hand, one believes, as the author has earlier argued, that the active involvement of the army in the political struggle of the Cultural Revolution was unforeseen, and that the army was ordered to intervene over the opposition of important elements in it, then it is conceivable that under certain conditions military commanders newly entrenched in political power would be less reluctant to relinquish their authority—this despite the attachment which they, like all powerholders, could be expected to have developed to their new positions regardless of their original intentions.

What, then, are these conditions? The behavior of military leaders during the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent period of party reconstruction points to at least one negative condition, namely, that military commanders were determined to resist any attempt to make them hand power back to party functionaries who were known to be radicals. If, however, this obstacle were removed, it can be assumed that other factors favoring a scaling down of the military's political power would cumulatively carry much greater weight. These factors include Mao's charismatic authority and political skill, the discipline of the military commanders and their commitment to the principle of party supremacy, and the presumed desire of professional officers to withdraw from the bruising arena of politics. Although there surely are tensions between veteran party cadres and military commanders, both presumably share a basic vision of the desired social order that enables them to cooperate effectively, as they have in the past. As experience has convincingly demonstrated, the same can hardly be said of the army officers and radical activists.[31]

These considerations clarify the close connection that exists between the rehabilitation of veteran, conservative party cadres hounded from office by the radicals during the Cultural Revolution and the disengagement of army officers from positions of political authority. The connection was amply underscored by the actions of the Tenth CCP Congress in August 1973, which formalized the rehabilitation of important party leaders[32] and at the same time reduced the representation of the military in the party's policymaking organs. The proportion of military figures among the full members of the newly-chosen Tenth Central Committee dropped by some 14 percent and stood at about 30 percent, and in the Politburo the proportion of army representatives declined from about one half to one third.[33] While the military still retained an important voice in these

[30] *E.g.*, Anhwei Provincial Radio, Dec. 12, 1971; Yunnan Provincial Radio, Dec. 13, 1971; Hainan Island Radio, Sept. 8, 1973; Shanghai Radio, July 31, 1974; Canton Radio, Sept. 8, 1974; also, "Outline of Education on Situation for Companies," *loc. cit.*, p. 97.

[31] See Roderick MacFarquhar, "China After the 10th Congress," *The World Today* (London), December 1973, pp. 520, 523.

[32] These rehabilitations inspired attacks by radical leaders, which became one of the major themes of the "anti-Lin Piao, anti-Confucius" campaign in 1974. See *ibid.*, pp. 522-23, and Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign . . .," *loc. cit.*, esp. pp. 878-80.

[33] Same source cited in footnote 15.

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bodies, the trend toward a reduction of their influence was apparent.

This trend was further reinforced by the shifts of regional army leaders announced by the regime in January 1974. After having left the powerful regional commanders, who concurrently held top provincial party and administrative posts, untouched for more than two years after the fall of Lin Piao, the central leadership carried out a sweeping reshuffle affecting seven of the existing commanders of the eleven military regions. Six exchanged places in straight swaps, while the seventh was transferred to the vacant post of commander of the Peking Military Region, with his former regional post being assigned to the head of the PLA's General Political Department.[34]

The reshuffle had several important implications. First, it meant a significant strengthening of the central leadership's control over the regional commanders. By removing them from their bases of power, in which some of them had been entrenched for many years and had doubtless built up networks of political and personal relationships, the center curbed their considerable local autonomy. Second, it meant that the leadership had dislodged some of the most powerful regional commanders from their top local political positions. All but one of the transferred commanders had held the post of provincial party first secretary or chairman of the provincial Revolutionary Committee, and they were not given corresponding positions at their new posts. Third, the fact that the transfers could be effected without trouble once again highlighted the professional military officers' high degree of discipline and the army's strong commitment to the center. In sum, even though, as of mid-1975, 13 of the 29 provincial party first secretaries and chairmen of Revolutionary Committees remained military men, the reshuffle constituted a major step toward stripping the regional military leaders of political power.

Still another step toward reasserting the party's political control over the army was the appointment in early 1975 of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a top party and government leader who had been denounced during the Cultural Revolution, as PLA Chief of Staff. Since Teng has no professional military background and is unlikely to devote much time to military affairs, his appointment was probably designed to place a leading party man acceptable to the army because of his conservative orientation in this sensitive post. The concurrent appointment of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, a party ideologue, as head of the army's General Political Department, a post previously held by a professional officer, likewise underlined the reassertion of party primacy over the military and was obviously intended to tighten the ideological orthodoxy of the armed forces. It probably reflected some sort of compromise, too, since Chang is identified with the radical wing of the leadership. Both appointments serve to point up the extreme complexity of Chinese military politics—a phenomenon already evidenced by the fact that the posts of army Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense had remained unfilled ever since the time of Lin Piao's fall.[35] (Several other top General Staff positions which had been occupied by officers who fell with Lin Piao also remained vacant for a long time, or still are.)

* * *

In sum, the precise political role of the army in the aftermath of its intervention in the Cultural Revolution and of the Lin Piao Affair still remains somewhat obscure and uncertain, and the same holds true of the party-army relationship in general and the state of intramilitary politics. Arching over the uncertainties, however, are two processes that can be discerned with a fair degree of certainty—*i.e.*, the gradual, step-by-step disengagement of the army from the political arena and the reassertion of party control over the military. Given the mysterious workings of Chinese politics, it would be hazardous to predict how far these trends will proceed. It would also be hazardous to speculate on what role the military is likely to play in the post-Mao succession process; however, in light of the developments of the past decade, it must be recognized that the precedent has been set for military intervention in a political struggle.

[34] For details of the reshuffle, see *Current Scene*, (Hong Kong), February 1974, pp. 19-24. The need to tighten control over regional military commanders was apparently another theme of the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign (see Merle Goldman, "China's Anti-Confucian Campaign, 1973-74," *The China Quarterly*, September 1975, p. 441).

[35] Another possible reason for the appointment of Teng as Chief of Staff may have been the inability of rival army factions to agree on a military man for this post. The appointment of Yeh Chien-ying, a 76-year-old army man, as Defense Minister was formalized at the National People's Congress session in January 1975.

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Use of the PLA in Foreign Affairs

By Angus M. Frazer

According to Article 15 of the present Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC), adopted January 17, 1975,

The task of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China is to safeguard the achievements of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the state, *and* to guard against subversion and aggression *by imperialism, social-imperialism, and their lackeys.*[1]

In attempting to develop an appreciation of the Chinese concept of the use of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in foreign affairs, of course, one cannot automatically accept this statement at face value, for ideology and internal social arrangements have an obvious, pervasive effect on Chinese perceptions of things. Thus, such Chinese (or, more properly, Communist) concepts as "just" and "unjust" wars pose difficulties because their definitions depend not on some disinterested authority but on the Chinese themselves.

Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests that Peking has over the years employed the PLA in foreign policy operations essentially in accordance with the constitutional principles just set forth and in a manner consistent with that in which other nations historically have employed their armed forces. Such a proposition is certainly supported by an assessment of past PRC military actions, or threats of action, in terms of certain broad categories of the classical uses of armed forces in the pursuit of foreign policy. It is further bolstered by analyses of the style and content of Chinese military assistance programs, of Chinese military doctrine, and of the force structure, improvement plans, and actual deployment of the PLA. This article will look in some detail at the evidence in each of these spheres. It will also attempt to gauge the prospects for Peking's continued adherence to its concept of the employment of the People's Liberation Army in foreign affairs.

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The PLA in Foreign Policy Execution

In the present context, two elements are of key importance in examining the PRC's past military actions and threatened actions: the motivations behind these actions and threatened actions, and the degree of correspondence between the general goals pursued and the purposes for which nations have historically employed armed forces in foreign policy undertakings. Apropos of the first consideration, it should be borne in mind that the PRC has a number of basic foreign policy objectives. Harold Hinton has conveniently summarized these as security, power, unification, and influence.[2] With respect to the sec-

[1] See *Peking Review,* Jan. 24, 1974, p. 15. Emphasis added. Article 10 of the old Constitution adopted in 1954 contained similar language. See Jan F. Triska, Ed., *Constitutions of the Communist Party States,* Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968, p. 92.

[2] *Communist China in World Politics,* Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966, Chap. 4.

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ond consideration, a list of traditional purposes for the employment of armed forces in the international arena would include:

(1) The physical defeat of an opponent. In this case, a nation's precise motivations may differ from instance to instance, and the participants in a given confrontation may have divergent views about what motivates that particular confrontation. But the goal is always a clear-cut military victory that would lead to a settlement of the conflict in favor of the victor. This purpose has been especially manifest in clashes over territory, whether crude seizures of land or recoveries of irredenta.

(2) The intimidation of another nation. The objective here is to persuade the target that the primary factor does indeed have the ability to punish and the will to use it. Situations which have caused nations to adopt such a course have often arisen from a desire to strengthen a politico-military bloc or a wish to develop insulation against a more powerful third country.

(3) Deterrence of an attack. In this case, the goal is to convince an opponent, by visible means, that an attack would not produce returns that would justify the damage he would incur in retaliation for the attack. Such a purpose has been apparent primarily in contexts involving the preservation of national security.

(4) The control or protection of another nation. The reasons why such control or protection is deemed desirable may vary greatly from situation to situation, but the underlying purpose remains the same. The existence of such an end has been most apparent in situations in which troops have actually been stationed in the "protected" territory.

(5) The training and equipping of a friend or ally. In this case, a hope to gain influence in the recipient country may prompt a state to take action. The establishment of formal military assistance programs, which have often gone hand in hand with mutual security arrangements, has provided the best evidence of such a purpose.

(6) The assertion of status. In the international realm, it is generally believed that a nation should have military forces commensurate with its economic and political position in the world; conversely, the possession of "forces in being" confers a kind of status that should, by international consensus, admit the power having them to the councils and deliberations of other powers of the same rank. This objective has been particularly manifest in relation to discussions of arm control and disarmament, where actual forces have constituted the bargaining counters of negotiation.

Let us, then, look briefly at the armed actions of the PRC in terms of the two considerations already mentioned. The PLA operations in Tibet, Hainan, and Quemoy in 1949 and the aborted plan for an assault on Taiwan proper in 1950 must be classified as "mopping-up" actions in an ongoing civil war rather than expressions of purely foreign policy attitudes and goals; nonetheless, the Peking leadership has engaged in a significant number of armed actions relevant to our discussion since assuming *de facto* control of mainland China in 1949.[3]

Korea. The Korean war has been by far the PRC's largest combat involvement since the closing period of the Chinese civil war. That the war broke out so soon after the protracted Chinese civil war raises serious questions about whether Chinese foreign policy goals were a factor in its initiation, but there is no doubt that the Chinese decision to intervene reflected fundamentally Chinese calculations. What these were remains a matter of some debate. In a thorough and interesting treatment of the subject,[4] Allen S. Whiting quotes an account by the Indian ambassador to Peking of a meeting with Nieh Jung-chen, Acting Chief of Staff of the PLA, in September 1950 in which Nieh indicated that "China would not sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the Sino-Korean border." Elaborating on this statement, Nieh acknowledged the danger of entering into a conflict with the US but insisted that the latter could not defeat China. Elsewhere in his book, Whiting goes on to say regarding Chinese motivations:

. . . we have stressed the political importance of intervention in relation to its expected effect on US-Japanese relations, China's role in Asia, and the security of the regime against subversion or attack

[3] There is a massive body of material that touches in one way or another on the PRC's military experiences. In the ensuing analysis, the author has drawn not only on the sources specifically cited but also on Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967; Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1970; Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1967; and a host of journal and magazine articles. The treatments of the several engagements, however, are entirely the author's and are designed to cover those issues directly relevant to the subject of this article, not to be exhaustive discussions of the events dealt with.

[4] *China Crosses the Yalu*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1960.

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Chinese troops crossing the Yalu River on October 25, 1950, marking the entry of the PRC into the Korean War.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 12, 1970, Special Supplement, p. 7.

from domestic anti-Communist groups assisted by American or Nationalist forces, or both. . . .

While Whiting discounts the element of concern that the Chinese may have felt over Manchuria, others have emphasized Peking's perceived need to guard Manchuria against invasion, reinforced by the need to rescue North Korea and to forestall Soviet action that might be harmful, as the prime factor in the Chinese decision.[5]

In the absence of any declaration from Peking, one cannot make a firm judgment on the relative merits of these interpretations of the political perceptions and goals that lay behind Chinese entry into the war. Nonetheless, it seems safe to say that the PRC intervened well beyond China's borders (albeit over a continuous and secure line of communications) and accepted serious risks and high costs in the process for a range of reasons which included at least some, if not all, of those noted above. Moreover, none fell outside the bounds of purposes for which nations have traditionally resorted to the use of armed forces.

The Taiwan Strait. Since 1949, the Taiwan Strait has constituted a restless divider between the PRC and the Republic of China in a still unresolved civil war. The discrete acts and random encounters that have occurred over the years there may all be viewed as incidents in that civil war, but exterior powers also played important roles in the major events of 1954, 1958, and 1962.

In early September 1954, the Chinese Communists began heavy artillery shelling of some of the Nationalist-held islands between the China mainland and Taiwan—especially Quemoy, the largest of the islands and not yet the military fortress that it was later to become. Taipei undertook air action in reply. This move inevitably drew the United States into the situation, for by this time the United States had become heavily reinvolved in Chinese affairs after a brief period of disengagement in the late 1940's. In January 1950, President Harry S. Truman had disavowed any US interest in bases on Taiwan and had declared that Washington would not provide military assistance or advice to the Nationalist government, but in June of the same year, two days after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, he had interposed the Seventh Fleet in the Strait to contain Communist forces and had urged Taipei to stop offensive actions against the mainland. In early 1951, military assistance had been put on a formal basis, and by 1954, the US was fully engaged in the organization and equipping of Nationalist armed forces.

The reasons for the PRC's actions in 1954 remain somewhat obscure, although the heavy military pressure that it applied carried with it the threat of an

[5] See, for example, Hinton, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

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invasion of Taiwan. Quite probably, a number of motivations prompted the Chinese to launch their bombardment, but in regard to specifically foreign policy objectives, it seems likely that the PRC was testing the depth of the American commitment to Taiwan. Certainly, the subsequent course of events points in this direction. In response to the implied challenge, Washington concluded a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China along the lines of those that the US had signed with other non-Communist Asian countries; furthermore, the American President obtained authority, through a separate Senate resolution, to engage in the defense of other locations if attacks on them were part of a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan.[6] Even though the first Nationalist act after the signing of the treaty was to evacuate the exposed Tachen Islands just off the mainland coast, Peking did not launch an effort to invade Taiwan but instead reduced the military pressure on Nationalist positions in the Strait.

Peking's action in the subsequent 1958 crisis was clearly designed to test the full extent of the American commitment to the Republic of China. The crisis arose in a rather complicated context.[7] By 1958, Taipei had heavily fortified the offshore islands and had manned them with a substantial portion of its first-line ground troops. Peking may have viewed such efforts as preparations for a Nationalist invasion of the mainland, with US backing, and felt a need to preempt it. Indeed, there is little question that the Nationalists were at that point looking for a fight with the PRC. At the same time, the PRC, for its part, also seemed eager for a confrontation. In a state of euphoria over the USSR's testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile and orbiting of an earth satellite in late 1957 ahead of the United States, the Chinese Communists apparently calculated that a more militant international posture was not only possible but desirable.

In the end, of course, the crisis produced results far different from those that Peking probably expected. The US demonstrated that it would risk the commitment of sea and air forces to prevent the PRC from taking over the offshore islands and would, in the process, increase the modern armament of the Nationalist forces. (By the end of fiscal 1968 Washington had extended $2.5 billion in military grant aid to the Republic of China.[8]) Mao also learned that the Soviet Union was a reluctant ally, unwilling to confront the US militarily or to orchestrate effective political action against it.

Chinese frontier guards withdrawing from Tawang, a town in a disputed border area between Chinese-ruled Tibet and India's Northeast Frontier Agency, on January 14, 1963. The withdrawal took place in the wake of the Sino-Indian border conflict of late 1962.

—Kung Fan-ken for China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

The 1962 situation was of a substantially different order than the 1954 and 1958 crises. About midyear, US military authorities became concerned over a sizable PLA troop movement into the coastal areas of Fukien Province, fearing that this might presage an attempt to invade Taiwan. But as things developed, it appeared that Peking was responding to events in the Taiwan Strait that could reasonably be assessed as preparation for a major amphibious assault on the mainland from Taiwan. The Chinese Communists seemed primarily to be deploying rein-

[6] Public Law 4, 84th Cong., 1st Session, text in Paul E. Zinner, Ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955*, New York, Harper, 1956.

[7] For an interesting and well-documented account of this period, see Hinton, *op. cit.*, pp. 265–70.

[8] See the testimony of Walter P. McConaughy in *US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearings before the Subcommittee on US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress, Part 4: Republic of China, Nov. 24–26, 1969, and May 8, 1970*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1970. Since 1970, grant military aid has steadily decreased and now amounts to less than $1 million a year.

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forcements to bolster the defense of an area that they saw as a target for invasion by the government of the Republic of China. However, they evidently achieved a foreign policy objective above and beyond deterring an attack in this specific instance, for President John F. Kennedy gave the PRC a flat assurance that the US would not support offensive actions against the mainland.[9]

The Sino-Indian Border. Sino-Indian differences over a number of border problems progressed from extended diplomatic correspondence in the mid-1950's, through skirmishes and patrol encounters in the late 1950's and early 1960's, to full-scale fighting involving several divisions on both sides in September and October 1962. After registering substantial successes in defeating and throwing back major Indian formations, the Chinese halted their drive into Indian territory and declared a unilateral cease-fire.

Some outside observers have seen this move as merely a recognition of the massive logistics problem that would have accompanied any effort to advance farther as winter closed the mountain passes through which the PLA's line of communication ran; others have suggested that Peking never contemplated more than a limited advance to give substance to the PRC proposal to negotiate the whole range of border problems.[10] The latter interpretation is the more compelling, for such an objective was consistent with Peking's priorities. To the Chinese, the importance of the disputed areas of the North East Frontier Agency derived from considerations of prestige and China's direct political relations with India. The territory in contention in the west, on the other hand, included the Chinese road connecting Sinkiang and western Tibet—a vital geographical feature in terms of the dispute between the PRC and the USSR then coming to a head. In short, the PLA's entry into India was undertaken primarily for the classical military purpose of preserving a strategic asset—the Aksai Chin road—and the Chinese regarded any other favorable results that it might produce as a bonus.

Vietnam. Chinese military activities related to the war in Vietnam during the 1960's and early 1970's were consistent with the principle of self-reliance urged on revolutionaries by Lin Piao.[11] They were carefully measured to provide effective and visible support to Communist North Vietnam—while permitting minimal accommodation of similar Soviet activities—without unnecessarily provoking the US. Chinese assistance took two primary forms: military assistance (which will be discussed later in another context) and the furnishing of support-type troops. Estimates of the total number of Chinese troops in North Vietnam at any one time have been in the 40,000-50,000 range. (Peking, of course, also stationed sizable numbers of troops in forward positions on Chinese territory, but such deployments would have been prudent in any case.) The railway engineer units that the PLA provided, which sometimes received close antiaircraft protection from other PLA units, were particularly helpful in repairing bomb damage. On several occasions, there were reports of PLA aircraft over North Vietnam, but periodic monitoring of air-control traffic suggested that these flights were low-key ventures, with the pilots instructed to avoid major contact or combat. In sum, the totality of PRC actions on behalf of Hanoi falls under the heading of the use of armed forces to protect or support another country.

The Sino-Soviet Border. Since the outbreak of open and serious hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 (after many smaller incidents earlier), the PRC has plainly geared its military activities toward the USSR so as to deter Moscow from launching an attack on it. It has carefully orchestrated and controlled instances of actual fighting so as not to allow them to escalate to a more violent level. It has deployed about one-third of the PLA's regular ground forces to counter a possible invasion from the Soviet Union.[12] It has developed and deployed nuclear weapons with the Soviet threat principally in mind.[13] At times, Moscow probably has felt a great temptation to "get it over with," but the prospects of coping with "people's war" in China and Peking's measures to raise the threshold of counteraction in the event of an attack have thus far served to deter Moscow from behaving precipitately.

[9] See Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1968, pp. 250–51.

[10] *Cf.,* on the one hand, Sudhakar Bhat, *India and China,* New Delhi, Popular Book Services, 1967, pp. 158–59, and, on the other hand, N.J. Nanpori, *The Sino-Indian Dispute,* Bombay, Times of India, 1963; Klaus H. Pringsheim, "China, India, and Their Himalayan Border (1961–1963), *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), October 1963, pp. 474–95.

[11] "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!," released by New China News Agency, Sept. 2, 1965.

[12] See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1974–75,* London, 1974.

[13] *Ibid.*

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A Chinese frontier patrol reconnoitering along the border between Chinese Sinkiang and Soviet Central Asia during a period of border friction in March 1974.

—Hsinhua via UPI.

However fragile this deterrence may be at the moment, Peking has not felt compelled to invest vast new sums of money in military equipment. According to US intelligence estimates, for example, China's military procurement funding has dropped substantially since 1971. During 1972-74, it was about 25 percent lower than it was in 1970-71, and that trend seemed to be continuing into 1975.[14] Whatever the reasons for this phenomenon, it suggests that the Chinese are not panicked and that they have no thought of trying to mount a preemptive attack against the USSR.

The Paracel Islands. In January 1974, the PRC moved to establish its authority in the Hsisha, or Paracel, Islands in the South China Sea, which South Vietnam also claimed. There was some actual fighting between the two parties on January 19 and 20, with the Chinese forces ultimately prevailing over the South Vietnamese forces and taking 48 prisoners (including one American). The Chinese line was that these small islands were—and historically had been —Chinese territory,[15] but it is not certain whether the Chinese motivations were simply the recovery of irredenta. The possibility that oil exists in the area and a desire to acquire a point from which to monitor Soviet naval movements may also have figured in Chinese calculations. In any case, what is of special interest is Peking's willingness to engage in armed action well outside China's mainland borders to further national ends when big-power interference seemed unlikely.

To sum up, then, if one pierces the overlay of revolutionary rhetoric and looks at the PRC's actual use of its military assets in foreign affairs, one finds that the security of the realm has had essential priority. In several instances, to be sure, operations have been directed at the recovery of irredenta, but from the Chinese perspective these have constituted efforts to expel usurpers from Chinese territory. Under all circumstances, moreover, risk-taking, while sometimes deemed necessary, has been carefully controlled.

Clearly, the Peking leadership has understood the constraints imposed by China's relative *lack* of military power as compared with the two superpowers and has behaved accordingly. At the Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1973, Chou En-lai underscored this by citing Lenin's acceptance of the necessity for the Bolshevik regime to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 in defense of compromises with "the imperialists." [16]

Military Aid

Operating with limited military resources and faced with severe economic constraints on both civilian and military production, the PRC has elected to confine its military assistance to small, usually well-conceived programs designed to enhance its influence abroad. (These programs have involved various combinations of the classical components of military aid: provision of weapons and equipment, advisory and training activities, and transfer of doctrine and tactics. In some cases, they have also

[14] See Sydney H. Jammes, "The Chinese Defense Burden, 1965–74," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 462–63.

[15] See, for example, the statement by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Jan. 11, 1974, in *Peking Review*, Jan. 18, 1974.

[16] Report of Aug. 24, 1973, to the Congress, in *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1973, p. 23.

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included road-building projects with military implications.) Since the Korean war, the Chinese have avoided direct involvement in combat alongside their clients. Apparently, the doctrines of "people's war" and the necessity of revolutionary self-reliance have reinforced the experience of the Korean conflict—namely, that the PLA fish does not swim well in a sea of foreign people.

The Chinese have selected the recipients of their military assistance on a case-by-case basis. By and large, they have chosen recipients who have seemed to offer promise of high payoffs for the PRC at minimum risk. Moreover, the PRC has tried to avoid direct competition with the Soviet Union, although it has operated in some of the same areas as its wealthier rival. Even as far as North Korea and North Vietnam have been concerned, China has not sought —or at least been able—to equal Soviet contributions in terms of either money value or modernity of equipment. According to statistics released by US Representative Les Aspin in June 1974, for instance, the PRC from 1966 through 1973 had extended $980 million in military assistance to Hanoi, as compared with $2.570 billion of Soviet aid (and with $95.762 billion of US assistance to Saigon).[17] Basically, then, Peking has provided aid to North Korea and North Vietnam to maintain its credentials as a functioning member of the Asian Communist community.

Peking's criteria for selecting recipients of military assistance, of course, have given it a wide range of options. In exploiting these options, it has provided aid not only to dissident forces in independent states and in colonial areas but also to national governments. The scale of assistance has varied considerably—running from the quite modest weapons and training support furnished dissidents in such diverse places as Burma, India, Africa, and the Middle East, to more lavish programs of assistance to the national governments of Tanzania and Pakistan.

Peking's specific purposes in extending military aid to individual recipients have been equally diverse. For example, the PRC has evidently been assisting the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, one of the three main groups vying for power in the current Angolan civil war, with an eye to having a voice—even a proxy one—in a final settlement.[18] Similar motivations appear to have been behind Chinese help to such groups as the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Persian Gulf. At the same time, considerations such as international prestige and common political (not necessarily ideological) interests appear to have prompted the Chinese to furnish aid to such countries as Tanzania and Pakistan, for both of whom the PRC has been the primary source of military assistance for a number of years.

While the PRC's military aid programs have not proved a total success in all cases, they have nevertheless produced some substantial payoffs for Peking—especially in terms of encouraging recipients to adopt a friendly posture toward the Chinese Communists. One cannot assert that the PRC's entry into the United Nations came about because of these programs, but it is interesting to note that not one of the states which had received military aid from the PRC voted against the seating of Peking's representatives in 1971. (In contrast, 38 nations that had at one time or another received military assistance from the United States voted in favor of seating them.) [19]

Military Doctrine

In turning next to Chinese doctrine for the employment of the PLA in foreign affairs, it is essential to bear in mind that China possesses two clearly separate military doctrines—one for carrying out revolution and one for defending the nation.[20] Because the Chinese hold firmly to the principle of revolutionary self-reliance, the first takes the form of guidance to other revolutionary forces around the globe on how to gain power in their individual countries. Consequently, what concerns us here is the second doctrine.

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[17] *Congressional Record* (Washington, D.C.), June 3, 1974, p. E 3506.

[18] In 1973, the PRC sent 113 military instructors to Zaire, whose President Mobutu Sese Seko was a strong backer of the National Front, to help train National Front forces, and it has more recently been supplying substantial quantities of arms to the National Front. See *The Washington Post*, July 7, 1975. The USSR, it should be noted, has furnished considerable material and moral support to another of the three groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

[19] Details of the voting on the issue may be found in *The China Quarterly* (London), January-March, 1972, pp. 202-03. Data on recipients of military aid were drawn from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's report to Congress, *The International Transfer of Conventional Arms*, September 1973, Table 3, pp. A 11-14.

[20] Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," *Asian Survey*, April 1968, pp. 239–62. This article has been reprinted by the American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc., as a pamphlet.

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It is also important to note that this doctrine grows out of a broad-gauged conceptual framework. While military doctrine has not been a continuously stable compound over the years, the framework itself by and large has been. Therefore, any discussion of the doctrine must begin with an examination of that framework.

Over all Chinese military thinking there presides the intellect of Mao Tse-tung, and one of the characteristics of his outlook often remarked on is the immanence of the human spirit. As one observer has put it,

Mao Tse-tung has long exhibited an almost mystical faith in the capabilities of the "masses," if they can only be thoroughly indoctrinated and motivated. He apparently believes that the masses then become an "impregnable bastion" and a force capable of achieving physical miracles.[21]

This "men over weapons" formula does not derive solely from Mao's feeling for the people. It flows in part from his realization that sheer numbers, if properly employed, are a major asset.

At the same time, Mao has not been oblivious to the significance of modern military weapons. In talking specifically about the fight against the Japanese in "On Protracted War," he observed:

The reform of our military system requires its modernization and improved technical equipment, without which we cannot drive the enemy back across the Yalu River.[22]

Nonetheless, Mao has demonstrated himself to be an arch-realist in this realm. During the pre-1949 years in China, he recognized that the revolution either had to be fought with what resources could be mobilized at the time or had to be abandoned, and he eschewed capitulation. Similarly, during the post-1949 period, he has accepted the fact that the PRC emerged into the international arena as "poor and blank" in military technology and that the acquisition of modern materiel is a difficult task, and he has argued that the PRC must make the most of what assets it has or simply surrender to "imperialism."

Out of this set of perceptions has developed a body of Chinese military doctrine designed to maximize the resources of a society and economy substantially inferior to those of prospective opponents fundamentally for purposes of deterrence and defense. The general character of this doctrine was dramatically illustrated in two conflicting prescriptions for PRC military policy that appeared during the mid-1960's when the Vietnam war was still escalating. The first of these was put forward by Lo Jui-ch'ing, at the time Chief of Staff of the PLA.[23] Lo, who saw the US as the PRC's most menacing enemy at that particular juncture, held that China needed to be able to emulate the Soviet Union in World War II—to move from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive, and then to pursue. He emphasized that the strategy of active defense "does not stop with driving the aggressor out of the country but requires strategic pursuit to destroy the enemy at his starting point, to destroy him in his nest." (This central theme, of course, implied the desirability of undertaking a massive procurement program for new weapons systems.) At the same time, he specifically stated that the PRC would not initiate an attack.

The second prescription was advanced by Lin Piao, then Minister of Defense.[24] Lin, who saw both the Soviet Union and the US as menacing, advocated concentration on "people's war" as elaborated by Mao. He expounded in some detail on the mystical virtues of the people, and he invited the US to invade Chinese territory, threatening its forces with total destruction. He also reiterated the old proposition that defeated and destroyed enemy formations would constitute the main source of additional and better materiel for the PLA. (This position, in effect, amounted to a direct rebuttal of Lo's argument in favor of rapid efforts to modernize and professionalize the PLA.)

While these prescriptions differed considerably (and while Lin's views eventually prevailed in terms of policy), the key thing to be noted in the present context is the major elements of similarity in their content. Both set forth a strategy for the defense of the realm—whether by actual combat, by intimidation, or by deterrence. Moreover, neither treated the PLA as an instrument for action abroad except in the pursuit of a defeated enemy, a legitimate element of defensive tactics.

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[21] *Ibid.*

[22] See *Selected Military Writings*, 2nd ed., Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1966, p. 259.

[23] "Commemorate the Victory Over German Facism! Carry the Struggle Against US Imperialism Through to the End!," released by New China News Agency, May 10, 1965.

[24] "Long Live the Victory of People's War!," *op. cit.*

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

A 1972 photo showing PLA tanks and infantrymen engaged in combat exercises simulating the repulsion of an enemy amphibious landing on the Chinese mainland.

—Keystone.

Over the intervening decade, there has been substantial evidence that the basic features of the doctrine for the employment of the PLA in foreign affairs have remained essentially unchanged. For instance, a PLA document of April 1973 designed for use in the troop-training program stressed the danger of an attack on the PRC and the need for the PLA to stand ready to defend the nation.[25] It specifically charged that the USSR "was waiting for an opportunity to wage large-scale aggressive war against our country," and it went on to describe the strength of Soviet military forces along the border and to assail the USSR for its growing naval activity in Asia. It directed some criticism at the US as well. Moreover, it said that both superpowers desired to use Japan as a base from which to attack China, though it indicated that the Japanese people would not permit such a situation to come to pass. In short, except for a *pro forma* vow to "liberate" Taiwan (by peaceful means if possible, but by the use of force if required), there was no mention of any mission beyond defense.

Speaking in a similar vein at the Fourth National People's Congress on January 13, 1975,[26] Chou En-lai observed:

Soviet social imperialism makes a feint to the east while attacking in the west. The two superpowers . . . are the biggest international oppressors and exploiters, and they are the source of a new world war. Their fierce contention is bound to lead to world war some day.

Then, after chiding the Russians for their lack of sincerity in negotiations, he went ahead to enjoin the PLA, the militia, and all the people to be ready at all times to "wipe out any enemy that dares to intrude."

The most extensive recent evidence, however, stems from a series of articles published during the ongoing "criticize Lin, criticize Confucius" campaign.[27] Although it is clear that these articles were aimed at denigrating Lin and disassociating his military thinking from that of Mao, they of necessity carried a substantial and straightforward exposition of the proper approach to warfare for the Chinese people. This followed traditional Maoist lines, with defense by masses of people, supported by secure and loyal bases, at the heart of the concept. Nowhere was there the remotest suggestion that the PLA was being readied for the projection of military power outside Chinese territory—those parts of the articles ostensibly dealing with military affairs contained no hint of any significant alteration or even incremental shift in the PLA's mission of territorial security.

Whatever the reasons, then, for the massive personnel changes that have taken place in the PLA during the last few years—the disappearance and subsequent death and disgrace of Lin Piao, the apparent simultaneous disappearance of several senior commanders, the unusual reshuffling of commanders in eight of the eleven military regions, and the

[25] Propaganda Division, Political Department, Kunming Military Region, "Outline of Education on Situation for Companies," as reprinted by the Political Department, 11th Regiment, Yunnan Production Construction Corps, April 25, 1973, Lessons 1–5. This document was secured and given limited distribution by the Institute of International Relations in the Republic of China. See *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), June 1974, pp. 90–109, and July 1974, pp. 94–106.

[26] "Report on the Work of the Government," ***Peking Review,*** Jan. 24, 1975.

[27] See especially "Conscientiously Study Chairman Mao's Military Writings," *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1974; "A Splendid Strategic Plan," *ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1974; "Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy Forces One by One," *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1974; "Advance Victoriously Along Chairman Mao's Line in Army Building," *ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1975; "Great Strategic Measure for Carrying Out People's War," *ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1975; and "Uphold the Marxist View of War, Criticize Lin Piao's Revisionist View," *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1975.

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appointment of new incumbents to a number of high PLA posts—it seems plain that these changes have not produced any modifications in Peking's fundamental doctrinal perspectives.

Military Posture

For insights into a particular state's calculations regarding the employment of its military forces, a consideration of the structure of its armed forces, its plans for improving those forces, and its deployment of those forces can prove even more enlightening than efforts to ascertain doctrine for the use of the forces, for that doctrine is virtually meaningless unless implemented in actual military posture. And the realities of military posture tend to change more slowly and with smaller fluctuations than military doctrine because of the differences in the inherent ease with which modifications in the two can be carried out.

Over the years since 1949, the PRC has engaged in a substantial effort to modernize and professionalize its military forces, though progress has been impeded along the way by conflicts between professionalism and ideological purity.[28] As a result, the processes of force building and force improvement have moved significantly forward—even if in a "two steps forward, one step back" style.

The precise alterations in force structure and deployment have, of course, been affected by a number of factors and considerations. These have included:

(1) The decision to "go nuclear" independently of any Soviet assistance or influence.

(2) The question of whether weapons should be produced for use primarily in the north or in the south.

(3) The issue of who is the main enemy, the Soviet Union or the US.

(4) The diversion of the PLA's energies to nonmilitary activities, especially during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

(5) The manifestation of "regionalism" on the part of some military leaders and the impact of this outlook on the effectiveness of PLA units.

(6) The recurring problem of competition between military and civilian agencies and among military groups (*e.g.*, nuclear forces *vs.* conventional forces) for scarce resources.

(7) Differences between military groups with fundamental loyalities to generational comrades, to associations based on geographical and field-army ties, or to particular services or branches.[29]

What is of major interest to us here, however, is the outcome of these changes, as reflected in the PRC's current military posture. And many aspects of that posture suggest strongly that the PLA has essentially a defensive mission in foreign affairs. Indeed, if any general statement about the military capabilities that the PRC has in hand or seeks for use in the international arena is possible, it would be that there is a substantial symmetry between the PLA forces and the purposes of territorial defense and, under controlled conditions, recovery of lands Peking regards as Chinese. To put things another way, while one can only speculate about *intentions*, the *capabilities* that the PRC possesses or is creating at the moment do not suggest aggressive plans far beyond China's borders.

Let us turn, then, to a more thorough examination of the relevant features of the PRC's present military posture.[30] In broad terms, it can be said that the PLA today has a range of weapons and equipment that is modest indeed when compared with the arsenals of the Soviet or American military forces. After the final break in the client-customer relationship between the USSR and China in the early 1960's, which left the PLA with an aging inventory of weapons and no readily available source of replacement, the PRC pursued a three-pronged policy of conserving on-hand assets, making copies or slight variations of existing models, and initiating research and development aimed at eventual self-sufficiency in design and production. But even if defense expenditures have absorbed about 10 percent of the country's gross national product as Western analysts have esti-

[28] For a discussion of these conflicts, see Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964*, Harvard East Asia Monograph No. 19, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.

[29] For a detailed analysis of many of the factors at work, see William W. Whitson and Chen-hsia Huang, *The Chinese High Command 1927-71: A History of Communist Military Politics*, New York, Praeger, 1973.

[30] It should be noted that trying to state the strength, the armament, the deployment, and the force improvements program of the PLA accurately is a thankless task. The estimates offered in the ensuing analysis constitute the author's own best estimates based on the sources cited, on the estimates of such responsible organizations as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (in its annual *Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey* volumes), on the *Jane's* series of publications covering military hardware, and on numerous news items. Whenever possible, account has also been taken of the US Department of Defense's annual posture statements to Congress—on the assumption that these statements would not tend to *underestimate* the strength of a major foreign power.

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mated,[31] economic and technological realities have imposed sharp constraints on production efforts.

While the ground forces of the PLA constitute a force to be reckoned with, especially on their home ground, they do not enjoy anything like the levels of firepower and mobility that American and Soviet units do. For example, a growing railroad net, expanding civilian truck fleets, and a modest increase in military vehicles have enhanced the PLA's strategic mobility within the PRC's borders, but these do little to improve its strategic mobility with respect to long-range operations abroad. The same situation prevails in the case of tactical mobility. Chinese armored forces are superior to those of Korean war days, and they provide a significant fighting capability at home and at the end of short supply lines. But they display little capacity for operating far from the PRC's borders.

The PLA's naval armament consists largely of submarines and vessels designed for close-in defense. As for submarines, the Chinese inventory has grown steadily over the years and may now include as many as 60 vessels—mostly Soviet diesel-powered models of the immediate post-World War II generation. Although there have been persistent rumors that the Chinese are constructing nuclear-powered boats, none has as yet been launched. Nor has there been a test of a submarine-fired missile. The submarine force, while not now active in waters at any distance from home, could conceivably create problems for the shipping of an opponent if Peking elected to do so; however, its ability to survive for long under conditions of modern anti-submarine warfare is questionable. As for other types of vessels, the PRC shipyards are building very good destroyers and escorts of their own design, and the number of missile-armed patrol boats mounts slowly. Yet none of these can really operate safely for very long far from the PRC's coastal waters. There seems to be little effort to expand or modernize the modest fleet of amphibious vessels or craft. In sum, then, the type of naval forces that the PLA boasts suggests a focus on close-in defense.

The same holds true with regard to Chinese air forces. The PLA has a home-defense interceptor force that has been estimated at some 3,500. This consists mainly of older Soviet models—the MIG-17, the MIG-19, and the MIG-21. Some of the MIG-19's and the MIG-21's have been home-produced, but a decision has evidently been taken to concentrate on the MIG-19 now. Local manufacture of the MIG-21 has apparently stopped. A home-designed fighter-interceptor has also entered the inventory, but there is reason to think that production and technological problems have slowed the production program drastically.

As for other air-defense forces, the PLA possesses a SAM-2 of Soviet design, modest radar systems, and a Ballistic Missile Early Warning System that is said to cover about 90 percent of the approach arc from the USSR. Moreover, heavy concentrations of gun-type anti-aircraft artillery are found near major military and industrial areas.

The PLA's bomber force is a mixed bag of aging planes. Construction has focused on the TU-16, of which there are 50-100 now in operation. These jet bombers can deliver a three-megaton nuclear device a distance of up to 1,650 nautical miles.

China's nuclear weapons program was accorded high priority as a consequence of the Soviet default during and after the 1958 Taiwan Strait affair, and the PRC has carried out a substantial number of tests of nuclear devices (the last in mid-1975). Today it possesses an estimated 50-60 medium-range ballistic missiles and 20-30 intermediate-range missiles capable of being armed with nuclear weapons. There have been press reports that it also has an unspecified number of missiles with a range up to 3,500 miles and is aiming for an intercontinental



Fast gunboats of the PLA's naval arm on patrol off the China coast during combined land, sea, and air maneuvers.

—Keystone.

[31] See, for instance, Jammes, *loc. cit.*, pp. 465–66, and Robert F. Dernberger, "The Economic Consequences of Defense Expenditure Choices in China," in *ibid.*, p. 474.

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

China's first test explosion of a hydrogen bomb, June 17, 1967.

—China Pictorial (Peking), No. 12, 1967, p. 20.

ballistic missile with a range of up to 6,000 miles,[32] but no test of the full-range vehicle has been observed. Nonetheless, work is in progress on solid fuels, and it is to be expected that in time the Chinese will significantly expand their nuclear forces.

At the same time, any Chinese progress in this area must be assessed in light of the massive stockpiles of the superpowers. With respect to the PRC's nuclear program, it should be noted, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff has remarked:

There is a steady, almost painstaking quality about this relatively small, but carefully conceived strategic program. A modest but credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR has been achieved.[33]

If, as has recently been reported, the PRC has fielded a mobile launching system, that would serve further to validate her ability to retaliate.

Thus, the total content and apparent thrust of Peking's nuclear efforts seem directed at "threshold raising." That is, the Chinese seek to make a prospective foe ask himself what price he is prepared to pay for an attack on China even if such an attack would wreak tremendous havoc within China's borders.

As for the PLA's air transport forces, they could carry at most a division at light scale (stripped of tanks, heavy transport, and weapons larger than the largest mortars). It would be possible to undertake operations requiring larger air-transported forces by coopting the growing civil air fleet, but such operations would be seriously limited by problems of logistics and fighter cover.

The general picture that emerges from the foregoing analysis is reinforced by what information is available about the deployment of PLA forces. While its 120-30 infantry divisions are distributed throughout the nation, their center of gravity is in the north and northeast, opposite the heavy Soviet troop concentrations. Moreover, the major first-line ground units in the north and northeast are not stationed up against the border. Rather, they are situated some distance from actual contact, and the forward space is filled by militia and provincial-type units.[34] (This positioning, incidentally, reflects a concept of "people's war"—using irregular forces to slow, harass, and impede the attacker as well as to provide information about the direction and intensity of his attack.) Chinese naval forces, including the fleet of submarines, function basically in waters near the coast of the Chinese mainland. Finally, most of the presumably nuclear-armed missiles that the PRC has in service at the present time are aimed at Soviet targets.

Prospects

All the preceding evidence concerning the employment of the PLA in foreign affairs derives, to be sure, from the present and past, and it could be argued that the future might bring an alteration in Peking's thinking on the subject as the PLA's military capabilities improve. Certainly, no one can predict exactly what the PRC would do if it managed vastly to increase its offensive power in the near term. Furthermore, there is no question that the current Chinese leadership is determined to bolster the

[32] See, for example, *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), July 17, 1975.

[33] General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for FY 1976*, Washington, DC, n.d. [Feb. 5, 1975].

[34] *Daily Telegraph* (London), July 14, 1974.

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PRC's claims to stand in the first rank of world powers by modernizing its armed forces. For instance, Yeh Chien-ying, the present Minister of Defense, made important speeches in 1955 and 1961 which emphasized the need for China to press forward to acquire modern military forces.[35]

Yet internal economic and technological constraints appear to place severe limitations on what the leadership can actually do in this connection. Short of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Peking has little means of accelerating force improvement, and even with such a rapprochement, it hardly seems likely that the PRC would be able to obtain enough assistance from Moscow to enable it to carry out a rapid buildup of offensive might.

Perhaps more critical, the Chinese leadership shows every sign of being aware of these considerations. For example, the available information on the PRC's recent investment in defense production (cited earlier) suggests pragmatism on Peking's part. The rate of that investment would provide funds for continued slow and steady modernization of the PLA, with stress on the enhancement of the capabilities now in hand.

In the not too distant future, it is true, control of the PRC will pass to a second generation of leaders, and no one can say with assurance that they will exhibit the same attitudes that the present leadership seems to evince. Nonetheless, they will still find themselves confronting the same problems of resource availability and technology that inhibit the current management.

Therefore, it seems likely that Peking will maintain a level of investment in defense which will permit the PLA to retain its present power and capabilities in a changing environment and that Peking will also employ the PLA essentially as a shield behind which China can concentrate on the multitude of tasks arising from its search for status in the first rank of modern, industrialized nations. In this context, the dominant concern of the Chinese leadership will probably be relations with the USSR and the prevention of a conflict that could exhaust or destroy the substantial fruits of the last 26 years. The encouragement of dissident revolutionaries, especially in the Third World, will in all likelihood persist, but at controlled levels and low military risk. Last but not least, the dangers of the outbreak of a two-front war and of alienating the United States will probably deter the PRC from launching a physical attempt to "liberate" Taiwan.

[35] See his speech delivered to the second session of the First National People's Congress on July 27, 1955, in *Current Background* (Hong Kong), No. 347, Aug. 23, 1955, pp. 29-31; and his speech at a Military Affairs Committee Conference on Training in late January 1961, reported in *Kung-tso T'ung-hsun* (Work Bulletin), Feb. 25, 1961, trans. in J. Chester Chen *et al.*, Eds., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army*, Stanford, Calif., The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966, p. 252.

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Messages from Czechoslovakia

By Jan F. Triska

I am forced to conclude that the present party line has been "successful" in the sense that social values have been successfully destroyed, but that none of the conflicts which led to the crisis in the party and society in the 1960's [before 1968] have been solved.

So wrote Alexander Dubcek,* the eclipsed architect of the Prague Spring, in a letter to the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly reportedly penned on October 28, 1974, the 56th anniversary of the birth of Czechoslovakia in 1918. Dubcek's long, critical statement was later smuggled out of Czechoslovakia, allegedly by members of the socialist opposition, and received worldwide press coverage in mid-April 1975.[1] The same week saw publication in the West of an open letter from the noted playwright Vaclav Havel to Gustav Husak, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) and now also President of the Republic, protesting against the pervasive system of "rule by fear" in the country.[2] At the end of April, Ludvik Vaculik, a prominent novelist and writer, sent a letter to Western news agencies in Prague complaining of police harassment against himself and other well-known individuals.[3] And at the end of May, Karel Kosik, the eminent Marxist philosopher, reported similar acts of harrowing intimidation in a letter to his French colleague, Jean-Paul Sartre.[4]

These messages are just a few links in a long chain of denunciatory letters, interviews, statements, declarations, and documents that have been sent out of present-day Czechoslovakia and published abroad. Despite the outwardly quiet, orderly, and even somewhat prosperous façade of the country seven years after the Warsaw Pact invasion, the outward flow of critical and often poignant commentary suggests the existence of deep tensions in Czechoslovak society. The fact that the complainants, who include many ordinary citizens as well as known figures, have been willing to risk further retaliation by allowing—and in some cases actively seeking—publication of their protests in the West is an indication of how serious they themselves view the situation to be. In the author's judgment, the protests that have surfaced are not simply the sentiments of an alienated minority but reflect a mood of disaffection that is widespread among the people of Czechoslovakia—a judgment based on a close, continuous study of the Czechoslovak scene and on personal observations and conversations during

* Owing to the unavailability of types with certain diacritical marks, these marks have been omitted from most names and foreign words in the present article—Eds.

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[1] Western coverage included publication of the letter in part and with comments in *The New York Times* (New York), *The Observer* and *The Times* (London), *The Guardian* (Manchester), *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt), *Die Weit* and *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), *Le Monde* (Paris), *Arbeiter Zeitung* (Vienna), *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), and many other major papers.

[2] Havel's letter was sent to foreign correspondents by registered mail, as reported by Reuters and the German Press Agency (Deutsche Presse-Agentur—DPA), which released the news item. See also *The Times* (London), April 23, 1975.

[3] Published, *inter alia*, in *Il Populo* (Rome), April 30, 1975.

[4] Published in *Der Spiegel*, June 9, 1975.

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many visits to the country (and other East European states) since 1968. The present paper will examine the content of a number of the messages that have been published and then offer an assessment of their import in terms of the broader political and social forces, both internal and external, now shaping Czechoslovakia's course.

A Voice from the Grave

Prior to the spate of protest letters publicized last spring (which will be discussed in greater detail below), perhaps the most dramatic and revealing statements to emerge from Czechoslovakia were several messages issued by Dubcek's former colleague, the late Josef Smrkovsky who—as a member of the KSC Presidium and Chairman of the National Assembly in 1968—was one of the four most prominent personalities of the Prague Spring (together with Dubcek, Premier Oldrich Cernik, and National Front Chairman Frantisek Kriegel). Smrkovsky's statements were made in the years 1971 through 1973, when he was engaged in a losing struggle with bone cancer, to which he finally succumbed on January 15, 1974. Possibly his illness increased his determination to speak out with candor about past and present events; certainly, in any case, he issued some extraordinary and eloquent appeals addressed to a solution of the ills brought on by the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Some of these messages will be examined in a later context; of particular interest at this juncture are two taped interviews which were sent to and eventually made public by Davide Lajolo, Editor-in-Chief of the Italian weekly, *Giorni—Vie Nuove,* and a member of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party. Since the more recent of these two interviews deals with events dating back to the preinvasion era, it seems useful to discuss it first.

According to the published account, the interview was conducted in a hospital during the late stages of Smrkovsky's illness. In initiating a serialization of the interview on February 20, 1975, Lajolo announced in a foreword that he had received the tape before Smrkovsky's death but had complied with the Czech leader's wish to delay publication for one year.[5] Avowing that "freedom cannot be separated from socialism—it is precious and inalienable to us Communists," Lajolo defined his purpose in publishing the account as follows:

We have never accepted the position that one socialist country should have on its territory armed forces of other socialist countries to guard it or guarantee it. . . . This publication is meant as a service to the countries and parties of the Warsaw Pact . . . to examine the question of the occupation anew. *We know that* consultations on this subject have taken place already; *we know also that internal resistance in Czechoslovakia is stronger than in the other countries of the Warsaw Pact. . . . Is it just that so many Communists should live like Dubcek? Is it just that Smrkovsky had to die without the card of a party he had served his whole life?* [6]

The substance of the interview provides new information on the behind-the-scenes events of the short-lived Dubcek era, as well as on the dissensions and uncertainties that plagued the reform Communists from the start. The account covered the period from the October 1967 plenum of the KSC Central Committee, which initiated the fall of the late and unlamented party boss, Antonin Novotny, to the post-invasion meeting of the Soviet leadership with those of the Czechoslovak leaders who were forcibly flown to Moscow in the last days of August 1968.

According to Smrkovsky, discussions in the Presidium in December 1967-January 1968 produced less disagreement among the top party members about forcing Novotny out than about who should succeed him. Dubcek's name at first evoked little enthusiasm, and he was in fact reluctant to accept the job. But Dubcek, then the party chief in Slovakia, was the only person against whom there was no real opposition from either the Slovaks or the Czechs. Once assured of the general support of all factions, he acceded to pressure and assumed the leadership.

Smrkovsky furnished many hints of the new regime's troubles with Moscow as well with anti-reform elements in the Communist Party. For example, on

[5] The interview was serialized in *Giorni—Vie Nuove* (Rome), Feb. 20, 1975, and subsequent issues. Extensive excerpts were republished in *The Sunday Times* (London), Feb. 23; *Le Monde,* Feb. 22; and *Der Spiegel,* Feb. 24.

[6] Emphasis added. Dubcek's present circumstances will be dealt with later in this paper. Smrkovsky's political profile is worth a brief note: having gained early prominence in the party, he was jailed in the 1950's and rehabilitated in the 1960's. In 1969, he was relieved of all his posts. In 1970, he happened to read an article in *Rude pravo* (Prague), the KSC's official daily, which referred to him as a former party member; that, he relates, is how he found out that he had been expelled.

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May 6, 1968, Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cernik, and Vasil Bilak, the ultra-conservative Slovak First Party Secretary, met with Soviet leaders in the Kremlin to discuss the Czechoslovak economic situation. According to Smrkovsky, the Prague delegation spent the day listening to Leonid Brezhnev's blistering criticism of recent developments in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev supported his detailed attack with voluminous clippings from Czechoslovak newspapers and with other materials and reports evidently furnished by anti-Dubcek forces, some never before seen by Dubcek and his friends. In the ensuing discussion Bilak took the Soviet side. Discouraged by the bitter Soviet reproofs and weakened by Bilak's behavior, Dubcek, Smrkovsky and Cernik did not fare well in their mission to obtain Soviet help. When they asked for a loan of one-half a billion rubles, Aleksei Kosygin and others reiterated a position which, in Smrkovsky's view, was designed to limit Czechoslovakia's independence from the Soviet Union. Arguing that no one in the West or East was interested in Czechoslovak consumer products but that the socialist camp wanted Czechoslovak capital goods, the Soviet leaders apparently insisted on the need to continue emphasizing heavy industry (the old position of the "iron-eaters"), a policy which had made Czechoslovakia dependent on the USSR for both raw materials and markets and rendered its economy inefficient in the past.

Smrkovsky revealed some heretofore unknown details about the crescendoing confrontation between Prague and Moscow. For example, in the meeting at Cierna-nad-Tisou on July 31, 1968, Soviet Politburo member Piotr Shelest confronted the Prague delegation with an accusation that leaflets printed in Czechoslovakia were being circulated in Ruthenia—formerly part of Czechoslovakia but now in the Soviet Ukraine (UkSSR), for which Shelest was immediately responsible—asking the population to secede from the USSR and join Czechoslovakia. According to Smrkovsky, the Czechoslovak team considered the accusation so baseless and provocative that it declared further negotiations impossible and walked out.

The next morning, Brezhnev and Dubcek "agreed" to convene a meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Bratislava on August 3. There, said Smrkovsky, the Soviet leaders presented a list of demands: that Frantisek Kriegel (whom one of the Soviet delegates in Cierna had derogatorily called a "Galician Jew") and KSC Central Committee Secretary Cestmir Cisar be fired; that the Dubcek regime quash the effort to reintroduce a Social Democratic party in Czechoslovakia; that KAN, the Club of Committed Non-Party People, and K-231, the club of former political prisoners, be banned; and that the mass media be "streamlined" to impose effective restraints on their output. In Smrkovsky's view, the invasion ultimately took place because the Czechoslovak leaders felt unable to accede to all these demands.

Smrkovsky related the following personal account of the Warsaw Pact invasion and its aftermath. Early on the morning of August 21, 1968, Soviet troops entered the KSC Central Committee building in Prague and arrested the Czechoslovak leaders who were there, including Dubcek and Smrkovsky. They were flown the same day in two groups to destinations in Poland and the Soviet Ukraine. Eventually, they were brought before Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Nikolai Podorgny in the Central Committee building of the CPSU in Moscow to become part of the official Czechoslovak delegation. In the meantime, others in the delegation, including President Ludvik Svoboda, had arrived in Moscow on their own. Thus, all the major Czechoslovak figures (including Kriegel, who was originally forcibly detained nearby) were present and participated in the ensuing negotiations with the Soviet leadership in the Kremlin.

The agreement which emerged—an unequal treaty if there ever was one, negotiated and signed under duress—was resisted by some Czechoslovak leaders more than by others. Dubcek alternately argued and collapsed; Cernik argued and cried; Smrkovsky gritted his teeth. The account pictures President Svoboda as the most subservient to the Soviets and haughty to his colleagues, while Frantisek Kriegel was the most resistive to the Kremlin leaders' demands. Svoboda, a general, treated Kriegel as if he were a lowly private; but Kriegel—alone among the Czechoslavak representatives—refused to sign the document of capitulation. In spite of the risk to himself, Kriegel in fact never stopped insisting that the "agreement" be taken to Prague for the approval of the KSC Central Committee and the National Assembly before he would add his signature. According to Smrkovsky, the Soviet answers to this and similar suggestions were blunt and threatening. Boris Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, kept saying:

If you don't sign today, you will sign in a week; if not in a week, then in two weeks; if not in two weeks, then in a month. . . . But you will sign.

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Was the agreement valid under international law? Should the Czechoslovak leaders have signed under threat of personal harm? Did they, by signing, in fact "commit treason" against their country? By asking these questions, Smrkovsky implied answers critical of the capitulators, including himself. Virtually on his deathbed, he wanted to leave as clear a statement on the tragic events of 1968 as an eyewitness and participant could make.[7]

Smrkovsky on the Occupation

The second and earlier interview of Smrkovsky in *Giorni—Vie Nuove* was published on September 22, 1971.[8] At the time it was taped, Smrkovsky was already ill with "a serious leg disease" (but reportedly did not yet know it was cancer), had spent several months in the hospital, could walk only on crutches, and was restricted to his home. Nonetheless, the interview was a vigorous presentation of his astute and insightful views of the imprint of the 1968 invasion on Czechoslovak society some three years after the event. The publication of the interview again reflected the firm, negative stand toward the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia on the part of Davide Lajolo and many of his colleagues in the Italian Communist Party.

At the start of the interview, Smrkovsky talked about the dilemma confronting himself, his friends, and other purged party members, government officials, intellectuals, and professionals who had resisted accepting the invasion of Czechoslovakia as an act of "fraternal assistance" on the part of concerned allies:

They [those purged] are told: agree to the occupation of your country or starve. Once you have been sufficiently starved and your children have nothing to eat, you will give in anyway and change your views! That is the "struggle based on principle". . . . Those who have done so [given in] to protect their families have had to violate their consciences, to live in shame, in a state of moral crisis, hating those who humiliated them. Those who have not [given in] are not allowed to work in [their professional] fields. They work as laborers, mostly on roads. . . . Professors are now stokers; former ambassadors are doormen; physicians, truck drivers; journalists, chauffeurs; etc.

The late Josef Smrkovsky (left), then Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly, with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, head of a four-member delegation which arrived in Prague on October 16, 1968, to sign the treaty on the "temporary sojourn" of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory.

—J. Finda for CTK via Eastfoto.

Smrkovsky did draw a distinction between conditions today and those of the past: he said he did not think in the 1970's tens of thousands of people could be arrested, put in jail, tortured to obtain confessions, and executed on the scale that characterized the 1950's—mainly because world opinion was more influential now than it had been 20 years ago, and because "the power, experience, and level

[7] It is noteworthy that Smrkovsky, upon returning from Moscow in 1968, had the courage to state in a radio broadcast in Prague on August 29: "Our decision-making was not easy. . . . We were aware that the [Moscow] decision may be regarded, by people and history, as unacceptable and treasonous." See the Czech-language émigré journal *Svedectvi* (Paris), Vol. 13, No. 49, 1975, p. 13.

[8] An English translation is available in J. Jacobson, Ed., "Repression and Resistance in Czechoslovakia," a Special Section of *New Politics* (New York), Winter 1972, pp. 83-90. For the official Czechoslovak rebuttal, see *Rude pravo*, Sept. 25, 1971.

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of information in the international Communist movement are different now." Nonetheless, he said, there were still innocent people being arrested, kept in jail without trial for long periods, and finally tried and sentenced to prison. Moreover, he asked, wasn't it horrible enough to witness the expulsion of more than half a million good party members from the ranks of the KSC? Wasn't it horrible enough to see "the corruption of the school system" and "the stifling of any creative activity"?

Turning to the underlying issues, Smrkovsky launched a discussion of the meaning of "dictatorship of the proletariat" and of "socialist democracy." In current practice, he said, dictatorship of the proletariat meant dictatorship, on behalf of the Communist Party, by the Presidium (Politburo) and the Secretariat—institutions of "paid officials." If such a system of dictatorship was necessary immediately after the defeat of capitalism, it could not be so justified in an advanced socialist country after some 25 years of existence. "Where," he asked, was "the participation of the people in decision-making, . . . in the formulation of policies, in the execution and control [of such policies]?" How could workers, intellectuals, economists, scientists, etc., support the regime when their activities were prescribed and controlled "by an inept bureaucratic apparatus"? And where could one perceive "*socialist* civil and human rights"?

On the subject of national independence—or Czechoslovakia's lack of thereof—Smrkovsky commented that he did not really understand claims of the priority of "class sovereignty" or "internationalism" or other "similar and equally empty phrases, according to which a nation is asked to surrender its inalienable right of self-determination to others" —an unacceptable surrender even if the "others" were "the dearest of allies." How, in any event, could anyone in a country give away that which did not belong to him but rather belonged to all the people?

Since the invasion, he went on, the successors of the Dubcek regime had devoted great efforts to convincing Czechoslovakia's citizens to accept the occupation of their country "as though it had been manna from heaven." But with what result?

These efforts, which have been carried [to the point of] blind fanaticism and cynicism, have used up all the energy of the party and its leadership and have isolated the party from the people. All of this has deadened people's activity, destroyed the nation's soul, and brought it to a state of lethargy. You may say: life goes on; industry, transport, and agriculture are operating. Of course they are operating. They always function, under any regime, because people's lives depend on them. But the question is how they function. Being out of agreement with present policies, people act accordingly. Those who do agree represent perhaps 10 percent [of the population] at most. The future will show that this is so. All the propagandists' efforts cannot change this; [the attempt] only makes people angry.

Smrkovsky claimed that in 1968 the people of Czechoslovakia had accepted the Communist Party's brand of democratic socialism "with great spontaneity and more overwhelmingly than ever before." Now the population hoped against hope that things would change, that the Soviet Union and its socialist allies would remedy the mistakes they had committed in 1968 and since. In defining the popular mood, he added:

Our people are like a doctor who, carefully watching a patient, is prepared to go into action immediately when a crisis occurs. This is a situation that does not have to be organized by anyone. It exists.

In summation, Smrkovsky suggested that reconciliation of all divergent views would be the only sensible and responsible solution to the problems of Czechoslovakia. There should be no victors or vanquished but only equals. All fraternal Communist parties and indeed all international progressive forces should have an interest in such an outcome. For the continued occupation of the Czechoslovak state would constitute "a barrier not only to socialism in Czechoslovakia but to [the progress of] the entire international socialist movement," he concluded. "Our cause is everyone's cause."

Dubcek Speaks Out

On March 14, 1974, almost two months to the day after the death of Smrkovsky, *Giorni—Vie Nuove* published a letter addressed to his widow from Alexander Dubcek. While essentially a message of sympathy and a eulogy to a departed colleague,[9]

[9] In explaining his absence at the funeral, Dubcek wrote that he first learned of Smrkovsky's death "through a Vienna news agency dispatch" and that a telegram giving the date and place of the funeral was delivered too late for him to make the trip from Bratislava to Prague.

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the letter contained a number of statements of political import. Dubcek praised Smrkovsky at some length; he then blamed Gustav Husak for "launching the accusations" that had led to Smrkovsky's expulsion from the Communist Party in 1970; he defended the actions of his government in 1968-69; he expressed his continued "failure to understand" why Moscow had chosen a course of invasion on the basis "of manifestly nonobjective and distorted information" (presumably a reference to "intelligence" supplied to the Soviets by anti-Dubcek Communists[10]); and he avowed that the present leadership in Czechoslovakia had lost "what counts most"—the confidence of the people.

These themes hinted of the smoldering sentiments that were to find articulation some months later in the ex-leader's remarkable anniversary pronouncement, which was quoted at the start of this paper and which merits examination in some detail. Like Smrkovsky before him, Dubcek spoke in his statement both of his personal situation and of his broader concerns about the course of Czechoslovakia's current development.

Dubcek, like most of his colleagues, had been expelled from the KSC and, at the time he wrote, was earning a living as an inspector in the Bratislava machinery park of the Slovak Ministry of Forests. In the first part of his message, he complained in bitter terms of sustained harassment by the secret police. They followed him everywhere, day and night, he wrote. Why? Because he, like many others who "differ from the present party leadership" merely on the way to achieve "implementation of party policy . . . and [on] the method of solving difficulties" (*i.e.*, on the means, not the ends, of Communist rule), were now considered "traitors." "Surveillance webs have been spun, and informants have been planted, not only where I work but throughout the society." This harms and frustrates the party and "replaces its main function [of leadership] by rule based on coercion." "This may be a simpler way to govern," he commented, "but it is extremely harmful to socialism [because] it spreads corruption, two-facedness . . . apathy . . . fear . . . suspicion . . . police-informing . . . hypocrisy." In a word, simple use of naked force could not replace open discussion; force should not be the means used "to obtain agreement with party policies and proof of their correctness in the party and society."

Alexander Dubcek, former First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, signs autographs for well-wishers in April 1971.

—Wide World.

Dubcek next turned to Czechoslovak-Soviet relations. These were unfortunately in worse shape than ever before, he concluded. He said that he did not blame the Soviet Union or the other Warsaw Pact members for the 1968 invasion. Instead, he blamed those who allegedly invited the Warsaw Pact forces to intervene in Czechoslovakia:

If the invasion by Warsaw Pact armies did take place at the invitation of a self-appointed group *of Czechoslovak representatives, as was announced by the official Soviet news agency, then I can only call such a procedure factional activity, to put it mildly, and the consequences of this step an affront and humiliation, the moral and ideological humiliation of the entire Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and of the Czech and Slovak nations. It was (whether [those responsible] intended it or not) a heavy blow to the Communist and socialist movement.*[11]

Dubcek asserted that Czechoslovak-Soviet relations

[10] Those suspected of being informers include four current members of the KSC Presidium: Vasil Bilak, who is also a Central Committee Secretary; Alois Indra, Chairman of the Federal Assembly; Karel Hoffman, Chairman of the trade unions organization; and Antonin Kapek, Secretary of the Prague Municipal Party Committee. Two other suspects are Viliam Salgovic, head of the Slovak Communist Party Control and Auditing Commission; and Pavel Aursperg, head of the Central Committee's International Department.

[11] Emphasis in the original.

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used to be warm and friendly, "with a long tradition behind them . . . strengthened by gratitude for our liberation." Yet, hundreds of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks who had fought side by side with Soviet troops and partisans were now labeled "anti-Soviet," and so were more than half a million expelled Communist Party members. "If people of this caliber are so branded, what other result can it have than to evoke anti-Sovietism in the minds of other members of the party and the public?" Nonetheless, Dubcek expressed his conviction that the future of Czechoslovakia could lie only in the community of socialist countries, and that cooperation with the Soviet Union "was and will continue to be the foundation of Czechoslovak foreign policy."

Referring further to the internal effects of the national and party purges of 1969-70 and after, Dubcek said they had caused "immense damage." The creative intelligentsia—those who could contribute most to cultural growth—had been hit the hardest, he reported. At the same time, the workers —"the nominal bearers of power"—were being "thoroughly manipulated," and "workers' participation in public affairs and state administration has been reduced to a minimum, insofar as it exists at all."

Dubcek characterized the present system of rule in Czechoslovakia as "an amalgamation of political, ideological, organizational, personnel, and other instruments and measures wielded primarily from a position of strength." Declaring in a dramatic finale that "this system is not compatible with Marxism-Leninism," he called it, on the contrary, a negation, a denial of socialism: "It is a misuse of power and a violation of socialist principles and party principles. It is a violation of human rights."

The widespread foreign coverage of Dubcek's letter when it surfaced in the spring of 1975 brought about an instant reaction in Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe, and the USSR.[12] Gustav Husak denounced Dubcek as a counterrevolutionary, not worthy of the "humane" treatment he had received, and asserted that in the wake of Smrkovsky's death, Dubcek was attempting to assert himself as the new leader of a campaign against the Czechoslovak people. Husak offered Dubcek permission to leave the country and go to Sweden (singling out the latter, no doubt, because Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme had expressed sympathy for the former leader); but Husak made clear that if Dubcek decided to stay in Czechoslovakia, he would have to "conform" and cease to be one of the "open traitors."

Since Dubcek undoubtedly anticipated such a reaction, why did he write this letter? He could hardly have expected to convince the authorities that he was not a betrayer of the socialist cause or to persuade them to free him from police surveillance (after all, he wrote in his letter, even General Svoboda, who was then President of the Republic, "had the habit of placing transistor radios at the windows before opening any discussions . . .")—indeed, he probably knew he was inviting further harassment. In the writer's opinion, Dubcek wrote his letter to offer additional public testimony to the depressing, unstable, unsolved state of affairs in Czechoslovakia today. His points are those that have been made before and since in other statements coming out of Czechoslovakia: that Husak's rule has not been successful; that the people have been driven into apathy and passivity but not won over; that the USSR has lost a true friend in Eastern Europe; and that there exists a responsible, articulate, well-informed, and relatively widespread body of opposition to the present regime.

The Assault on Talent

A similar sense of a country in distress and in a tight police grip was conveyed by the other aforementioned messages that surfaced in April and May 1975. The first of these was an open letter to Gustav Husak written by Vaclav Havel, the well-known creator of the "theater of the absurd" in Czechoslovakia—in happier days a prolific, talented playwright but now reported to be a brewery worker in Prague. Havel's letter, copies of which were sent to foreign correspondents in Prague around the third week of April,[13] avowed that the situation in Czechoslovakia was becoming dangerous. "Pervasive fear" was the universal phenomenon—fear of being persecuted or harassed, of losing employment, of being left without any means of support. No one was exempt. The secret police, "omnipresent and omnipotent," was enforcing this system of rule by fear. The manifest presence of the police was in itself

[12] For official Czechoslovak reaction, see *Pravda* (Bratislava), April 17, 18, and 19, 1975; *Mlada fronta* (Prague), April 18; *Lidova democracie* (Prague), April 18. Indignant commentary in other Communist countries appeared, *inter alia*, in *Pravda* (Moscow), *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), *Neues Deutchland* (East Berlin), and *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest).

[13] See footnote 2.

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"enough to affect one's natural behavior and to induce the habit of pretense." Havel charged that Husak, relying on this system to maintain order, was concerning himself primarily with the party's external image at the price of internal disintegration and societal, spiritual, and moral decay. He concluded with the admonition: "How terrible the hour of truth that may come at some future time!" Like Dubcek, Havel was severely denounced in the Czechoslovak press after his letter was published in the West.[14]

Several specific examples of police intimidation were reported by novelist Ludvik Vaculik in a letter sent to Western news agencies in Prague and published abroad on April 30. Vaculik wrote that his home had been subjected to an extensive police search and that some 80 objects—including notebooks, recording tapes, manuscripts, and notes—had been confiscated. According to the novelist, similar searches and confiscations had taken place about the same time in the homes of other prominent individuals, including writer Ivan Klima, historian Vilem Precan, literary critic Ivan Kadlecik, and economist Venek Silhan.[15] Later reports reaching the West suggested that these searches were related to a wave of raids and arrests directed against former high-level members of the Dubcek regime—particularly Zdenek Mlynar, ex-secretary of the KSC Central Committee; and also Jaromir Litera, former head of the Prague party organization; Robert Horak, ex-secretary of the National Assembly; and historian Jan Kren. Reportedly, the object of this whole series of searches was a document of some 200 pages prepared by Mlynar comparing the political situation in Czechoslovakia before and since the Warsaw Pact invasion, in defense of the Dubcek program and in condemnation of Husak. (Dubcek was said to have sent excerpted copies of Mlynar's document to Erich Honecker, the party chief of East Germany, and Enrico Berlinger, the Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party, requesting that it be made public at the conference of European Communist parties which was then slated to take place in East Berlin in the summer of 1975).[16]

The effects of police searches and harassment were movingly described in the open letter sent by Marxist philsopher Karel Kosik to his friend Jean-Paul Sartre in May 1975. In the letter, Kosik accused the Czechoslovak police of violating his "fundamental human rights" and especially his "right to protect his dignity and not to have to give in." He related the hardships that had befallen him: he had been expelled from the KSC, dismissed from his university chair as Professor of Philosophy, deprived of his post of Deputy Director of the Academy of Sciences, and even forbidden to drive a taxicab—presumably because he could conduct secret conversations with his passengers. The ongoing intimidation to which he was subjected reached a high point in April 1975, when the police invaded his apartment, plundered his library, and confiscated a manuscript of some 1,000 pages which he had written. Kosik, now unable to express his ideas even in private, became "simply nothing." Unable to write, unable to support his wife and two children, he was "dead," he wrote to Sartre.

Kosik's case became a *cause célèbre* at the Congress of the International Hegel Society in Stuttgart, Germany, attended by some 900 philosophers and guests from all over the world at the end of May. Jürgen Habermas, the principal spokesman of the philosophy of the Left in West Germany, spoke to the Congress about the case with authority and compassion: If men like Kosik were deprived not only of their livelihood but of the fruit of their private thoughts, what, Habermas asked, was left of socialism? [17] And Sartre, in his reply to the letter, expressed deep sympathy for his friend and for Kosik's country, "invaded and humiliated," a sympathy which "all friends of Czechoslovakia share." "If Karel Kosik is guilty," concluded Sartre, "then all (not only intellectuals but peasants and workers as well) who think the way he does are guilty." In any event, he added, the secret police would not be able to destroy Czechoslovak culture, "try as they might." [18]

The Broader Base of Discontent

Quite naturally, the letters and interviews that have emanated from former leaders such as Dubcek and Smrkovsky or from prominent creative intellectuals such as Havel, Kosik, and Vaculik, have attracted a great deal of attention abroad (and have in turn been severely attacked at home). But, as noted at the start of this paper, these headline-

[14] See *Tvorba* (Prague), April 30, 1975.

[15] See footnote 3.

[16] See *Le Monde*, May 13, 1975; *Der Spiegel*, June 16, 1975. *Postponed several times, the conference of European CP's still has not taken place as of this writing.*

[17] *Der Spiegel*, June 9, 1975, p. 123.

[18] *Le Monde*, June 30, 1975.

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making statements represent only a portion of the messages that have been sent out of Czechoslovakia. While considerations of space prevent a comprehensive review, a random sampling may at least indicate the variety, both in form and in content, that has characterized the complaints of Czechoslovakia's unhappy citizens.

A "Ten-Point Manifesto" written by a group of Czech intellectuals, most of them long-term party members, was addressed to the National Assembly (Czechoslovakia's legislature) in protest against the occupation. Two of the writers who hand-delivered the document—former member of the legislature Rudolf Battek and historian Jan Tesar—were arrested in 1971, held without trial, released, and then rearrested in January 1972. The Manifesto itself was published in 1972 in a collection of protest items in the New York journal *New Politics*.[19]

An anonymous "Letter from Prague" was written under the pseudonym George Moldau and published in the British Journal *Survey* in the spring of 1973. The letter-writer declared that Czechoslovakia was "a state without leaders" and argued: "We must give a mandate to those 'who are abroad' [*i.e.*, émigrés and exiles] so that they will realize their responsibility and act accordingly." [20]

In a "Letter to Gustav Husak," Milan Hübl, a longtime Communist who identified himself as a former friend of Husak, told a hapless tale of being arrested in late 1971, then released, being "unable to find any job at all" before or after, and finally being rearrested and accused of Zionism on no more grounds than the authorities' presumption that "proof positive of Jewish origin [is] the dieresis on 'a,' 'o,' or 'u' in the spelling of one's name"—while in fact he was, "you will excuse me—'of pure Aryan descent'. . . ." [21]

A Mrs. Sabatova addressed a letter to foreign Communist parties protesting against the arrest, trial and imprisonment of her husband and three children and asking for intervention on their behalf. The letter was published in December 1973 in the official organ of the British Communist Party.[22]

Among documents issued in the past year, an item of particular interest was an unattributed directory of 144 Czech and Slovak historians, archivists, and curators who had been driven from their professions and in some instances imprisoned. Titled *Acta Persecutionis* (Acts of Persecution), the directory was addressed to the 14th International Congress of Historical Sciences, which took place in San Francisco in August 1975. A brief, unsigned preface stated that the list was incomplete because fear of reprisals had inhibited the collection of information and because persecution was still going on.[23]

In a separate, signed letter addressed to the same congress, one of the listed historians, Vilem Precan (previously cited as a victim of police harassment), described his personal plight. Deprived of his post at the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences in 1970, he worked as a receptionist in a Prague restaurant but then was dismissed from that job as well. In April 1975 police raided his home and confiscated part of his library, his files, and his personal diary. Though destitute, Precan said that he would not give in: "I refuse the Czechoslovak state and political leadership the right to treat me as a vassal . . ., to deny me . . . the fundamental right to a decent human and material existence according to my talents, interests, and education. . . . I ask you, esteemed colleagues, . . . to help me as far as you possibly can. I say this quite openly. Without your solidarity and your support, I have no chance of remaining free to resume my work as an historian." [24]

Late last summer, a Czech playwright named Pavel Kohout addressed an open letter jointly to the German writer Heinrich Böll and the American playwright Arthur Miller. He wrote in part: "Czech and Slovak writers have lived and worked in the past seven years under conditions which are a consequence of the year 1968 . . . our actions [in support of the Dubcek program] violated neither laws nor the ethical standards of writers. We have engaged in the defense of ideas which temporarily are being suppressed by the people in power, and that is all. . . . After seven years we and the government have come full circle. We suffer the fate of those who have been silenced. The government suffers the shame of the silencers. . . . In this encounter there are neither victors nor losers, only the defeated." [25]

[19] Jacobson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 55-59.

[20] *Survey* (London), Spring 1973, pp. 245-49.

[21] Jacobson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 64-67.

[22] *Morning Star* (London), Dec. 5, 1973.

[23] The directory carried no date of publication or publisher's name but was translated in both German and English and was presumably printed in West Germany. For news coverage, see David Schoenbaum, "Writing History Brings Purge of Czech Historians," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 24, 1975, p. E3; and Israel Shenker, "Czech Historians Reported Purged," *The New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1975, p. 30.

[24] Excerpted from a five-page letter datelined Prague, July 1975, mimeographed and distributed to the 14th International Congress of Historical Sciences, San Francisco, August 1975.

[25] *The New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1975, p. 27.

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Other messages, interviews, and documents could be cited. Some have been addressed to Husak or to the National Assembly or both, invoking the writers' constitutional right of petition, while others have been addressed to prominent friends abroad, or to the international Communist or socialist movement, or to the United Nations, or simply to world public opinion. Some have been signed; some have not. Some authors have given permission to publish their messages; others have not. Some have written of personal problems caused by the excesses of the current regime, while others have addressed themselves to the broad problems of the society at large. But all have reflected to some degree a common concern to make known the critical conditions in Czechoslovakia brought about by the invasion and occupation of the country.[26]

The far-ranging content of these messages, in combination with other information, makes it possible to offer a number of general observations about conditions, changes, and developments in that polity. The remainder of this paper will be addressed to several critical questions: the motivations that have prompted the outward flow of protest from citizens, former leaders, and prominent personalities; the indications that such protest reflects widespread disaffection in the population; the frustrated efforts of the Husak regime to "normalize" Czechoslovak society; the impact of international issues and of inter-party pressures within the Communist movement on Czechoslovak affairs; and finally, prospects for the future. The author's observations on these questions are based on his perceptions of the Czechoslovak scene, on a continuous perusal of information emanating from or concerning the country, and on the critical evaluations of other observers inside and outside Czechoslovakia. The analysis below attempts to identify the emerging cultural trends, the maturing social conditions, and the evolving political nuances which make up the symbiotic complexities characteristic of Czechoslovakia today.

Dissident Aims and Regime Counteraims

Varied as have been the publicized messages of protest, they fit into a single pattern. They are, in a word, pleas for help. Realizing that the fate of their country has been determined from outside and that little can be done at home to change that fate, Czechoslovakia's citizens have sent their appeals abroad. This, they believe, is a realistic approach. World public opinion has become an increasingly effective force, and in the mid-1970's no country can afford to be insensitive to it. The Soviet Union is deeply concerned to protect its influence in the international Communist movement, which has been split down the middle by the Sino-Soviet conflict. Moscow is equally interested in détente, which might lead to the USSR's acquisition of needed modern technology and to a larger Soviet role on the world economic scene, while at the same time further isolating China. Thus, the stakes are high for the Soviets. Is the occupation of Czechoslovakia worth the censure it costs? The country is already an economic liability to the USSR; should it become a political liability as well? Put the other way, can outmoded strategic and psychological considerations outweigh both liabilities?

The message-writers hope not. They suspect that the occupation itself is not really the main issue; after all, there was no occupation in the 1950's, when the worst party excesses took place. The Warsaw Pact forces will leave Czechoslovakia sooner or later, they believe—among other reasons, because of the sustained pressure on the USSR created by détente and the Sino-Soviet split. But the mere departure of the occupation forces will not mean Czechoslovakia's greater independence. The public will no doubt feel a sense of relief and perhaps may even exact some small concessions from the regime; however, it would be illusory to expect more.

The real target of protest, then, is not the occupation *per se* but the complete dependence of the present Czechoslovak leadership and apparat on the Soviet Union. This dependence is epitomized in the prisoner's dilemma of Gustav Husak, a proud, sardonic, ambitious, lonely, embittered man with an extraordinary passion for power, who has been carrying the burden since 1969—and who has failed. He presents a tragic figure: unable to ignore the proddings of the pro-Soviet ultra-conservatives, but unwilling to give in to them too much; relying for assistance on some whom he earlier condemned, but deserted by many who were former friends; wishing to provide prosperity as a palliative for the new restraints on freedom, but failing to sell the trade-off to the public; willing to permit some relaxation to make things easier, but fearing that if he

[26] For still other samples, see a collection of protest messages translated into German and published in Jiri Starek, Ed., *Briefe aus der Tschechoslovakei* (Letters from Czechoslovakia), Cologne, Verlag Styria, 1974.

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Czechoslovak Communist Party First Secretary Gustav Husak (left), with CSSR President Ludvik Svoboda (center) and Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovskiy, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, on the reviewing stand at the conclusion of Warsaw Pact exercises in Czechoslovakia in October 1972.

—Endre Friedmann for Interfoto MTI via Photoreporters.

gives an inch the people will take a mile; wanting to be popular, as Dubcek was, but isolated from the society; needing domestic support, if for no other reason than to increase labor productivity, but, in the process of governing, alienating everyone; unwilling to share power with others, but fearing the concentration of top offices in his own hands (he now wears the hats of Secretary General of the KSC, President of the Republic, Chairman of the Defense Council and of the National Front, and Commander of the Workers' Militia); hoping to improve Czechoslovakia's image abroad, but getting consistently bad publicity instead; and most important, trying to please the Soviet leaders—in the full knowledge that without Soviet support his government would fall apart—but never certain when he may lose their mandate to rule.

In this situation, Husak, his colleagues, and the apparat represent a government on the edge of a slippery cliff. As Josef Smrkovsky described their dilemma (in another notable commentary that reached the West[27]): "They think as follows . . .: We cannot do anything against Moscow. . . . We must adjust in fundamentals and must make our country a quiet, *unsuspect* zone, so that we can do something . . . at least partly . . . in the national interest. . . ." The present leaders regard the washing of Czechoslovakia's dirty linen in public abroad as dangerous not only because it centers world attention on their own precarious position but also because it brings Moscow's wrath down upon them. The Soviet leadership would like nothing better than that the world forget Czechoslovakia. Both Moscow and Prague would like the Czechoslovak case to quiet down, to be less visible, less conspicuous—without further reminders of the invasion and occupation.

Thus, the main objective of the Husak leadership has been to put the lid on the pot, to restore "law and order" in Czechoslovak society, a goal requiring the obedience of the masses to the regime at all levels—at the top, in regions, and in districts. As a major means to that end, the leadership has tried its best to create a relatively prosperous society, offering ample food, decent housing, even cars—a society which, satiated (at least by comparison to the past), would not be tempted to get mixed up in politics.[28] However, things have not worked out the way it hoped. While the economy has in fact reg-

[27] Jan Teren (pseud.), "Night Conversations with Comrade Josef Smrkovsky," *Svedectvi,* Vol. 12, No. 47, 1974, p. 413. Emphasis in the original.

[28] For a useful internal analysis of economic trends, including a lengthy discussion of the standard of living, see Josef Goldman, "The Czechoslovak Economy in the 'Seventies,'" *Politicka ekonomie* (Prague), No. 1, 1975, pp. 1-17. On the improved wage structure, see Jiri Fremr in *Prace a mzda* (Prague), March 17, 1975. For a comparison of Czechoslovak living standards with those of other East European countries and the USSR, see J. Pitlik, "The Differences Are Being Eliminated," *Hospodarske noviny* (Prague), July 19, 1974.

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istered some gains, the support of the public has not been won over, as many of the protest messages testify. Material comfort, it turns out, is not a substitute for dynamic, principled leadership; and Husak and his cohorts, themselves entirely dependent on Moscow, are hardly charismatic types to whom the masses can relate and respond. Nor can the leaders fall back on ideological appeals: as Smrkovsky put it, Marxist-Leninist beliefs "are to them only phrases which must be mouthed on certain occasions. They know well that the ideology has no social effect [any more], that people simply do not believe in it. It is a game whose rules all know, no one disputes them, and everybody cheats. . . . The few believers in the party are considered either naive, primitive, or stupid." [29]

The Power, the People, and the Party

The power of the leadership is hence based not in the society but in the apparat. It is the bureaucratic apparat that controls the chain of command at all levels and in all areas and sectors of political and social life—including the party itself, the ministries, the military, the police, the trade unions, the youth organization, and other institutions. Perhaps a quarter-million strong (out of a total population of over 14 million), members of the apparat, or apparatchiks, are carefully selected by the supreme powerholders to enforce the dictates of the regime.

Yet the apparat is far from homogeneous. Many apparatchiks are simply opportunists who have kowtowed to the new regime and if necessary recanted past "sins" in order to keep a foothold in the power structure. Others got into the apparat by sheer chance and are afraid to back out for fear of the consequences. The ultra-conservatives, mostly in top positions, are more pro-Soviet than the Soviets themselves and give Husak a difficult time. Finally, there are apoliticals who have never trafficked in politics, are without opinions, and thus have survived all the tests of the post-invasion checkups. Willingness to adapt and to obey is their virtue. Generally underlings, they have little ability, experience, knowledge, or skill. All the apparatchiks share one common denominator: fear. They support the regime because their own welfare depends on it. They have existentially grown into the regime—in power, they are everything; without it, nothing.

[29] Teren, *loc. cit.*, p. 414.

The other social strata, however, appear to be almost universally against the authorities. According to all indications, the workers by a large majority do not regard either the party or the government as theirs; on the contrary, they view the regime as hostile. Cooperative farmers appear to be indifferent, concentrating on their own economic and social problems and on their special interests. The economic and technical intelligentsia tend to consider the regime to be without expertise; they work for it because they have no other alternative. The creative and scientific intelligentsia—at least those who made it through the massive checkups and purges—know well for what kind of system they work. Most of them are ashamed that in order to hold onto their positions they lied about their views, while their less

Soviet Party chief Leonid Brezhnev presents a decoration to Vasil Bilak, First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, during an awards ceremony on the occasion of the signing of a 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Czechoslovakia in Prague, May 6, 1970.

—Camera Press.

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compromising colleagues—in many cases including the cream of the crop in particular fields—now dig ditches, if they have jobs at all. The white-collar employees in services such as commerce, trade, health, and transportation do not seem to favor the regime either. As for the youth, practically all of them appear to be hostile. So, too, do the many ex-party members. The first and major wave of purges within the KSC was concluded by the fall of 1970, and Gustav Husak announced its results at a December 1970 Central Committee plenum: the party had declined by 473,731 members, or 28 percent; of these, 326,817 members (almost 22 percent) had been expelled, and the rest had quit.[30] Since 1970, additional expulsions have taken place; the total, according to all accounts, is now well over 500,000 people, or almost one-third of the 1968 membership. In many cases, loss of party cards has meant loss of jobs as well. This is a large force, potentially a dangerous one. It is composed of people with special political experience, many of whom are highly educated, knowledgeable in the intrigues of the apparat, and on friendly terms with some of its remaining members. By all reports, they despise the regime. Could this be the nucleus of an opposition movement in Czechoslovakia? Not at all, according to Smrkovsky: "Undoubtedly, it is a great force which the regime fears. But to speak of it as an opposition is nonsense; it is unorganized, fragmented, watched, and as a whole, powerless." Many of the ex-party members are under surveillance, their telephones are tapped, their mail opened, their visitors photographed, their apartments bugged.[31]

What has all this done to the Communist Party, the "leading progressive force" in Czechoslovakia? According to the message-writers, the KSC is not only an organization of the past—obsolete, regressive, stultified, and doctrinaire—but "a gross and insolent destructive force, an annihilator of human rights and civil liberties." People in an advanced socialist country such as Czechoslovakia have a different image of socialism than that presented by the party today. To them, socialism represents social justice, a modern socialist economy, and a means to achieve national and personal fulfillment. The party is not that. Even in the case of the "proletariat," the party is no longer representative of the workers' struggle for social progress, economic advancement, and other goals of socialism. It is a power organization, pure and simple.[32]

In this country of no real leaders and no real supporters, where everything of importance depends on Moscow but where the rulers keep up the pretense of ruling, where the system keeps running and people keep working and everything more or less keeps going, the citizens seem to feel that they are subject to a kind of historical fate against which any application of will is useless and ineffective. Widespread lethargy, social and political apathy, a mental state devoid of any alternative perspective, pervade the nation. The leadership knows this well. It understands that it has the support of no one except the apparatchiks. But it chooses to interpret the national mood of passivity as a political and ideological victory, maintaining that the population stands steadfastly behind the new socialist order.[33]

Short- and Long-Term Perspectives

The leadership has attempted to shore up its position by fulfilling at least some societal demands. As pointed out earlier, its effort to raise the standard of living has been not unsuccessful economically but has proven ineffective politically. To achieve a compromise with the people, the regime would somehow have to salve their wounded national pride and restore a minimal feeling of national integrity—and that is precisely what the leadership cannot do. This is the dilemma of Husak the prisoner: his hands are tied. A relaxation of controls would be dangerous in a double sense; it could provoke a swift, negative response from the Soviet leaders, or it could start an avalanche at home which he would be too weak to contain. He is hemmed in, hobbled.

There is the further question whether the regime can continue to provide the economic palliatives upon which it has relied in its quest for viability and stability. To further increase the living standard, promote development, and solve a number of pressing economic problems, the government needs the contribution and cooperation of the working force. Yet it is plagued not only by a shortage of labor but by poor labor discipline—as indicated by widespread absenteeism, failure of workers to produce to capacity, and popularization of the motto, "the worse, the better." All this is hardly conducive to party goals. How can adequate popular support

[30] *Rude pravo*, Dec. 15, 1970.
[31] Teren, *loc. cit.*, p. 423.
[32] See *ibid.*, pp. 420-21.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 416.

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be elicited from a withdrawn and alienated society?

To an observer, it seems obvious that the Czechoslovak political system rests on thin ice. There is nothing to indicate that post-invasion "normalization" is succeeding, though at the same time it is clear that the system will not suddenly come apart. Developed political communities, whether socialist or capitalist, cannot do without the participation of their citizens, especially those with education, skill, and expertise, in the socio-economic and political process. But the developed polity must in turn provide an environment conducive to such participation. In Czechoslovakia today, many of those who stand apart are the articulate, the educated, and the expert. Their legitimate demands and needs are simply not being met. Yet, these are people the system cannot do without if it wishes to meet its developmental goals.

Can something be done to make the regime more humane, more responsible, more responsive to people's demands? Smrkovsky had some suggestions:

We must employ all legal means, from the Constitution to individual administrative orders, to insist on the fulfillment of laws. . . . Each citizen can take part in this struggle without great risk. This has nothing to do with anything illegal; this kind of activity is directly based on legality. We must behave with the dignity of citizens, must not retreat before illegal chicaneries, must protect ourselves and our families, utilize everything which can be of assistance in [terms of] legal norms. . . . To overcome fear is the first victory of a person over a system. I consider the moral stand of individuals, *their inner strength and resistance to pressure, as most important [factors] in our struggle for the future. . . . It should not be possible to throw people out of work without their defending their rights. . . . One should protest a decision of a local national board (MNV), say, in a housing issue, which contradicts the letter and spirit of a law. People should not tacitly accept a decision forbidding their sons or daughters to study at a high school or a university because their father was expelled from the party. . . . One should fight such decisions directly, against the individuals responsible, in order that they be known, their names remembered, and they not hide behind the anonymity of collective organs in their illegal acts motivated by fear, opportunism, or vengeance. . . . In this way, the regime would begin to realize the limits of its might. . . . As I see it, the main task of opposition [lies] not in organized illegal activity but in the sustained unmasking of the actual power-holders at all levels, in letting the public know who is who among them, who are the worst, and what acts they have committed.*[34]

A poster portraying cordial relations between Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev and Czechoslovak party chief Gustav Husak at a Soviet exhibition in Prague in January 1973.

—UPI.

This counsel would be sound if Czechoslovakia were a nation of saints. But it is not. It is a nation of ordinary people who would face the wrath, "the

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 421-22.

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chicanery," or "the vengeance" of the powerful on all levels. The risks are indeed great, Smrkovsky's wish to the contrary notwithstanding. A few may follow his advice—and in fact have—but not many. Thus, as has been the case in the past (in 1918, when Czechoslovakia appeared for the first time on the map; in 1938, at the time of the Munich appeasement; in 1948, when the Communist *coup d'état* took place; and in 1968), any change, to be effective, has to originate outside the country rather than at home. It is in this respect that the Husak regime and the Soviet Union are most vulnerable. The letter-writers are right in directing their appeals abroad.

External Factors of Influence

In pursuing Soviet objectives and dealing with problems across a broad range of foreign-policy concerns—including, *inter alia,* détente and the relaxation of tensions, international trade, world opinion, and the conflict with China—Moscow continues to rely on the support of the international Communist movement, or of as many Communist parties as can be mustered to its side. To have several Communist parties disagreeing with the wisdom of the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia—and repeatedly bringing the issue up in public—must, at the least, be disconcerting to the Soviet authorities. The parties in disagreement have been circumspect, but they have seldom left doubt where their sympathies lie. The Spanish CP (in exile) has been the most vocal in its denunciation of the occupation.[35] But far more important, from Moscow's view, has been the reaction of the Italian CP, today perhaps the most influential nonruling party in the Communist movement. Although it has not entered into open argument on the subject with Moscow, the PCI has engaged in many public exchanges with the Husak government. *L'Unità,* the official PCI newspaper, condemned the Soviet invasion in 1968; deplored the purges and political trials of 1970-72; printed a speech which a representative of the PCI was not permitted to deliver at the Czechoslovak Party Congress of 1970; published a long, moving obituary upon the death of Smrkovsky in 1974; carried extracts from the Dubcek letter to Mrs. Smrkovsky; and so forth. In turn, the Husak-controlled press has printed attacks on the PCI and on individual members such as Davide Lajolo for their stand on Czechoslovakia, and the government has twice expelled *L'Unità*'s correspondents from the country (in February 1972 and again in December 1973). Of additional interest, the Italian Socialist Party daily, *Avanti!*, reported that in 1973 Enrico Berlinguer, the Secretary General of the PCI, was asked to deliver a letter from Smrkovsky to Leonid Brezhnev urging liberalization in Czechoslovakia and to reiterate to Brezhnev the PCI's position with respect to the occupation and its negative effect on détente. According to the report, ". . . the PCI did do its part, without publicity. . . ." [36] Again, when *Literaturnaia gazeta* attacked Lajolo for the anti-occupation statements in his journal, *L'Unità* defended him on the ground that he "expressed the [same] position that our party has adopted." [37] (The Italian Communists are, of course, crucially interested in détente, since it reinforces the PCI's independent line and promotes its political influence both at home and in the international Communist movement.)

Other parties have also continued to oppose the occupation, some more openly than others. In France, the Communists have been less vociferous than the Socialists in expressing support for anti-occupation sentiments and forces;[38] nevertheless, the PCF claims that it has not changed its negative view of the invasion. The British and Australian CPs

[35] It is worth noting that the Spanish Communist Party's theoretical paper, *Realidad,* is published in Rome, apparently with the assistance of the PCI.

[36] Luciano Vasconi, "Smrkovsky Is Dead," *Avanti!* (Rome), Jan. 16, 1974. In his letter, Smrkovsky reportedly told Brezhnev how delighted he was with the Soviet policy of détente. He could imagine, he said, that not all Soviet leaders were happy with the policy and likened its opponents to those who had insisted on military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. He then offered his opinion that détente could not succeed as long as Czechoslovakia was occupied. He maintained that while the Husak regime had had some success with the economy, it had failed to solve dire social and political problems that were causing widespread tension and increased anti-Soviet and anti-socialist feeling. Thus, Czechoslovakia was rapidly becoming an unreliable ally of the USSR and a weak member of the socialist community. For this reason, Smrkovsky recommended that negotiations be initiated among the Soviet leaders and representatives of both the Husak and Dubcek regimes without delay.

According to another source (quoted in *Briefe aus der Tschechoslovakei, supra),* Smrkovsky wrote this letter in July 1973. He was warned several times by the secret police not to have the letter published in the West. Apparently, he ignored the warning. For a later account, see *Der Spiegel,* Dec. 9, 1974.

[37] *L'Unità,* Dec. 14, 1972.

[38] Of interest, in November 1971, the Socialist Party held a two-day colloquium on Czechoslovakia and invited Dubcek, Smrkovsky, and Kriegel to attend. None of them was permitted to go, but Smrkovsky managed to send a letter in which he commented on his current situation and on the sad conditions in Czechoslovakia. See *Le Monde,* Dec. 1, 1972, and *Unir-Débat* (Paris), Dec. 10, 1972.

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have remained critical of the occupation and have on occasion published letters and messages from Czechoslovak dissidents in their official publications. Among the parties in power, the Yugoslav regime's sensitivity to the Czechoslovak situation is well-known, though not always visible. The Romanians undoubtedly have similar sentiments, given their own probings for more independence (labeled by one Slovak critic a "policy of walking a tightrope" inspired by "excessive nationalism." [39])

In the effort to keep the case of Czechoslovakia alive, the post-1968 Communist émigrés and exiles have also played an important role. They are the vital link between Czechoslovak society and the international Communist, Socialist, and leftist movements. Unlike the post-1948 émigrés and exiles, who were essentially anti-Communists, this new wave of ex-party members has not only broad support at home but a ready forum outside Czechoslovakia. They claim to speak on behalf of the great majority of Czechoslovak citizens and are listened to with attention by the Left abroad. Their major aim is to keep as much attention as possible focused on continuing events in occupied Czechoslovakia. In this they have been fairly effective, especially in Europe. There is some irony in the fact that the exiles, working in cooperation with opponents of the regime at home and with foreign Communist parties, seek an objective that is shared by the Husak government—in that both sides wish the occupation forces would withdraw from Czechoslovakia and that the country could become less dependent on the USSR.

[39] *Smena* (Bratislava), March 10, 1975.

Future Prospects

The possibilities for the future of Czechoslovakia depend on a number of factors, not the least of which are changes in the personnel and the attitudes of the Warsaw Pact countries since 1968. In the Soviet Union, half of the Politburo members who pushed for the invasion are no longer on that body; of the three principal hawks, the Stalinist Arvid Pelshe is retiring, and Brezhnev and Andrei Kirilenko now claim to be détente doves. Hungary's moderate



Czechoslovakia's V. I. Lenin works (built on the ruins of the Skoda factory)—producer of steam turbines, rolling mills, foundry equipment, trolley buses, locomotives, and other heavy equipment.

—Camera Press.

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and experienced Janos Kadar has become a friend—and perhaps even advisor—to Gustav Husak. Poland's astute Edward Gierek is certainly not another Gomulka. And East Germany's Erich Honecker is also very different from his Stalinist predecessor, Walter Ulbricht.

A number of other factors may affect the course of events. In Czechoslovakia itself, there is Husak's crucial need to gain a measure of popular support, if for no other reason than to improve the low productivity—and low morale—of the numerically inadequate labor force, in a situation where the obsolete Soviet socioeconomic model must still be followed. In the Soviet Union, leadership decisions are bound to be influenced both by domestic problems (notably, kinks in the economic system, recurring crises in agriculture, and growing tensions among nationalities) and by Moscow's aspirations abroad (including détente with the Western powers; increased trade with Europe, the United States, and Japan; and improved relations with other Communist parties in view of the cold war with China). In Eastern Europe, there have been many changes since 1968—in governmental structures and foreign policies as well as in leaderships—and, perhaps more important, the area is rapidly becoming a Soviet economic luxury. In the international Communist movement, among the Socialists, and on the Left in general, sharply dissenting views persist with respect to the occupation—views fed by the continuous stream of dissident messages from Czechoslovakia effectively disseminated by ex-citizens abroad. Finally, there is the factor of world public opinion, to which the Soviet leaders have become increasingly sensitive.

Given all these considerations, is it so unthinkable that doubts about the wisdom of continuing the military occupation of Czechoslovakia might creep into the minds of the Soviet leaders? And might not these doubts beget other doubts about the wisdom of perpetuating the absolute dependency of Czechoslovakia on the USSR—a dependency which weakens the whole socialist community? Might it not occur to the Soviet leaders that in addition to being an economic, political and psychological burden, Czechoslovakia could become an unreliable military ally—a chink in the armor of the Warsaw Pact.

It is true that the Soviet leaders are not known for their creative ingenuity; all things being equal, they would rather leave well enough alone than stir up a potential hornet's nest. The question is whether they can afford the status quo. After all, the message-writers do not propose the Finlandization of Czechoslovakia. What they plead for is a relationship of limited dependence on the Soviet Union, under conditions that would encourage economic and social development, would look toward Czechoslovakia's partnership in an advanced socialist community, and would permit the pursuit of socialist goals as a means of personal and national fulfillment within that community.

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Books

"World Communism" in Fragments

By Neil McInnes

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH: *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* —1973. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974.
RICHARD F. STARR, Ed.: *1975 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1975.

THE FACT THAT the US Department of State will no longer produce its annual handbook on Communist Party strengths (after this final volume) is a sign of the times. More specifically, it is a sign of the breakup and decay of the entity, "world communism." The handbook lost its subject. The world Communist movement not only fragmented as a global phenomenon, but within the frontiers of non-Communist countries it frequently was lost, outflanked, and overwhelmed in a magma of oppositional and revolutionary forces —that very magma from which Lenin extracted it 70 years ago.

The quantitative pretentions of the handbook made it especially vulnerable to these changes, for the one certainty about radical opposition in the Americas and West Europe today is that it cannot be measured, in the way (it was once believed) that "card-carrying members" of an official Communist Party could be head-counted. Such head-counting was always subject to a huge margin of error, even in peaceful situations like that in contemporary France. But once a revolutionary situation threatened or supervened, the notion of counting lost meaning. The membership of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) shot up from about 1,000 (according to the handbook) under the dictatorship to 100,000 in the first month of the revolution—whereupon the PCP stopped issuing statistics or even, it seems, distributing party cards. Guesses and claims about the Spanish party's size range from 5,000 to 150,000; one figure could be correct this week, and the other next week. Obviously, it would be useless to record the earlier figure as a clue to the party's prospects.

Furthermore, the estimated party strengths no longer add up to a total. They are no longer comparable, as quantities of the same thing. That thing, "world communism," has disintegrated into a large number of incompatible political entities of widely varying natures. This fact alone probably determined the fate of the handbook in the eyes of the practical men who manage US diplomacy. If you cannot add the Spanish party's strength to that of the French party, or compare the strength of the Australian party with that of the New Zealand party (because the membership figures are no longer measurements of manifestations of the same political force), then practical men lose interest. A "shortage of funds," such as occurs whenever practical men lose faith in an enterprise, duly supervened, and the handbook was killed. It belonged to an age when Western governments believed they could get approximate but significant measurements of the threat they faced from one single important base of radical opposition.

TO BE SURE, scholars might well still be interested in what practical men no longer find useful. The editors of the *1975 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* in fact express regret at the passing of "such a valuable research tool" as the handbook. Yet the very changes that spelled the demise of the handbook are also undermining the yearbook. Only in its title does it still pretend to deal with one entity, world communism. In its text, it has become a yearbook on (a) ruling collectivist parties and (b) revolutionary and radical opposition in other countries. It is now, in effect, an en-

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cyclopedia of world politics that focuses on what we vaguely call radical leftist forces (the only alternative to vagueness being inaccuracy).

The editors would no doubt resist the suggestion that its name be changed. For one thing, as scholars they would be dismayed by the loose, subjective air of a title like *Yearbook of Radical Politics,* as contrasted with the formerly precise titular reference to "world communism." For another thing, they would point out that the yearbook describes oppositional politics in each country by putting the local Communist Party at the center of the picture. Unfortunately, this has in many cases become a mere artifice. For example, in the chapter on Mexico (where the Communist Party is not proletarian, or radical, or particularly pro-Soviet), more space is devoted, of necessity, to the Popular Socialist Party and the guerrilla movements. Similarly, in Canada, Belgium, Turkey, Ceylon, and even Spain, there is no advantage in giving privileged position to the Communist Party in the radical opposition. In many parts of the world, that party has lost its monopoly of protest power and has even been outnumbered by other subversive forces.

Portugal over the past year has been instructive in this respect. By concentrating attention on the PCP, observers have tended to overlook the power of the ebullient ultraleft, which played a considerable role in the subversion of the armed forces and in the "revolutionary process" that was wholly credited to the PCP. When the revolutionary tide ebbed, in the Communists' view at least, the ultraleft emerged as its rival and dangerous enemy. Regardless of how the affair ends, we have seen how often Bolshevik tactics (Lenin's science of revolution) boomeranged on the PCP and helped those to its left. For example, appealing to "the masses" was in the past a useful Communist tactic that meant going over the heads of representative parties and authorities to mobs that were in practice led and manipulated by Communist revolutionaries. But that tactic failed in Portugal when "the masses" who invaded politics (and to whom newspapers, radio stations, and business enterprises were handed over) turned out to be ruthless bands of anti-Communist, anti-Soviet ultraleftists.

The way the PCP has repeatedly been hoist by its own petard has not been lost on other Communist parties. The Italian and Spanish parties have openly criticized the PCP for taking such risks, showing that they have become nervous about revolutionary situations that can get out of hand—out of Communist hands, that is. The French party has refused to be openly critical, but it feels more strongly than ever that it was correct in May and June 1968 to shun a revolutionary situation and to side ("objectively") with constituted authority.

The point here is that given the emergence of situations in which the official Communist Party is not the principal subversive force in a country but actually fears subversive violence as a danger to itself, then it becomes bad logic and also bad taxonomy to describe revolutionary forces as variants of communism and to catalog the lot in a yearbook of Communist parties.

Needless to say, there *are* places where the Communist Party is still the main base of radical opposition (though very often in these cases—*e.g.,* in Italy—the question arises whether and to what degree the party is still subversive, revolutionary, and

Reviewers in This Issue

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SIDNEY I. PLOSS—Soviet Affairs Analyst, US Department of State (Washington, DC); author of *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963,* 1965.

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pro-Soviet). Admittedly, too, there are links between many Communist parties, so that a global treatment of the subject might still seem in order. What has to be clarified, however, is the direction and limitation of those links (*i.e.*, how many parties are embraced in each of the competing Communist movements), and whether they are genuine organizational ties such as once existed in the Comintern or whether they merely represent lip service to a dead internationalist ideal.

ON THE LATTER point, the yearbook is useful because each chapter has a section on "international party contacts." By analyzing the information therein, the reader can perceive in what sense "international Communist affairs" still exist. It emerges that some parties are actively hostile to the very notion of "international Communist affairs" if it implies "international communism"; others agree that an international dimension exists but have a conception of it violently distasteful to Moscow; others, again, seem to wish the whole question would go away. (One wonders if a Communist Party has ever written to the Hoover Institution and demanded to be omitted from the next yearbook. Probably not, but then illegitimate aristocrats do not write asking to be dropped from the Gotha almanac of noble families.)

The upshot is that only a minority of Communist parties have that unitary, global view of "international Communist affairs" which the Kremlin (and the editors of the yearbook—for purely methodological reasons, of course) would wish to see accepted. Indeed, the yearbook quotes a calculation by one source (p. 137) that only nine out of 65 nongoverning parties publicly supported the latest Soviet call for a worldwide party conference. (That source is significantly entitled *The Myth of World Communism*, by Leopold Gruenwald.) The veritable labor of Sisyphus that the Kremlin has undertaken to secure a meeting of even the European parties underscores the point.

If the European conference does eventually take place, the prospective participants have agreed that it must not discuss anything beyond what Moscow discussed with "bourgeois" governments in Helsinki this year: international peace, cooperation, and security. Specifically censored as possible subjects of debate are: the class struggle under capitalism, collaboration with Western socialists, and the construction of socialism in East Europe. In short, if "international Communist affairs" exist, most European parties do not want to talk about them.

The sympathy one feels for parties that combat the unitary views of Moscow and seek to consolidate independent national Communist policies should not blind one to the fact that such efforts are intelligently incoherent. To maintain a Leninist machine but to cut it off from the mystique of world communism and from the reality of Soviet (or Chinese) power is a contradictory undertaking that must fail. In warning the Japanese and Spanish parties of this fact, Moscow was only being reasonable. The hallmark of a Communist party—the element that distinguishes it from Socialist parties of the Second International—is "proletarian internationalism," which means imbrication in a world movement with a national power base. Cut off from that movement and that stronghold, a Leninist party either backslides to social democracy or else degenerates into factionalism (if it is a nonruling party) or warring cliques (if it is in power).

Communist party leaders around the world who are trying to get free of Moscow (without siding with Peking) presumably know of these risks. That is why they cover over their quest for bureaucratic autonomy with talk of continued cooperation between parties "on a footing of equality," through "unity in diversity," and similar subterfuges. The Spanish party is perhaps the most hypocritical on this score. To quote Ignacio Gallego: "Unity is only possible in diversity and on the basis of respect for the independence of each party and for its right to elaborate its own national and international policies and to maintain the position it considers most correct on each problem." [1] Apparently Sr. Gallego does not know what "unity" means—either in a Leninist sense or by simple dictionary definition. Soviet commentators were correct to say the Spaniards' line "includes not one ounce of proletarian internationalism" but "reeks with nationalism." [2]

Apart from its deviation from Leninism, such a stance involves a deviation from political realism. No international organization could function if it put "on a footing of equality" the mighty Soviet party, which is also the government of the world's second power, and—*e.g.*—bands of Communist exiles from small Latin American and Mediterranean countries. Nor

[1] I. Gallego, *El Partido de masas que necesitamos* (The Mass Party We Need), Paris, Editions Sociales, 1971, p. 48.

[2] Quoted in Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon, "Spanish Communism in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1975, p. 51.

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could a rival organization have as equal members the powerful Chinese Communist Party and a clique of "Maoist" political freaks calling themselves the Communist Party of New Zealand. Nor again, could the defense of Western interests and ideals be furthered by an organization in which the US government had the same weight as—say—a handful of refugees from the Baltic states.

The conception of "world Communist affairs" put forward by those Communist bureaucrats who want the advantages of a Leninist machine without the liabilities of the Soviet connection is absurd. For the time being, nevertheless, they seem to be gaining ground, at the expense of what is left of "world communism." Which raises the question of how long the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* can survive the *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations.*

The Soviet Model and Its Prospects

By Melvin Croan

TIBOR SZAMUELY: *The Russian Tradition.* New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975.
HENRY W. MORTON and RUDOLF L. TŐKÉS, Eds.: *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's.* New York, The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974.
CHARLES GATI, Ed.: *The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe: Testing the Soviet Model.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.
HENRY KRISCH: *German Politics under Soviet Occupation.* New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1974.

IN A SERIES of lectures delivered some 30 years ago at Oxford, E. H. Carr depicted "the Soviet impact on the Western world" in terms of the broader challenge to individualism and democracy posed by advanced technology and mass society.[1] A tentative harbinger of the notion of "convergence" between the Soviet Union and Western systems, Carr's observations exerted scant initial appeal. Rather, with the brutal exactions of Stalinism inside the USSR, the extension of the Soviet sphere to Eastern Europe, and the cold war between East and West, the Soviet experience was quickly subsumed under the rubric of totalitarianism, an approach predicated upon apparent similarities between the Soviet regime and Nazi Germany. But the totalitarian school did not hold sway for very long. By the early 1960's, many observers had come to regard the Soviet Union as a model of rapid economic development and sociopolitical modernization of particular relevance to the Third World. Yet, once Soviet influence there experienced some setbacks, focus upon the USSR as a developmental model waned also. Today, even among those who regard anything approximating complete convergence as highly improbable, attention is likely to be directed to those problems the Soviet Union shares with other advanced industrial societies. Discussion of its prospects in the face of what is assumed to be the common challenge of "postindustrial society" thus willy-nilly evokes recollection of Carr's early approach.

The almost full circle encompassed by Western interpretive fashions has come in for its fair share of criticism on the part of Soviet commentators. Having some time ago pounced on the concept of totalitarianism as utter anathema, they have more recently reserved their ire for the notion of convergence. Each and every *teoriya edinogo industrialnogo obshchestva* ("theory of a single industrial society"), it has been repeatedly charged, conceals an insidious ideological shaft aimed at subverting the Soviet system. In a more positive vein, Soviet experience continues to be upheld as a unique model of universal significance. To be sure, pronouncements on the applicability of the Soviet model elsewhere frequently make allowance for distinctive na-

[1] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World,* New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947.

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tional conditions. Nonetheless, primary emphasis is always accorded to the general applicability of all the basic features of the Soviet system, a point that is typically underscored by reference to the role of the Soviet Union as pacemaker in devising effective solutions to universal problems. Indeed, particular aspects of Soviet experience are often recommended for adoption elsewhere in quite specific detail. To cite one recent example, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the USSR as a multinational union, many commentaries explicitly prescribed further international integration among the states of the socialist community along the lines of the domestic Soviet model.

The counterpoint between Western interpretations and Soviet claims raises a number of tantalizing issues. Assuming there is agreement on the basic features of the Soviet model, can we identify the traditional cultural factors that helped shape it in the first place? How deeply has it taken root when actually transplanted from Russia onto foreign soil? And, whatever its past achievements, is the Soviet model really adequate to the current challenge of modernization, or has it become a drag on further development? All the books presently under review shed light upon one or more of these crucial concerns. Each, in one fashion or another, contributes something to our understanding of the dynamics and dilemmas of the Soviet model.

TIBOR SZAMUELY's *The Russian Tradition* rejects the view that the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution marked a radical break with the past. On the contrary, it argues that Leninism constituted a continuation and indeed led to an intensification, in a new guise, of traditional Russian authoritarianism. Endorsing the descriptions of critical foreign travelers to Russia over the centuries, Szamuely stresses "the astonishing durability of certain key social and political institutions, traditions, habits, and attitudes; their staying-power, their essential stability amidst the turbulent currents of violent change, chaotic upheaval, and sudden innovation" (p. 6).

This gloomy interpretation of Russian history is scarcely novel, but rarely has it been put forth with such sustained analytical prowess. Szamuely's treatment of Russia's historical development before 1917 is divided into two parts. The first, running up through the reign of Nicholas I, deals with the "Russian state tradition." It examines the peculiar concatenation of geopolitical forces and cultural conditions that fostered the dominance of state over society in terms suggestive at times of the French *Annales* school and its crowning achievement to date, Braudel's study of Mediterranean civilizations.[2] The second part of the study, devoted to the 19th century and "the Russian revolutionary tradition," includes a cutting discussion of the intelligentsia as "not so much a class as a state of mind." Some students may feel that Szamuely has exaggerated the idealization of the state in Russian revolutionary thought, but few will quarrel with his account of the pervasiveness of intolerant fanaticism and self-serving elitism within revolutionary ranks. Szamuely contends that on balance the Russian revolutionary tradition not only recast but also strengthened the Russian state tradition, and that it fell to Lenin to fuse the two into what might be designated "revolutionary traditionalism." Precisely how this was actually accomplished by Lenin and further developed by his successors is left open. These themes would doubtless have been explored in subsequent volumes, had not an early death cut short the career of a brilliant and controversial scholar who himself had abundant first-hand experience of many of the most oppressive realities of the Russian tradition in Soviet life.[3]

STRIKING AN entirely different note, the editors of *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's* accentuate "the Soviet system's continued capacity for evolutionary change." A fine collective effort in honor of John N. Hazard by his former political science students at Columbia's Russian Institute, this book presents diverse essays ranging from broadly focused analyses to a number of case studies of particular problems (including cotton growing in Soviet Central Asia, local government in the Georgian city of Kutaisi, the role of women in Soviet politics, housing, crime, and welfare). All of the studies can be read with profit, although the extent to which they add up to proof of the Soviet system's "capacity for evolution-

[2] Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols., New York, Harper & Row, 1974.

[3] Born in Moscow in 1925, Szamuely went to England as a young boy but returned to Russia with his family in the mid-1930's. His uncle, the well-known Hungarian Communist, Gyorgi Szamuely, disappeared in Stalin's Great Purge. Tibor Szamuely served in the Soviet Army and attended Moscow University but was himself arrested in 1951 and spent time in a camp in the Vorkuta area. Szamuely moved to Budapest in 1958. While on a lecture assignment in Ghana in the mid-1960's, he and his family decided to settle in England.

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ary change" may well be queried. Much depends, of course, on one's concept of change itself, something that has generated no end of confusion, as William Taubman's delightfully irreverent survey of major Western theories of Soviet change, appearing as the final chapter in the book, so well illustrates. Out of the conceptual wreckage he has wrought, Taubman salvages the notion of "bureaucratic pluralism." What he has in mind seems consonant with coeditor Rudolf Tökés' analysis of dissent as "the politics *for* change in the USSR," which broaches the intriguing possibility of "a growing degree of interdependence between the regime and its domestic, instrumental-pragmatic critics" (p. 40).

As concerns the quintessential, as yet unreconstructed Soviet model, two other contributions to the volume edited by Morton and Tökés deserve special mention. One of these, David E. Albright's systematic examination of the Soviet appeal to the Third World, convincingly demonstrates that Moscow's set of methods for attaining political power and its techniques of rapid modernization no longer exert anything like the influence they were once thought to have. Nonetheless, Albright sagely cautions that limitations on the viability of alternative developmental strategies may yet impart renewed relevance to the Soviet model. In a rather different and somewhat discursive essay, Paul Shoup examines the similarities and differences between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Despite their shared background of economic backwardness and a common Leninist road to modernization, Shoup finds that significant divergences persist and novel ones have emerged.

THE MANY VARIED consequences of the imposition of the Soviet model serve as a unifying theme of the *Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe,* which comprises all of the papers and many of the commentaries presented at a 1973 Columbia University conference. In addition to the usual case studies, this volume also features much speculation on key analytical issues, including the question of the precise meaning of concepts such as "modernization" and "political development" and their applicability to Eastern Europe. Through the welter of diverse opinions on these and other matters, one's attention is repeatedly refocused on what Charles Gati rightly singles out as a fundamental question: Was the Soviet model of modernization helpful or detrimental to the development of Eastern Europe? This particular issue receives highly sophisticated treatment at the hands of Vernon Aspaturian, who, together with several other contributors, also notes the changes to which the Soviet model has been subjected in different Eastern European settings. In view of the breadth of coverage, it is somewhat surprising that the topic of Eastern Europe's growing integration with the Soviet Union should have been overlooked entirely in the volume, while consideration of the area's future prospects is both sparse and uninspired.

FEW STUDENTS of Eastern Europe would deny that, human costs aside, Sovietization accomplished the rapid socioeconomic transformation of traditional societies into modern structures. Yet, it is well to bear two facts in mind. First, pre-Communist Eastern Europe was not uniformly backward, and, secondly, modernization is not a *terminus ad quem* but rather an ongoing process. With respect to both considerations, the experience of East Germany, an advanced industrial society before the Communist takeover, may be illustrative. Just how "modern" is the German Democratic Republic today? Granted, East Germany possesses all the basic features of the Soviet model, which it acquired in a relatively gradual fashion. The process dates back to the early fusion of the Soviet zone's SPD (Social Democratic Party) and KPD (Communist Party), engineered by the Soviet occupation authorities in a series of maneuvers ably described by Henry Krisch's monograph on *German Politics Under Soviet Occupation.* The subsequent consolidation of Communist political power went hand in hand with the enactment of socioeconomic measures that eradicated the last vestiges of the traditional German social structure. In the view of Ralf Dahrendorf, the distinguished West German sociologist who now heads the London School of Economics, the Communists produced their own solution to Germany's retarded social development, and, as a result, East Germany must now be regarded as an authentically modern society.[4] Why, then, do visitors so quickly discover—either to their delight or to their dismay—so many more manifestations of the "old Germany" in the eastern Democratic Republic than in the western Federal Republic? Is this merely a case of culture-bound perception? Or could it possibly be that these remnants from the past have been sustained and even strengthened

[4] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany,* Garden City, New York, Anchor Books, 1969, *passim,* esp. Chap. 26.

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by the set of institutions, processes, and sociopsychological attitudes that comprise the Soviet model? And, if the latter is the case, what does that portend for the future of the Soviet system itself?

Had he been pressed for his answer, Tibor Szamuely might well have quoted the Marquis de Custine. "Tyranny," that French traveler to Russia under Nicholas I wrote, "invents only the means of consolidating itself."[5] A biting remark but one that is surely no less apposite than E. H. Carr's, now echoed by so many other Sovietologists, that "no human institutions or order of society ever stands still."[6]

[5] *Journey for our Time,* trans. and ed. by P. P. Kohler, London, Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1953, p. 229.
[6] Carr, *op. cit.,* p. 113.

The Historian and the Kremlin

By Sidney I. Ploss

NANCY W. HEER: *Politics and History in the Soviet Union.* Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1971.

IN THIS WORK, Dr. Heer takes a step away from the traditional Western view that the writing of history in the USSR constitutes a mirror of political events. Skillfully employing a rich variety of source materials spanning the years 1956-66, she disputes the notion that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been able to maintain rigid control over Soviet historians, and she demonstrates that a dialogue between professional historians and politicians has now emerged.

As Ms. Heer shows, there is a general conservative-revisionist polarity among Soviet historians, though the precise spectrum of professional opinion varies with the particular historical issue. But, remarkably, a sense of professional group identity and pride has begun to infect even conservative historians reared on the idea that history is nothing more than current-day politics retroactively imposed upon the past. Some historians now demand that researchers using the party archives be accorded access to all unpublished documents; others call for an analysis of the mechanisms of power that allowed Josef Stalin to establish himself as the unchallengeable head of the party. It is quite likely that such heretical thinking helps to explain the brutal response of the Soviet leadership to the dismantling of the thought-control system in neighboring Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Ms. Heer, to be sure, does not ignore the fact that historiography can also serve as a vehicle of high-level political debate and a weapon of factional infighting. Indeed, she offers invaluable advice in suggesting that the Western analyst of contemporary Soviet politics should read the official magazine of party history with the same care that he ordinarily devotes to *Pravda*—especially in connection with behind-the-scenes discussions within ruling circles over the methods of government associated with Stalin. In light of the increased secrecy surrounding political processes in the USSR under Leonid Brezhnev, as compared with the situation under his less conservative predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev, sources of information about these processes are at a premium, and Ms. Heer performs no small service in illustrating the utility of historical writings in this regard. Nevertheless, her main contribution lies in the picture she provides of the contemporary relationship between historians and politicians.

This pathbreaking study, however, may tend to exaggerate recent progress in the "de-ideologizing" of historiography, a branch of scholarship which Stalin had brought under his personal control and gravely hobbled. For instance, the portrayal of Leon Trotsky as an archvillain remains "one of the few fixed points" in Soviet historiography, and there still cannot be objective scrutiny of a host of

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topics ranging from the life and outlook of Vladimir Lenin to the origins of the cold war. Nor can anyone openly link such milestones as the fiasco of agricultural collectivization and the launching of the Great Purge in the 1930's.

Ms. Heer's coverage of the "new" approach to the role of the Bolsheviks in the overthrow of the Tsarist regime also obscures the treadmill nature of much of Soviet historical writing. She notes that orthodox historians who wish to demolish their reformist colleagues' evidence of spontaneous uprisings in March 1917 argue that street demonstrations, while not literally sparked by the Bolsheviks, grew out of their prior work with the masses, and she holds that this version of events "moved the dialogue onto another and more sophisticated level." But this argument is in reality a throwback to the make-believe that Trotsky set forth in his *History of the Russian Revolution.*[1]

Of perhaps greater importance, an unwary reader may gain a false impression about the relationship between the top leader of the CPSU and Soviet historiography. Ms. Heer implies that the head of the party is the only one in the Kremlin who can employ historiography as a political tool. Yet V. M. Molotov's article of April 1957 praising Stalin's "short course" history of the party and in effect apologizing for Stalin's crimes clearly indicates that others can press historiography into factional service too.[2] By the same token, the refusal of Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy, the Soviet Minister of Defense, to sing the praises of Khrushchev on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad[3] suggests that Khrushchev never acquired Stalin's status as the supreme arbiter of Soviet political history.

The book suffers as well from some inaccuracies. For example, contrary to what Ms. Heer states, Molotov was praised in the 1959 edition of the official textbook, *The History of the CPSU*, for his part in vanquishing the Trotskyites in 1926-27.[4] Similarly, the introduction of Stalin as a tragic historical figure came not in 1959 but in 1956: Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 lamented "the whole tragedy" of Stalinist misrule.[5]

Moreover, the analysis has to some extent been overtaken by events. For instance, it is no longer true that "the figure of Stalin has been eased offstage." Since at least 1968, party historians have cited his writings in a positive vein. To take but two other illustrations, current treatments of the anti-Stalin opposition forces of the 1920's have revived old charges of treason, and the general penalties imposed upon Soviet historians accused of revisionism have increased from time to time.

In spite of these imperfections, however, Ms. Heer's work belongs on the reading list of every college student interested in Soviet studies. It displays industrious and down-to-earth scholarship at a time when writing on the Soviet Union, especially in the United States, exhibits alarming symptoms of tired blood and misplaced scientism.

[1] F. W. Dupee, Ed., *The Russian Revolution. The Overthrow of Tsarism and the Triumph of the Soviets* (selections from Leon Trotsky's *The History of the Russian Revolution)*, Garden City, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959, pp. 147 and 161.

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), April 22, 1957.

[3] *Ibid.*, Feb. 2, 1963.

[4] *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1959, p. 384.

[5] See Basil Dmytryshyn, *USSR. A Concise History*, New York, Charles Schribner's Sons, 1965, p. 442.

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The Maoist Ideology
Roots and Political Impact

By Louis A. Barth

FREDERICK WAKEMAN, JR.: *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973.
CHALMERS JOHNSON, Ed.: *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China*. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1973.

THE ONGOING scholarly discussion of ideology and its uses might strike many as ambiguous, interminable, and tiresome. Two recent events, however, remind us that, at least in the Communist world, ideology remains a persistent and preoccupying reality. In the USSR, we have witnessed a sharp public disagreement between two prominent dissidents, both Nobel Prize winners—the physicist Andrei D. Sakharov and the exiled author Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn—over the influence of official ideology in Soviet society, with Sakharov arguing that Solzhenitsyn had exaggerated its role and that the Soviet regime makes pragmatic use of ideology merely as a "convenient facade."[1] Meanwhile, in the People's Republic of China, the 1974 ideological campaign of denunciation against Lin Piao and Confucius and the still more recent renewal of calls for unremitting anti-rightist struggle have testified once again to the undiminished importance of ideology in that Communist society.

In view of these happenings and the fact that the role of ideology has been less explored in relation to the PRC than in relation to the USSR, the two books under review focusing on Maoist ideology and the 1966–69 Cultural Revolution are a welcome addition to the steadily growing body of literature on contemporary Chinese politics. Wakeman's book and the volume edited by Chalmers Johnson diverge quite sharply in their views of the relative importance of ideology *vs.* practice in the genetic and evolutionary stages of the Communist revolution in China: Wakeman stresses the importance of the theoretical origins of Mao's revolutionary program, while Johnson sees the essays in his volume as supporting the view of Michael Oakshott that political ideology arises rather as "a meditation on a manner of politics" than as a "pre-meditation in advance of political activity" (p. vi). Different as they are, however, the two books do treat of common subjects and in some ways complement each other, making it profitable to discuss them together.

WAKEMAN'S BOOK is a comprehensive study of the intellectual development and ultimate views of Mao Tse-tung in relation to the theory underlying the Cultural Revolution and represents an attempt by the author to present a historical explanation of that "paradoxical" episode. How could Mao, the dedicated Marxist revolutionary, contravene Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy by turning his back on the party and invoking assumption by the masses of the party's leadership role? Dissatisfied with the analyses of other scholars such as Stuart Schram, Maurice Meissner, Jerome Ch'en and Benjamin Schwartz, Wakeman felt he could not dismiss Mao as a mere pragmatist without a theory to inform his revolutionary practice, and he therefore takes Mao "seriously" with respect to the Chinese leader's presumed theoretical assumptions. Reasoning that Mao's philosophical de-

[1] Sakharov took issue with Solzhenitsyn's view of official ideology as a root cause of evil in Soviet society in an open letter replying to Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" of September 5, 1973, which was published abroad after the latter's expulsion from the USSR in February 1974. An English translation of Solzhenitsyn's letter was published by Harper & Row in 1974 under the title *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*. An English translation of Sakharov's reply appeared in *The New York Review of Books*, June 13, 1974, and is also included in *Sakharov Speaks*, edited by Harrison Salisbury and published by Knopf in 1974.

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velopment might supply the key to the "contradiction" of the Cultural Revolution, Wakeman delves into the theoretical influences which came to bear on Mao during his early life and student days and on into adulthood. This thorough search takes the reader through the history of Chinese philosophy from the classics to modern times, and it leads him through the thought of some of the modern European philosophers as well.

The author broadly states in his introduction (p. xii) that he proposes "to present a logically coherent exposition of the philosophical foundations of Sino-Western thought," but he is selective in his study of the various Chinese and European philosophers, singling out only those philosophical ideas which in his opinion are likely to have contributed to the formation of Mao's revolutionary theory.

The meaning of the title of Wakeman's book becomes clear when he describes the Cultural Revolution as that moment "when history (bureaucratic routinization) and will (Mao's permanent revolution) conflicted dramatically" (p. xiii). The author's ultimate insight is that for Mao the two contradictories, will and history, are necessary for their mutual existence, and that their antithetical struggle is equally demanded. "Without will there would be no history. And without history, no will at all," he writes (p. 327). Thus, the book is essentially a study of the philosophical genesis and evolution of Mao's theory of history and will. And it is here that he finds the answer to the "contradiction" of the Cultural Revolution.

Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China is a collection of ten essays by well-known China specialists dealing with "the interaction of ideology and politics" in recent Chinese history. The volume resulted from the fifth conference sponsored by the Subcommittee on Chinese Government and Politics of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, which took place at Santa Fe, New Mexico, in August 1971.[2] Of the ten essays, three or four deal more or less directly with the development of Mao's revolutionary theory and thus cover some of the same ground searched by Wakeman. However, they do so in a quite different manner, and none of them explores the influence of European philosophy on Maoist thought as Wakeman does.

Of the essays relevant to Maoist revolutionary theory in the Johnson volume, John Israel's provides a perceptive discussion of the "Continuities and Discontinuities in the Ideology of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." While pointing to traditional Chinese ways of thought that perdure in Chinese Communist theory, Israel warns of the dangers inherent in the emphasis placed by Western scholars on the "discovery" of what, viewed from a Western perspective, appear to be continuities in Chinese thought (a caution that might well have been heeded by Wakeman). "It may be more important," he writes (p. 46), "to understand how the *Chinese* think they relate to their past than to speculate about how *we* think they relate to it" (emphasis added). Lawrence Sullivan and Richard H. Solomon provide a detailed content analysis of the journal *Hsin Ch'ing-nien* (New Youth) with a view to tracing the influence of its intellectual themes on the thinking of the young Mao and his contemporaries—a subject also discussed in one of Wakeman's chapters, which presents complementary yet contrasting insights. Jerome Ch'en addresses himself to the evolution of Mao's thinking that resulted in the formulation of his "mass line." Whereas Wakeman looks at this aspect of Maoism primarily from the standpoint of the philosophical influences on Mao's thought, Ch'en sees the "mass line" as a pragmatic formula for solving China's problems derived more from practice than from theory.

Other essays in the Johnson volume which touch in some way on subjects falling within the purview of Wakeman's wide-ranging synthesis are Merle Goldman's fascinating account of the ideological debates of 1962-64 between the intellectuals who wished to reestablish harmony in Chinese society and the orthodox Maoists who called for intensified struggle; Byung-Joon Ahn's description of the academic debates of 1959-62 relative to the Great Leap Forward; and Benjamin I. Schwartz's reflective discussion of Mao's conception of science (a "Baconian-pragmatic view") and his opposition to bureaucratism, both of which Schwartz sees as a reaffirmation of the indispensability of the center (Mao).

Ideology and Politics also includes a number of articles on topics not discussed by Wakeman. Richard H. Solomon, borrowing psychoanalyst Erik H. Eriksen's doubtfully appropriate concept of

[2] As noted in the introduction to the Johnson volume (p. vii), the participants in the conference "addressed themselves in general and in detail to the influence of the Chinese revolution on Chinese Communist ideology."

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the developing personality and combining it with Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba's notion of crises of political development, attempts to describe the interaction of Maoist ideology with reality in the various stages of the Chinese Communist revolution. Suzanne Pepper provides a sympathetic study of the *crise de conscience* of China's urban intellectuals as they gradually came to terms with the Communist program. Rensselaer W. Lee III, in an essay on the interplay of "politics" and technology, concludes that Maoist policies relating to technology spring from a combination of Marxist ideology and Chinese nativism. Philip L. Bridgham interprets the abrupt shift to the right in domestic and foreign policy following the leftist excesses and so-called "revolutionary diplomacy" of the Cultural Revolution as Maoist ideology's response to the forces of political reality both in China and abroad. The overall picture of Chinese Communist ideology that emerges from most of the essays in *Ideology and Polititcs* is one of "a self-justifying dogma, a doctrine manipulated to fit practical needs," as Bridgham puts it (p. 349). Perhaps Sakharov's characterization of ideology in the USSR as "a convenient façade" would be just as apt in the case of China.

THUS, BOTH *History and Will* and *Ideology and Politics* treat extensively of ideology and ideological influences. How, then, do the various authors conceive of ideology and ideological influences? And what can be said about the methodologies they have employed in their research? These questions, to be sure, are more relevant to the Johnson volume than to Wakeman's, but they may usefully be applied to the latter as well. As noted earlier, *Ideology and Politics* professes to deal with "the interaction of ideology and politics" in recent Chinese history. But if the meaning of ideology and the suitable methodology to investigate it were intensively discussed at the Santa Fe conference, there is little evidence in the papers contained in the Johnson volume of more than token consideration of these topics—this despite the explicit avowal of the editor that "we have to conceptualize ideology properly" (p. v). While one can sympathize with the contributors' reluctance to become bogged down in attempts to arrive at an adequate philosophical definition of ideology, one can surely be excused for being skeptical about conclusions concerning the "interaction of ideology and politics" in the absence of sufficient evidence that both concepts have been adequately comprehended.

True, some of the essayists in *Ideology and Politics* do attempt brief definitions of ideology preliminary to developing their topics, but in most cases it is not clear that these definitions have any significant impact on what follows. Only in the case of the joint article by Sullivan and Solomon does the preliminary definition of ideology appear to exert a sustained influence throughout, and Solomon's separate individual contribution on "The Evolving Functions of Ideology in the Revolutionary Process" seems to presuppose a similar understanding of ideology. (It may be noted in passing that, in general, the contributors manifest slight acquaintance with the vast body of literature on ideology in European languages.[3])

One might profitably compare *Ideology and Politics* with David Joravsky's very different treatment of what he aptly terms "the intractable problem of ideology." In *The Lysenko Affair,* Joravsky at the outset poses two questions about ideology: How can ideology be distinguished from other types of thought? And how can one be precise and factual in analyzing ideological influences in Soviet history?[4] First, he carefully analyzes the general concept of ideological beliefs and arrives at a useful distinction between "grand ideology" and "petty ideology." Then he looks specifically at Soviet ideological beliefs and explains what methodology he considers most appropriate to the assessment of the influence of these beliefs on the course of Soviet history. While the present reviewer prefers the analysis of ideology that will be outlined later, Joravsky's general approach to the problem seems clearly preferable to that found in *Ideology and Politics.*

Wakeman's *History and Will* does posit a certain basic meaning for "ideology" and "ideological influences." Essentially, he seems

[3] *E.g.,* Hans Barth, *Wahrheit und Ideologie* (Truth and Ideology), Zurich, Manesseverlag, 1945; Carl August Emge, *Das Wesen der Ideologie* (The Essence of Ideology), Mainz, Verlag der Akademie Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Wiesbaden, 1961; Theodor J. Geiger, *Ideologie und Wahrheit: eine Soziologische Kritik des Denkens* (Ideology and Truth: A Sociological Critique of Thought), Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1968. French scholars have also written extensively on ideology as well, among them Louis Althusser, whose theory of ideology was discussed by Maurice Cranston in *Problems of Communism,* March 1973, pp. 53-60. The journal *Studies in Soviet Thought* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands; Boston) keeps the Western world abreast of the prolific writings of both Soviet and East European scholars on the subject of ideology.

[4] Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 1-17.

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to understand ideology as "that theory which informs conscious revolutionary activity" (pp. x-xi). However, he often uses the term "ideology" in a rather vague and ambiguous way, and in general his terminology is somewhat less than precise, occasionally verging on the rhetorical. In Wakeman's view, ideology derives from a whole structure of assumptions, mainly philosophical. (In the case of Mao's theory of revolution, he sees these philosophical assumptions as drawn from both Chinese and Western thought.) Thus, he implies that ideology springs from philosophy, yet he seems to see it as something distinct from the philosophy from which it is derived. In one place, he comes close to intimating that it is "political philosophy" (p. 64); in another, he comments that one wing of Neo-Kantianism inclined toward the pluralism of Weberian sociology, "replacing ideology with the ideal type" (p. 194). One could cite other passages that convey equally vague impressions of how Wakeman understands "ideology." Nevertheless, unlike the authors of *Ideology and Politics*, he does seem to have some familiarity with the literature on the concept of ideology. One only wishes that he had put his erudition to more effective use in the interests of clarity.

PERHAPS ONE WAY to introduce greater clarity and precision into discussions of ideology lies in the application of modern logic. One significant attempt to do this has been made by Joseph Bochenski, who has proposed a systematic logic of Communist ideology.[5] For all but those trained in logic, Bochenski's work is somewhat overly technical, but his analysis of the various components of ideological discourse offers some precise and practical definitions of terms that are commonly but confusedly employed in connection with ideology.

To be sure, not all scholars will agree with the meanings he gives to "ideology," *"Weltanschauung,"* and "philosophy."[6] Though they sometimes are used interchangeably, the history of these terms alone attests that they are not synonymous.[7] Even more than the historical approach, however, logical analysis seems to offer the best means of achieving greater precision in defining ideology and of finding answers to relevant questions that arise in reference to it, such as: What are ideological, philosophical, and scientific sentences? How are these sentences logically connected with one another? And, in respect to politics, are practical political decisions logically derivable from these sentences?

Basic to this logical approach is the presupposition that there is a distinctive language or discourse which characterizes social groups such as Communist societies—a presupposition which seems to be justified by experience. This distinctive language or discourse is not concerned just with ideas or concepts but also refers to objective structures, and it is held to comprise a complex class of sentences which are accepted as true by the group as a whole. The all-inclusive class is divided into four subclasses, each subclass differentiated from the others according to the reason for which its sentences are accepted as true.

The whole discourse is termed Communist Total Discourse or CTD, and the subclasses are *Weltanschauung* (WE), political ideology (PO), philosophy (PH), and science (SC). A particular CTD sentence falls in the WE category when it pertains to one's world-view, in PO only when it expresses something enjoined by the party, in PH when it derives from philosophical insight, and in SC when it is substantiated by scientific evidence. (The process of discriminating among the various subclasses, it should be noted, is by no means automatic, and it is occasionally quite difficult to determine to which subclass a given sentence belongs.) Subclasses WE and PO are deemed ideological, whereas subclasses PH and SC are not. It is important to observe that those deemed ideological comprise statements that are accepted uncritically, without assent based on rational insight or verifiable evidence, the reasons for assent in these cases being reducible to reasons of authority.

It is probably obvious to the reader that the foregoing analysis would hold true *mutatis mutandis*

[5] "Toward a Systematic Logic of Communist Ideology," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, September 1964, pp. 185-205. The substance of this presentation is drawn from this article.

[6] See, for example, Jakob Barion, *Ideologie, Wissenschaft, Philosophie* (Ideology, Science, Philosophy), Bonn, Bouvier, 1966. The differences in meaning between these various terms have been discussed on a more popular level in some of Maurice Cranston's writings, especially in "Ideologies, Past and Present," *Survey*, (London) No. 70/71, Winter/Spring 1969, pp. 10-11. Many other authors, including Franz Schurmann in his *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, distinguish between *Weltanschauung* and ideology. Schurmann applies his distinctions to the Chinese scene in his first chapter, pp. 16-104.

[7] Literature on the history of the concept of ideology is voluminous. Two easily accessible and readable short accounts are Joseph S. Roucek, "A History of the Concept of Ideology," *Journal of the History of Ideas* (Ephrata and Philadelphia, Pa.; New York), Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 479-88, and Keith Bruce Miller, *Ideology and Moral Philosophy*, New York, Humanities Press, 1971, pp. 21-36.

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for any total ideological discourse of comparable development.[8] While it was primarily designed for application to Soviet Communist Total Discourse, the analysis would seem to be adaptable to the Chinese Communist one as well. At the very least, such an analysis would enable one to make useful distinctions and to use terms in clear and consistent fashion. The logical relationships among the various types of sentences within CTD merit more detailed treatment than is possible here, but perhaps, a brief explanation of one of the more obvious logical relationships—*i.e.* that of consistency—may be helpful.

As a viable language system comprising four subclasses of sentences, CTD must be internally consistent or noncontradictory. That is to say, one of the logical relationships that must exist among the many sentences is mutual consistency. One sentence cannot contradict the others, and when an apparent contradiction arises, its source must be discovered and analyzed. The most common way to overcome such contradictions is to redefine or reformulate an offending sentence so that its meaning becomes compatible with the others. Both of the volumes under review include accounts of discussions leading to reformulations or redefinitions intended to reestablish internal ideological consistency.

What is the influence of ideology on practical political decisions? It has been suggested above that the application of modern logic to ideology can facilitate the formulation of an answer to this question, and perhaps some general observations may be offered to indicate possible lines of inquiry. To begin with, it must be noted that what is required here is strict logical derivability and not some vague, tenuous sequence. The question may be restated thus: Can sentences expressing practical political decisions be derived from CTD in a strict logical way? The answer must take into account the enormously complicated logic of the process of decision-making, which, in the final analysis, terminates in an exercise of informed free choice. Political decisions are concerned with the selection of *these* means to attain *this* political end; that is to say, they are about specific courses of action. The most likely sentences from which specific policy decisions might be derived are sentences falling in the PO subclass—*i.e.* those accepted solely because the party enjoins them. In reality, however, political decisions, like ethical decisions, involve many circumstances and considerations of a factual nature that are expressed in sentences not belonging to CTD. They are outside the discourse, yet are necessary elements in the process of arriving at a policy decision.

It would seem, then, that practical policy decisions are not logically derivable wholly within the system of CTD. Nevertheless, this observation itself may be of some value when the interaction between ideology and politics is under discussion. If nothing else, it may encourage students to be more hesitant in affirming that ideology alone determined a particular course of political action, and to look for other factors that may have influenced the decision in question.[9]

The foregoing are some brief and inadequate indications of how modern logic might profitably be applied to problems involving the nature and influence of ideology. Such a project, indeed, demands the specialized knowledge of competent logicians and philosophers; however, in view of the proven efficacy of applied logic in the fields of the natural sciences, there is no reason to believe that it cannot also be useful in the realms of the social sciences and humanities which deal with the "intractable problem of ideology."

TO RETURN MORE directly to the books under review, there is one further topic that merits some observations, and that is the matter of the impact of Western ideas on Chinese modes of thinking. While this subject is touched upon by some of the contributors to *Ideology and Politics,* it is only Wakeman who attempts an in-depth comparison of Chinese and Western philosophical thought, and the following comments relate specifically to his analysis.

Setting himself the task of demonstrating how Western ideas became Sinicized, Wakeman rejects as "fatuous" simple contrasts between Eastern and Western thought, and he considers sweeping generalizations attributing

[8] An interesting example of the application of Bochenski's logic to another discourse—namely, that of religion—is found in his *The Logic of Religion,* New York, New York University Press, 1965. In this work, the ramifications of the basic ideas presented here are explicated. Anyone wishing further information should consult this book and Bochenski's article cited above.

[9] Chalmers Johnson himself, in his introduction to *Ideology and Politics* (p. v), observes that scholars have sometimes given simplistic treatment to the influence of ideology on Communist societies. In particular, too little consideration has been given to the validity of the assumptions underlying analyses of the "interplay" of ideology and politics. One of the inherent difficulties in defining the influence of ideology resides in the indeterminateness of ideological statements themselves—a characteristic which has been described as "systematic ambiguity."

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"timeless and historically meaningless characteristics to particular cultures" equally useless. His concept of comparative philosophy thus seems to be somewhat more exclusive than that of the late Charles A. Moore, who edited the well-known study, *The Chinese Mind.*[10] Moore and others engaged in the study of comparative philosophy hold that the identification of general characteristics of the thought of a given culture, while perhaps risky and requiring qualification, does have some merit. Commonly enough, scholars have compared philosophers of different cultures and different times who appear to have some ideas in common—for example, the Indian dialectician, Nagarjuna, and Hegel—and these comparisons have not been fatuous.[11]

Wakeman himself does this sort of thing, as for example when he reflects on the affinities between the 16th-century Chinese thinker Wang Chi and the European existentialists. For the most part, however, he attempts to describe how Western concepts *changed* as they were adopted by Chinese thinkers like Mao. For instance, his lengthy exposition of Kant's thought is designed to show "just how adamantine are the categories behind Western Marxism, whereas Maoism employs the identical integers with more resilience and flexibility because of a different intellectual context" (p. xii). In view of this contrast, Wakeman maintains that Mao's dialectic is "not truly Marxian" (pp. xii; 236-37).

However, the path of the comparative philosopher holds many pitfalls, and Wakeman himself has not eluded all of them.[12] Despite his avowed aversion for generalizations, the volume is replete with them.

Moreover, the critical reader would be much more receptive to these flowing universalizations if he were convinced that Wakeman had the relevant literature in complete control. But there are indications that Wakeman, in spite of his ambition to "present a logically coherent exposition of the philosophical foundations of Sino-Western thought" (p. xii), has not achieved thorough mastery of Chinese and Western philosophy. For one thing, the indicated sources for his treatment of the European philosophers are not the most authoritative ones. For another, he does not seem to have been selective enough in synthesizing the vast amount of research materials gathered. While his principle of selection is clear enough, he does not seem to have followed it consistently in determining the relevance of various inclusions. There is an unnecessary proliferation of names and a dubious introduction of tangential issues, both of which mar an otherwise creditable work.

Finally, Wakeman deals rather inconclusively with the important question of whether Mao's theory of the Cultural Revolution was drawn from Chinese and Western non-Marxist sources (as well as Marxist sources) or from Marxist influences alone. While he clearly tends toward the former view, he hedges his conclusions with mild reservations and admits that others might conclude differently. Thus, after a lengthy exposition of the thought of T. H. Green, he says: "However similar this is to Maoism, I cannot with certainty say just how much of Green's philosophy was absorbed by Mao during his student days in Ch'angsha" (p. 293). He typically ends his treatment of Kant and Wang Yang-ming in a similar vein. His inconclusive attitude is summed up in the following:

To be sure, those who regard Marxism-Leninism as an imported revelation in its own right would dismiss these other factors and probably declare the elements in Maoism which reflected Green or Wang Fu-chi's influence to have existed in Marx to begin with. Are we overexplicating, overstraining those hazy early influences for ideas which Mao Tse-tung could just as well have gotten from, say, Engels? Was Green's notion of the will so unique? (p. 293)

Has Wakeman, then, succeeded in transcending the analyses of Schram, Ch'en, Meissner, and Schwartz, whose research and thought left him dissatisfied? To borrow the language of methodology, what Wakeman presents us with is a historical study whose *explanandum* is Mao's theory of revolution and whose *explanans* is an account of Mao's philosophical development. In characterizing the various chapters of his book, the author employs such metaphors as "montage," "image," and "reflections as in a hall of mirrors." The individual chapters, or essays, instead of being written to follow from one another in logical sequence, are intended only to pre-

[10] Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1967.

[11] *E.g.*, P. T. Raju, in his *Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*, Carbondale, Ill., Southern Illinois University Press, 1962, makes some worthwhile comparisons of Western, Indian, and Chinese philosophical traditions.

[12] For example, in a footnote on page 268, referring to the controversy among the Thomists, Scotists, and Suarezians on the nature of the distinction between *esse* (existence) and *essentia* (essence), Wakeman totally misconstrues the meaning of these terms in scholasticism.

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sent arguments ("images," "reflections") on the same theme. Wakeman is confident, however, that the reader himself will bring these arguments together in a final act of synthesis, which presumably would provide the complete historical explanation. But does it really? The arguments offered in many of Wakeman's individual essays do not go beyond mere plausibility—at best, they offer what Plato called "likely reasons."

In sum, if Wakeman found the analyses of other scholars lacking in terms of a definitive explanation, his own work remains open to a similar judgment. Nevertheless, he has made a permanent and valuable contribution to our understanding of Mao's intellectual development through extensive research in areas not so thoroughly worked. He has pointed the way for fruitful studies by others through his brilliant and courageous attempt to explain the perhaps unexplainable. Even one who is skeptical about his presuppositions and objects to his methodology can profit considerably from his book.

As for *Ideology and Politics*, despite the fact that it is the work of many hands, it achieves a certain coherence-amid-variety on a rather high level. In the opinion of this reviewer, the essays of Israel and Schwartz are the most satisfying, though he has learned much from the other contributors as well. Perhaps the source materials could have been expanded to include more publications of Japanese and European scholars. The ambitions of this volume are considerably more circumscribed than those of Wakeman's study and have probably been more fully realized.

Indonesia's "Gestapu Affair"

By Guy J. Pauker

REX MORTIMER: *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno—Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965.* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1974.
FRANÇOISE CAYRAC-BLANCHARD: *Le Parti Communiste Indonésien.* Paris, Armand Colin, 1973.
RAHADI S. KARNI, Ed.: *The Devious Dalang, Sukarno and the So-called Untung-putsch—Eye-witness Report by Bambang S. Widjanarko.* The Hague, Interdoc Publishing House, 1974.

ABOUT TEN YEARS have passed since the gruesome sequence of events which started with the kidnaping and assassination of six prominent Indonesian Army generals on the night of September 30/October 1, 1965. In direct and immediate reaction to those killings, the Indonesian Army captured and executed the top hierarchy and senior cadres of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), at that time one of the most powerful Communist parties outside the Communist orbit. Then, taking advantage of this breakdown of legal process, civilian anti-Communist groups proceeded to kill large numbers of people, especially in the countryside, who were believed to be associated in some fashion with the PKI or its mass organizations. According to conservative estimates, not less than 150,000 persons, including whole families in some instances, lost their lives in the course of these acts of violence, which continued into the late spring of 1966. Tens of thousands of Communists were detained without trial for various lengths of time, and several thousand still remain under arrest, without hope of either early trial or release.

In the aftermath of these events, Sukarno, who had dominated the Indonesian nationalist movement for almost four decades and had been proclaimed president for life, lost effective power in 1966 and was formally deposed in March 1968. He died in disgrace in June 1970 without any public disclosure by the Indonesian authorities of the role he had played in what is still referred

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to in Indonesia as the "Gestapu Affair" (from the acronym for "September 30 Movement" in Indonesian). Meanwhile, General Suharto, whose decisive action on October 1, 1965, had foiled the intricate political plot of which the assassination of the six generals was to be the first step, had become Indonesia's second president and had radically changed both the country's domestic policies and its foreign orientation. Internally, the PKI was outlawed, and "Indonesian socialism" was abandoned in favor of an economic policy relying on free market forces. Externally, the "Jakarta-Peking Axis," proclaimed by Sukarno in August 1965, was scrapped, and diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China were suspended.

Events of such major historical impact and fraught with so much human tragedy were bound to generate intense emotions and produce sharply divergent interpretations among specialists on Indonesia. Earlier generations of scholars, who shared the optimistic beliefs of the age of reason, could expect historical and political analysis to be objective and value-free. Nowadays such views are dismissed as naive, and it is taken for granted that everybody has biases when dealing with human affairs. Nevertheless, one still judges the intellectual caliber and even the moral probity of a scholar by the efforts he makes to build a compelling case for his point of view and by the respect he shows for the alternative explanations that he seeks to invalidate. In the case of the Gestapu Affair, there are many reasons for approaching the evidence offered by all parties with considerable skepticism. Some of the military and PKI figures involved in those events disappeared without any official explanations for their disappearance; others were tried in open court by Special Military Tribunals. Transcripts of some of the investigation and trial proceedings have either been published or circulated in typescript, while others have never been released. Some of those convicted and sentenced to death have been executed; others are still alive.

In these circumstances, any serious student of the Gestapu Affair would necessarily have to devote considerable time and effort to determining how valid the available documentation is. There is obviously a wide gap between, say, the scrupulously fair proceedings conducted by US District Judge John J. Sirica in the recent Watergate Affair and the action of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court in accepting the patently fake evidence presented by the notorious prosecutor A. Y. Vyshinsky in the 1930's purge trials of the Old Bolsheviks. How close to either end of this continuum the Indonesian investigators and judges came in their proceedings to establish the truth in the Gestapu Affair is not a question which can be answered lightly on the basis of the evidence that has so far become available.

THIS MAKES IT all the more distressing that a book like Rex Mortimer's *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno* shows so little concern for accepted standards of scholarship. Apparently written originally as a dissertation for a Ph.D. degree in Political Science from Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, the book was published last year by Cornell University Press. The dust jacket informs us that the author, now Professor of Political Science at the University of Papua and New Guinea, had previously been a practicing lawyer for 17 years. These are clearly impressive credentials for a student of Indonesian affairs undertaking, eight years after the event, to cast some additional light on the Gestapu Affair.

Unfortunately, this is not what Mortimer has done. At the end of a lengthy discussion of the relationship between the overt ideology of the PKI and its political activities in the years between the abolition of parliamentary democracy by Sukarno in 1959 and the fateful events of 1965, the author devotes a few pages of his main study and two relatively short appendices to the Gestapu Affair —not to set forth new perspectives or interpretations but to reinforce a bizarre thesis propounded as early as January 1966 by a group of Indonesia specialists associated with the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell University. At Monash University, Rex Mortimer was a student of Herbert Feith, who in turn had been a student of George McT. Kahin at Cornell University. In his Preface, Mortimer expresses his gratitude to these two well-known specialists on Indonesia, as well as to two other members of the Cornell group, Benedict R. O'G. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, whose interpretation of the Gestapu Affair advanced in 1966 created a sensation in American academic circles and a furor in Jakarta.

The original paper by Anderson and McVey, dated January 10, 1966, and entitled "A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia," was marked *Strictly Confidential* and circulated privately to a small number of academics and journalists in

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various parts of the world. A prefatory note to the 162 pages of text read:

This copy is . . . for your eyes only. The material in it is common property, feel free to use it as you wish in publication, but please do not refer in any way to this document.

This invitation resulted in the publication of a number of articles in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, France, and the Netherlands—all of them seeming to arrive independently at the same conclusion — namely, that the Gestapu Affair had had its genesis within the Indonesian Army and not, as the Suharto regime claimed, in a plot masterminded and directed by the PKI. Only after the Anderson-McVey paper became known outside the small circle to which it had been initially distributed did it become evident that the other articles, all written by persons with close ties to the Cornell group, were derivative, though without attribution.

What made the thesis of the Anderson-McVey paper suspect was not only its bizarre logic but also the fact that the paper had been written before any results of the investigations conducted by the Indonesian authorities became available for critical scrutiny. Even more intriguing was the fact that the conclusions set forth in the "Cornell Paper," as it became known in Indonesia, fully supported the statement issued by the Political Bureau of the PKI Central Committee on October 5, 1965, when it was clear that the coup had failed. This statement claimed that the killing of the generals had been "an internal problem of the Army."

Since January 1966, the PKI underground itself, in statements released not only in Indonesia, where the possibility of fabrication could not be excluded, but also in the People's Republic of China and in Albania, has admitted that the late Chairman of the PKI, D.N. Aidit, was responsible for the events which led to the destruction of the party. Aidit's policies were also criticized in open court by Sudisman, an important member of the PKI Politburo, whose dignified and courageous conduct before the military judges at his trial in 1967 impressed all observers. His admissions of PKI mistakes were consistent with his statements from the underground before capture and did not sound like a forced confession. Yet this evidence is glossed over by Mortimer. In the three pages of his main text devoted to the Gestapu Affair, he writes:

The conclusion arrived at, on the basis of the available facts, is that the official Indonesian case is suspect and that the genesis of the September 30 Movement is to be sought in the activities of a group of dissident officers of the Diponegoro Division from Central Java. If there was any degree of PKI involvement, a matter about which there is suggestive but far from conclusive evidence, then it was very limited and probably peripheral to the main conspiracy. This view of the event, based on an analysis of the trial materials that have been released by the Indonesian government and other facts brought to light by independent researchers, is admittedly tentative and does not explain all aspects of the affair. It accords best, however, with the implications to be derived from the ideology and strategy of the PKI as delineated in this study. (p. 392)

Mortimer's interpretation of the PKI's ideology and strategy flatly maintains that the party, under Aidit, relied exclusively and without reservation on the pursuit of power by peaceful means. He does not even consider the possibility that the PKI leaders, for strong tactical reasons, may have consciously refrained from admitting publicly that under certain circumstances the party might resort to force. Indeed, his interpretation is hardly flattering to a group of dedicated Marxist-Leninist leaders who had the ability to transform the PKI from a small, despised political group with less than 8,000 members in 1951 into the largest Communist party outside the Communist orbit 15 years later. No professional Marxist revolutionary could conceivably be wedded irrevocably to the concept that force—long regarded by orthodox Marxists as "the midwife of any old society pregnant with a new one"—should not be used under any circumstances. If Aidit pursued the peaceful road, could he not have done so for tactical reasons? If he had secret plans for the use of force under appropriate "objective conditions," would this not have confirmed his standing as a true Marxist revolutionary? And if his plans failed, might not the failure have been due to errors of judgment, either in appraising the objective situation or in the preparations for a coup? None of these possibilities is even discussed by Mortimer. In fact, he explicitly states that the "constant theme" of his book is "that the PKI sought a peaceful road to power in Indonesia and that this was an aim from which the Aidit leadership never deviated" (p. 393). Despite 17 years of legal practice, he makes no effort to marshal evidence from the trials

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in support of his thesis, or alternatively to present a convincing case that the evidence of PKI involvement in the Gestapu Affair was trumped up. Instead, he excuses his failure to do so with the following statement:

The trials have not been subjected to systematic analysis, in part because of the amount of evidence involved, the time spread over which the trials have been held, and the difficulty of obtaining access to all trial records. (Some of the evidence has been taken in secret, and other trial testimony had not been released as of 1973.) (p. 421)

However, even after admitting that he did not study the trial records, Mortimer goes on to cast doubt on the testimony of one of the key defendants in the Gestapu Affair trials. The Indonesian government claimed that this defendant, Sjam, was the head of a secret Special Bureau of the PKI through which Aidit maintained liaison with covert Communist supporters in the Indonesian Armed Forces, and that the assassination of the generals was carried out by military personnel under instructions received through the Special Bureau, as part of a broader plot aimed at paving the way for the PKI's accession to power in the event of Sukarno's death. Mortimer, however, without offering any evidence whatsoever in corroboration, makes the extraordinary statement that "the possibility that Sjam was acting as a *provocateur* cannot be discounted" (p. 439). This reviewer personally attended Sjam's trial in Bandung in February 1968, and although not entirely convinced that the trial was not stage-managed, he felt that Sjam conveyed an impression of sincerity and that his admissions concerning his role as head of the Special Bureau were not such as to strain the credulity of a critical observer. While this may not be sufficient reason to accept Sjam's testimony as a historical fact, a trained lawyer and political scientist is hardly justified in casually suggesting that Sjam may have been a government *agent provocateur,* without making the slightest effort to construct a case in support of that hypothesis.

Equally unjustifiable, in the reviewer's opinion, is Mortimer's final remark (p. 441) that General Suharto "may have played a more devious part in the affair than has been generally recognized." Here again, he offers no supporting evidence other than a reference to the views of a Dutch professor, W. F. Wertheim, an ardent and vocal political enemy of the Suharto regime, who—in Mortimer's words—"strongly suggests that the coup episode was a provocation involving Suharto [and] aimed at liquidating both the army command and the PKI." It is regrettable that such unscholarly political pamphleteering should find its way between hard covers bearing the name of a well-known university press.

IN HER 1973 study, *Le Parti Communiste Indonésien,* written under the auspices of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris, Françoise Cayrac-Blanchard treats the Gestapu Affair much more cautiously and with greater regard for the available evidence. Although she accepts in part the pro-PKI interpretation of those events, she tries to maintain a balanced point of view and to treat the evidence critically. Regarding that evidence, she writes:

One has to use the declarations obtained by the Special Military Tribunal with serious reservations, but they contain many elements which cannot be completely neglected. (p. 151, reviewer's translation)

Unlike Mortimer, Mme. Cayrac-Blanchard, relying on Sudisman's trial statements, accepts the thesis that the leaders of the PKI—though not the party as such—were involved in the assassination plot. She also considers it plausible that "the leaders of the PKI may have hidden the truth in order to safeguard the future of the party."

At the same time, however, she fails to consider the possibility—which, in the reviewer's opinion, is cardinal to a full understanding of the affair—that the leaders of the PKI may have refrained from mobilizing their cadres and preparing for outright armed rebellion simply because the purpose of the plot was not to seize power by force from Sukarno, but only to eliminate the small group of anti-Communist generals who could be expected to block the PKI's "peaceful" road to power as Sukarno's successors, and to replace those Army leaders with officers favorable to the PKI. Such a scheme had to be staged as if it were "an internal Army affair," and mobilizing the PKI cadres would have been contrary to the logic of the plot. As to the more exotic interpretations, such as the Wertheim thesis that General Suharto may have played a central role in staging the Gestapu Affair, Mme. Cayrac-Blanchard takes note of the various theses and wisely concludes that the bits of circumstantial evidence involved "can be regarded as pure coincidences" (p. 156).

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FROM WHAT HAS been published so far on the Gestapu Affair, it is clear that we are still a long way from knowing what really happened. Hence, the publication in the Netherlands—in Indonesian and in English translation—of the interrogations of Indonesian Marine Colonel Bambang Widjanarko, under the curious title *The Devious Dalang, Sukarno and the So-called Untung-putsch,* provides a welcome addition to the available evidence, even though the origin and authenticity of the reports cannot be critically appraised. Colonel Widjanarko served as an adjutant to President Sukarno from December 1960 to July 1967, when he was reassigned to the Marine Corps. The published interrogation reports establish the curious fact that he was not questioned by the Central Investigation Team of the Indonesian government until five years after the Gestapu Affair and four months after Sukarno's death. Nor were the interrogation reports ever officialy released by the Indonesian authorities; they were privately obtained by a Dutch journalist, Antonie C. A. Dake, in the course of his research for a doctoral dissertation in Political Science for the Free University of Berlin.[1]

The Widjanarko testimony implicates Sukarno much more deeply in the assassination of the six generals than any previously available documentary material. But in the absence of any explanation of why Colonel Widjanarko was only interrogated in October 1970, the full value of this potentially important document cannot be established. All things considered, the field still remains wide open for a serious effort to reconstruct the Gestapu Affair in keeping with scholarly historiographic standards.

[1] Antonie C. A. Dake, *In the Spirit of the Red Banteng, Indonesian Communists Between Moscow and Peking,* The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1973, pp. 479. For a review of this book, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Asian Communism in the Crucible," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1975, pp. 55-58.

The Outlook for Eastern Europe

By Samuel L. Sharp

LOUIS J. MENSONIDES and JAMES A. KUHLMAN, Eds: *The Future of Inter-bloc Relations in Europe.* New York, Praeger, *1974.*
ROBERT R. KING and ROBERT W. DEAN, Eds.: *East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation.* New York, Praeger, 1974.

AS THESE LINES are being written, the reviewer has the advantage of knowing, as the contributors to the two books under consideration here did not, that a spectacular gathering of 35 heads of states and governments took place in Helsinki in July 1975. These dignitaries met to affix their signatures to a series of laboriously negotiated documents, including one of fairly prodigious length that contains a codification of principles which are supposed to govern relations among the nation-states of Europe (minus, of course, unsplendidly isolated Albania) and others with an acknowledged interest in the peace and security of the continent. Yielding to the terminology employed during the negotiations, one can say that the eggs in all three baskets have finally been hatched in something of a record for protracted incubation, as the first suggestion of a conference on European security was made by V. M. Molotov back in February 1954 at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers. In the opinion of some, to be sure, such imagery may tend to mislead, for reference to the hatching of eggs implies the birth of something new, whereas what appears to have occurred is the formal issuance and acceptance of a long-delayed birth certificate for the situation in Europe produced by

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the outcome of World War II. Yet, whether one shares this view or puts a broader and more cheerful interpretation on the event, one still deals with an accomplished fact.

For this reason, one must pay tribute to the bravery of the collective authors of these volumes, who undertook to speculate about the future of all or part of Europe when there was no certainty that the Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CSCE) would be held and, if it materialized, what its exact format would be. Nonetheless, a careful look at the character of the conference suggests that their efforts have not suffered appreciably from their temerity.

It is clear from the long history of the idea of such a conference that the event was the outgrowth of Soviet initiative. The notion of convening it was pursued over the years through multiple channels: direct overtures by Soviet officials and diplomats; moves credited to the diplomacy of UN members acting, to say the least, in close association with Soviet diplomacy (as, for instance, the proposal linked with the name of Poland's former Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki); resolutions and communiqués of the political arm of the Warsaw Pact organization; and, finally, statements and appeals by gatherings of Communist parties, either of a regional or an all-European nature.

Up to a certain point, moreover, the Soviet Union and its allies assiduously repeated, with varying degrees of intensity, two themes: the evil of the American "imperialist" presence in Europe and the menace of "Bonn revanchism." The first of these obviously played upon the sense of pride and independence of West Europeans; hence, it looked like an attempt to capitalize on occasional manifestations of seeming disarray in the political-military arrangements within NATO. The second, in keeping alive East European recollections of the "German menace," was presumably designed to maintain solidarity between Moscow and the East European states.

But there is a serious question about how accurately these themes reflected Soviet motivations and expectations with regard to the conference. One cannot, to be sure, eliminate all elements of uncertainty as to why any decision in the field of international relations was taken; however, one can distinguish between motivations that would have made tentative sense according to reasonable criteria at the time the decision was reached (even if the efforts launched as a result of that decision subsequently went sour) and those that would have made no sense at any time. In this context, it is difficult to accept the notion that Soviet officials and their East European allies at any juncture considered that it would be possible to use the conference to bar the United States from participation in the defense arrangements of Western Europe. By the same token, it is hard to believe, despite numerous Soviet hints to the contrary, that Moscow ever had any thoughts of scrapping the formal structure of the Warsaw Pact organization in return for the dissolution of NATO, and of relying on a rather vague all-European security mechanism. Allowance must be made for the technique of what might be called the "pseudo-concession": starting initially from an absurdly outrageous or unrealistic position and slowly moving toward ultimate acceptance of a compromise envisaged from the outset as the limit of the feasible. This technique permits the actor to preserve a reputation for reasonableness, while also satisfying ideologically conditioned expectations like those that derive from Marxist *machismo*.

The course of events leading up to the CSCE lends credence to such a line of argument. For example, the USSR agreed to American participation in the conference, and it recognized that no progress could be achieved toward convening the conference until Moscow had negotiated specific arrangements for relations with West Germany and had spelled out the conditions of access to Berlin.

Perhaps more important, however, the final arrangements for the solemn event in Helsinki did not in actuality provide any party with a one-sided advantage. Some analysts may still maintain that the tenor of certain of the documents signed in Helsinki confers "undeserved" legitimacy on the status quo in Eastern Europe (which mirrors the outcome of World War II as modified by events *within* the area, not by outside challenges). All that can be said about this view is that it mistakes certification for creation. To the observer not tied emotionally to a deserving but not very hopeful cause, the CSCE appears to reflect a roughly balanced need for positive results.

At the same time, it is quite apparent that these results do not constitute a major alteration of circumstances in Europe. They might be likened to the international treaties banning nuclear weapons from outer space and the bottom of the sea, for while they represent worthwhile steps toward reducing conflict and potential

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confrontation, their impact on the future of East-West relations in Europe and on intrabloc relations in Eastern Europe is bound to be limited.

THUS, THE TWO volumes before us retain their essential relevance. The first addresses itself to the future (or alternate futures) of relations between the two major politico-military blocs in Europe. In the final chapter, Walter L. Barrows assesses possible models for the future—including a Sovietized Europe, a "Finlandized" Europe, a fragmented Europe, an *Europe des états,* an "Atlantic" Europe, a partnership Europe, and an independent and federalized Europe—in terms of American and Soviet preferences. He concludes that an "Independent Federal Europe" (apparently meaning a federalized *Western* Europe), especially one with an autonomous nuclear capability, would be "welcomed by neither power," and he endorses Alastair Buchan's suggestion that the USSR would no doubt prefer to continue its "limited adversary" relationship with a "conservative United States," provided the latter were content "not to stir up trouble in Eastern Europe," rather than to deal with a new, unpredictable power in Western Europe.

This view, incidentally, permits one to interpret some past moves of Soviet diplomacy as clumsy, not to say perverse, efforts to obtain American consent to a partnership arrangement based on the common interest of the superpowers in resisting unsettling shifts in the global balance potentially undesirable from the "conservative" perspective of both. It should be made clear, however, that such an interpretation is only mentioned, not necessarily accepted, by a number of the contributors to the volume.

The general conclusion that emerges from the volume is that the continued operation of balance-of-power factors and shifting military alignments in the conduct of international relations would mean "a precarious existence at best" for both parts of Europe. While this appears to be a sound guess, hopes for acceptance of a code of conduct "less preoccupied with the military-security implications of international interaction" can hardly be said to mirror tendencies actually visible on the horizon.

As a final note, it is worth pointing out that at least some of the contributors display commendable modesty and hesitancy about their conclusions even though they employ techniques of investigation relying heavily on the help of computers. For example, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., whose inquiry produces the not unreasonable finding that no major modification is to be expected in interbloc relations in Europe, suggests that "we should be hesitant about accepting as definitive the findings of this or any research effort." That it is necessary, however, for him to clothe this conclusion in language such as "the system's basic behavioral profile exhibits such invariance as to render extremely improbable the emergence of a new interbloc system clearly distinguishable from the past" strikes the reviewer as somewhat pretentious.

THE VOLUME edited by Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean examines the possibilities of evolution within the eastern part of the European continent. It discusses thoroughly the impact of détente in general and of European security arrangements in particular on the area.

While the editors and contributors to the book offer their opinions in a private capacity, they are all connected with Radio Free Europe, and in view of accusations heaped on that organization by Communists sources in the past, there is a certain piquancy in the neo-realistic spirit that pervades the book. For instance, the introductory chapter of the study observes:

Western policy has now turned away from the assumption that an evident, if inchoate, East European desire for greater independence from Moscow was capable of acceleration and exploitation.

Elsewhere, it is remarked:

The West recognizes that the road to a new modus vivendi *with the states of Eastern Europe runs of necessity through Moscow.*

The neo-realistic spirit is especially manifest in the discussion of the possibilities for an alteration of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. The judgment is advanced that since "Soviet determination to maintain hegemony undiluted and unchallenged" remains a constant, the pressures that détente has released for greater tolerance of diversity in Eastern Europe are bound to have strict limits. In fact, there will probably be increased efforts in certain areas, such as ideology and economic coordination, to tighten control (a prediction since borne out by developments in a number of East European countries). Thus, while arrangements designed (from the Western perspective at least) to promote greater move-

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ment across more permeable borders have introduced a measure of dynamic fluidity and ambiguity into the situation, the political fate of Eastern Europe will continue to be governed by Soviet determination to maintain a regional *pax Sovietica*. (The editors, it should be noted, display a rather puzzling male chauvinism in speaking of a *pax Sovieticus!*) For this reason, the authors draw an apparent distinction between "mere" and "real" détente, expecting the latter to result only from "evolution of the Soviet system," a long-term proposition in their eyes.

It may be appropriate to underscore from a post-CSCE perspective that although détente and the CSCE have opened up a period of "adaptation" in European relations, the Soviet leadership probably will deliberately attempt to restrict their impact on the internal evolution of the USSR and the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, though elimination of the "German menace" has reduced the tenability of Moscow's claims to constitute the ultimate guarantor of East European security, the Soviet Union is likely to remain the "arbiter of the terms and modes of peaceful engagement."

Nevertheless, if, as the authors contend, "mere" détente gets at what is the "central issue" for the United States and the Soviet Union—the avoidance of a direct confrontation with each other—it may amount to quite a lot, given the implications of nuclear technology. In short, though one may be annoyed by the circumscribed parameters within which developments in Eastern Europe will probably move, any sign of movement and adjustment is more encouraging than a rigid, frozen framework of East-West confrontation.

CORRECTION

Some copies of the September-October 1975 issue of *Problems of Communism* contain an error in Figure 1, page 8, a structural diagram of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (accompanying Lawrence T. Caldwell's article, "The Warsaw Pact: Directions of Change"): In the box listing the "Joint Armed Forces" (bottom left), "East European national contingents" should have appeared as a separate item outside and above the brackets designating "Soviet forces permanently assigned to WTO."

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